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The World Drug Report 2016 comes at a decisive moment, 
just months after Member States, at a special session of the 
General Assembly, adopted a comprehensive set of opera-
tional recommendations on the world drug problem.
The session was only the third in the history of the General 
Assembly to focus on drugs, and the resulting outcome 
document, entitled “Our joint commitment to effectively 
addressing and countering the world drug problem”, pro-
vides a concrete way forward to take action on shared 
challenges.
In the outcome document, Member States reaffirmed their 
commitment to addressing persistent, new and evolving 
challenges in line with the three international drug control 
conventions, which were recognized as allowing States par-
ties sufficient flexibility to design and implement national 
drug policies consistent with the principle of common and 
shared responsibility. 
The operational recommendations contained in the out-
come document encompass measures to address demand 
and supply reduction, as well as to improve access to con-
trolled medicines while preventing their diversion; they 
cover human rights, youth, children, women and commu-
nities and highlight emerging challenges and the need to 
promote long-term, comprehensive, sustainable, develop-
ment-oriented and balanced drug control policies and pro-
grammes that include alternative development. 
The text highlights the importance of drug abuse preven-
tion and treatment; encourages the development, adoption 
and implementation of alternative or additional measures 
with regard to conviction or punishment; and promotes 
proportionate national sentencing policies, practices and 
guidelines for drug-related offences. 
Now the international community must come together to 
make good on its commitments. 
The World Drug Report 2016, which provides a compre-
hensive overview of major developments in drug markets, 
trafficking routes and the health impact of drug use, sup-
ports comprehensive, balanced and integrated rights-based 
approaches. 
This year’s report offers insight into the wide-ranging 
impact of drugs not only on the health and well-being of 
individuals, but also on the people around them — families 
and communities. This can include such harms as HIV, as 
well as the threat of violence, faced in particular by women 
and children. 
The report also flags the alarming rise in heroin use in some 
regions. While the challenges posed by new psychoactive 
substances remain a serious concern, heroin continues to 
be the drug that kills the most people. This resurgence must 
be addressed urgently. 
The report looks at issues of gender, marginalization, stig-
matization, violence and human rights, and considers how 
counter-narcotics strategies can be sensitive to environmen-
tal concerns such as deforestation and pollution. It exam-
ines the use of the “dark net” and new technologies for drug 
trafficking, as well as the potential of illicit drug profits to 
fund terrorism and violent extremism.
Moreover, the 2016 report’s thematic chapter focuses on 
the interlinkages between drugs and development and the 
importance of “development-sensitive” drug control poli-
cies. This is a topic of particular relevance: as Governments 
noted in the outcome document, “efforts to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals and to effectively address 
the world drug problem are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing”. 
The research contained in the report can support effective 
drug and development policies. The evidence is clear: illicit 
drug cultivation and manufacturing can be eradicated only 
if policies are aimed at the overall social, economic and 
environmental development of communities; confronting 
drug trafficking and its associated violence requires strong, 
transparent and fair criminal justice institutions and tar-
geted efforts to dismantle transnational organized criminal 
organizations; prevention and treatment of drug use work 
if they are based on scientific evidence and are gender-
sensitive; and the excessive use of imprisonment for drug-
related offences of a minor nature is ineffective in reducing 
recidivism and overburdens criminal justice systems. 
There is clearly much work to be done to tackle the many 
evolving and emerging challenges posed by drugs. The out-
come document and its operational recommendations offer 
a solid foundation, one built on agreed frameworks, 
informed by evidence and based on the principle of 
common and shared responsibility. 
This report, as with all of the Office’s expertise and on-the-
ground experience in addressing the many aspects of the 
world drug problem, is at the disposal of Member States 
as they strive to meet this call to action.
Yury Fedotov 
Executive Director 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
The boundaries and names shown and the designations 
used on maps do not imply official endorsement or accept-
ance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents 
approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir 
agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the 
parties. Disputed boundaries (China/India) are repre-
sented by cross-hatch owing to the difficulty of showing 
sufficient detail. 
The designations employed and the presentation of the 
material in this publication do not imply the expression 
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat 
of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities or con-
cerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Countries and areas are referred to by the names that were 
in official use at the time the relevant data were 
collected.
All references to Kosovo in the present publication should 
be understood to be in compliance with Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999).
Since there is some scientific and legal ambiguity about 
the distinctions between “drug use”, “drug misuse” and 
“drug abuse”, the neutral terms “drug use” and “drug con-
sumption” are used in the present report.
All uses of the word “drug” in this report refer to sub-
stances under the control of the international drug control 
conventions.
All analysis contained in this report is based on the official 
data submitted by Member States to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime through the annual report 
questionnaire unless indicated otherwise.
The data on population used in the present report are 
from: United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Pros-
pects: The 2015 Revision. 
References to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, unless 
otherwise stated.
References to tons are to metric tons, unless otherwise 
stated. R stands for the correlation coefficient, used as 
measure of the strength of a statistical relationship between 
two or more variables, ranging from 0 to 1 in case of a 
positive correlation or from 0 to -1 in case of a negative 
correlation;  R2  stands for the square of the coefficient of 
correlation. 
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“We reiterate our commitment to strengthen our 
efforts in addressing and countering emerging and 
persistent challenges and threats of all aspects of 
the world drug problem … and we recommend 
the following: … promote, as appropriate, the use 
and analysis of relevant, reliable and objective 
data … to improve the implementation of 
comprehensive, integrated and balanced national 
drug control strategies, policies and programmes 
… and encourage the sharing of best practices 
and lessons learned.”
Outcome document of the special session of the 
General Assembly on the world drug problem, 
entitled “Our joint commitment to effectively 
addressing and countering the world drug 
problem”
The World Drug Report 2016 is published in the wake of 
the landmark moment in global drug policy, the 
special session of the General Assembly on the world drug 
problem. Chapter I provides a global overview of the 
supply of and demand for opiates, cocaine, cannabis, 
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and new psychoactive 
substances (NPS), as well as their impact on health. It also 
reviews the scientific evidence on polydrug use, treatment 
demand for cannabis and developments since the legaliza-
tion of cannabis for recreational use in some parts of the 
world. Chapter II focuses on the mechanisms of the inter-
action between the world drug problem and all aspects of 
sustainable development through the lens of the Sustain-
able Development Goals.  
Drug use and its health consequences
It is estimated that 1 in 20 adults, or a quarter of a billion 
people between the ages of 15 and 64 years, used at least 
one drug in 2014. Roughly the equivalent of the combined 
populations of France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, though a substantial amount, it is one that does 
not seem to have grown over the past four years in propor-
tion to the global population. Nevertheless, as over 29 
million people who use drugs are estimated to suffer from 
drug use disorders, and of those, 12 million are people 
who inject drugs (PWID), of whom 14.0 per cent are 
living with HIV, the impact of drug use in terms of its 
consequences on health continues to be devastating. 
With an estimated 207,400 drug-related deaths in 2014, 
corresponding to 43.5 deaths per million people aged 
15-64, the number of drug-related deaths worldwide has 
also remained stable, although unacceptable and prevent-
able. Overdose deaths contribute to between roughly a 
third and a half of all drug-related deaths, which are attrib-
utable in most cases to opioids. The time period shortly 
after release from prison is associated with a substantially 
Prevalence of injecting drug use, 2014 or latest available year
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir 
agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between 
the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
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xincreased risk of death from drug-related causes (primarily 
as a result of drug overdoses), with a mortality rate much 
higher than from all causes among the general 
population. 
In many countries, prisons remain a high-risk environ-
ment for infectious diseases, which is a significant concern 
for prison health. A number of studies report high levels 
of drug use in prison, including the use of opiates and 
injecting drug use. In addition, the prevalence of HIV, 
hepatitis and tuberculosis among persons held in prison 
can be substantially higher than among the general popu-
lation. However, despite the high-risk environment and 
scientific evidence for effective health interventions, there 
are significant gaps in prevention and treatment services 
in many prisons around the world.
PWID experience some of the most severe health-related 
harms associated with unsafe drug use, overall poor health 
outcomes, including a high risk of non-fatal and fatal over-
doses, and a greater chance of premature death. One in 
seven PWID is living with HIV, and one in two with 
hepatitis C. PWID are a key at-risk population for HIV 
and hepatitis, with almost a third of new HIV infections 
outside sub-Saharan Africa occurring among PWID. 
Moreover, studies have found people who inject stimulants 
to engage in more risky sexual behaviours, resulting in a 
higher risk of HIV infection than for those injecting 
opiates.
Cannabis remains the most commonly used drug at the 
global level, with an estimated 183 million people having 
used the drug in 2014, while amphetamines remain the 
second most commonly used drug. With an estimated 33 
million users, the use of opiates and prescription opioids 
is less common, but opioids remain major drugs of poten-
tial harm and health consequences. The fact that a sharp 
increase in heroin use has been documented in some mar-
kets (particularly North America) where it was previously 
declining, shows that heroin remains one of the major 
drugs of public health concern.
29 million suffer from drug use disorders
but only 1 in 6 people with drug use disorders is in treatment
247 million people used drugs in the past year
12 million people inject drugs
1.6 million people who inject drugs
 are living with HIV
6 million are living with hepatitis C
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As an overall trend at the global level, the use of cannabis 
has remained stable over the past three years. In some sub-
regions, however, particularly North America and Western 
and Central Europe, cannabis use has increased. After a 
period of stability, since 2010 cocaine use has also been 
rising, mainly because of an increase in cocaine use in 
South America. On the other hand, the use of ampheta-
mines appears to be stable, but that may underplay the 
situation in subregions, specifically East and South-East 
Asia, where recent information on the extent of drug use 
is unavailable. 
Making the global picture of drug use more blurred is the 
fact that many people who use drugs, both occasionally 
and regularly, tend to be polydrug users who use more 
than one substance concurrently or sequentially. For exam-
ple, the non-medical use of prescription drugs, synthetic 
stimulants and NPS in lieu of or in combination with 
more conventional drugs clouds the distinction between 
users of a particular drug, presenting an interlinked or 
cyclical epidemic of drug use and related health conse-
quences in recent years.
Treatment related to cannabis use has been increasing in 
many regions over the past decade. In Europe, an increase 
in the numbers in treatment for cannabis use has been 
observed in several countries, despite a decline in the 
number of frequent (monthly) users. The proportion of 
people seeking treatment for the first time for cannabis 
use disorders remains high globally, with nearly half of the 
people treated for cannabis use disorders being first-time 
entrants. Changes in patterns of the people in treatment 
for cannabis use may be attributed to a number of factors, 
including practices in referrals by the criminal justice 
system and an expansion in the provision of treatment for 
cannabis in some countries. While there is some evidence 
that higher potency cannabis is now more widely available 
in Europe and the United States, how this might translate 
into greater harm for cannabis users is not clearly 
understood. 
On average, younger people are seeking treatment for can-
nabis and amphetamines use disorders more than for other 
drugs. This reflects the trends in increasing use of cannabis 
and amphetamines and the resulting increase in people 
seeking treatment for disorders related to the use of can-
nabis and amphetamines. People in treatment for opioid- 
or cocaine-related disorders are typically in their thirties, 
and, in many subregions, this reflects an ageing cohort of 
users in treatment and an overall decrease in the propor-
tion of treatment demand. 
Overall, men are three times more likely than women to 
use cannabis, cocaine or amphetamines, whereas women 
are more likely than men to engage in the non-medical 
use of opioids and tranquilizers. Gender disparities in drug 
use are more attributable to opportunities to use drugs in 
a social environment than to either gender being more or 
less susceptible or vulnerable to the use of drugs. Moreo-
ver, while in most surveys the prevalence of drug use 
among young people is reportedly higher than among 
adults, the gender divide in drug use is narrower among 
young people than among adults.
Global trends in the estimated prevalence of drug 
use, 2006-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Estimated percentage of adults (ages 15-64) who used drugs in the 
past year.
Global trends in the estimated number of people 
who use drugs, 2006-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Estimates are for adults (ages 15-64), based on past-year use.
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DRUG SUPPLY AND MARKETS
The most widely cultivated drug crop continues to be can-
nabis, which was reported by 129 countries over the period 
2009-2014, far more than the 49 countries that reported 
opium poppy cultivation (mostly located in Asia and the 
Americas) and the 7 countries that reported coca cultiva-
tion (located in the Americas). Leaving aside the disparity 
in their respective numbers of cultivating countries, opium 
poppy cultivation has been decreasing in the past year 
while coca cultivation has been rising.
Cannabis also continues to be the most trafficked drug 
worldwide, while there has been a large increase in seizures 
of synthetic drugs. Although there were 234 substances 
under international control in 2014 (244 in January 
2016), the bulk of trafficking (based on reported drug 
seizures, which reflect both law enforcement activity and 
drug flows) was concentrated on a far smaller number of 
substances. Cannabis in its various forms was intercepted 
in 95  per cent of reporting countries in 2014 and 
accounted for over half of the 2.2 million drug seizure 
cases reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) that year, followed by ATS, opioids and 
coca-related substances. 
In all countries, more men (90 per cent of the total, on 
average) than women are brought into formal contact with 
the criminal justice system for trafficking in drugs or for 
possession of drugs for personal use. However, the report-
ing of gender-disaggregated data has improved over the 
years and shows an increased number of women arrested 
for drug-related offences in absolute terms. Nevertheless, 
the proportion of women in drug-related arrests, while 
fluctuating, showed a downward trend over the 1998-2014 
period, particularly for drug trafficking-related offences. 
Drug supply via the Internet, including via the anonymous 
online marketplace, the “dark net”, may have increased in 
recent years. This raises concerns in terms of the potential 
of the “dark net” to attract new populations of users by 
facilitating access to drugs in both developed and develop-
ing countries.
Opiates
Primarily carried out in South-West Asia and, to a lesser 
extent, in South-East Asia and Latin America, global 
opium production in 2015 fell by 38 per cent from the 
previous year to some 4,770 tons, i.e., to the levels of the 
late 1990s. The decrease was primarily a consequence of 
a decline in opium production in Afghanistan (a decrease 
of 48 per cent from the previous year), mainly as a result 
of poor yields in the country’s southern provinces. How-
ever, at 183,000 hectares, Afghanistan still accounted for 
almost two thirds of the global area under illicit opium 
poppy cultivation, which decreased by 11 per cent from 
the previous year to around 281,000 hectares. 
UNODC estimates indicate that the global number of 
opiate users (i.e., users of opium, morphine and heroin) 
has changed little in recent years and that opiates contin-
ued to affect some 17 million people in 2014. It seems 
unlikely that the sharp decline in opium production in 
2015 will lead to major shortages in the global heroin 
market given the high opium production levels of previ-
ous years. The build-up or depletion of previous years’ 
opium inventories may be used to offset annual changes 
in production and maintain the supply of heroin to user 
markets. It may take a period of sustained decline in opium 
production for the repercussions to be felt in the heroin 
market. 
Indeed, the global opiate market appears to be stable 
despite important regional changes. There are indications 
that heroin use may be undergoing a resurgence in some 
countries where it was previously declining. Heroin use 
increased in North America in the past decade, which 
resulted in an increase in the level of heroin-related deaths. 
Long-term trends, in contrast, have been stable or declin-
ing in Western and Central Europe since the late 1990s. 
There are early signs, however, of a surge in the heroin 
market, with an increase in the availability and use of 
heroin in some markets in Europe, as well as a major 
increase in the size of individual seizure cases of heroin 
destined for Europe. Meanwhile, based on trend percep-
tions reported to UNODC, the use of opioids may have 
grown in Africa. Overall opiate use in Asia is reported by 
experts to have remained largely unchanged over the 
period 1998-2014, whereas opiate use in Oceania has 
declined. 
The global interception rate for opiates doubled from the 
period 1980-1997 (particularly after the special session of 
the General Assembly on the world drug problem in 1998) 
to the 2009-2014 period. The largest amount of opiates 
Trends in the quantities of drugs seized worldwide, 
1998-2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
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seized takes place in South-West Asia, followed by Europe. 
Accounting for 75 per cent of global opium seizures, 61 
per cent of global morphine seizures and 17 per cent of 
global heroin seizures, the largest aggregated opiate seizures 
worldwide in 2014 were reported by the Islamic Republic 
of Iran.
The so-called “Balkan route”, which supplies Western and 
Central Europe with Afghan opiates, through Iran (Islamic 
Republic of ) and Turkey via South-Eastern Europe, con-
tinues to be the most important conduit for heroin traf-
ficking. However, the so-called “southern route” (through 
Pakistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran by sea to the Gulf 
region, Africa (particularly East Africa), South Asia and, 
to a lesser extent, South-East Asia, the Oceania region and 
North America), has grown in importance. Meanwhile, 
opiate trafficking on the so-called “northern route”, from 
Afghanistan to neighbouring States in Central Asia, the 
Russian Federation and other countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States, has started to undergo a 
resurgence after the decline in the period 2008-2012, 
while trafficking out of the Golden Triangle is on the 
increase, mainly due to rising levels of opium production 
in Myanmar after 2006. Moreover, heroin trafficking in 
the Americas continues to increase, with heroin and mor-
phine seizures rising from an average of 4 tons over the 
period 1998-2008 to 7 tons per year over the period 2009-
2014, in line with reported increases in opium production 
in Latin America over those periods. 
Cocaine
Although global coca bush cultivation in 2014 increased 
by 10 per cent from the previous year, the actual area under 
coca bush cultivation was the second smallest since the 
late 1980s. Global cocaine manufacture was slightly higher 
than in the previous year but still 24-27 per cent lower 
than the peak in 2007, and thus basically back to the levels 
reported in the late 1990s. At the same time, there are 
indications that the increase in global cocaine manufacture 
observed in 2014 was not a one-off event and may have 
continued in 2015.
Cocaine trafficking via Africa may be regaining impor-
tance, and there are signs of increases in the trafficking of 
cocaine to Asia, particularly to East and South-East Asia 
and the Middle East, as cocaine seizures in Asia tripled 
from an average of 0.45 tons per year over the period 
1998-2008 to 1.5 tons per year over the period 2009-
2014. In Oceania, the cocaine market appears to be sta-
bilizing, following rapid growth over the past decade. 
Despite these regional fluctuations, the annual prevalence 
of cocaine use remained largely stable at the global level 
over the period 1998-2014, fluctuating at between 0.3 
and 0.4 per cent of the population aged 15-64. However, 
as the population has grown, the number of cocaine users 
has increased, from some 14 million in 1998 to 18.8 mil-
lion in 2014. Meanwhile, it is likely that there has been a 
decline in per capita consumption of cocaine, prompted 
by a decline in the amount of cocaine available for con-
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sumption over the period 2007-2014, mainly linked to a 
drop in cocaine production in the Andean region. In par-
allel, the number of heavy cocaine users in North America 
has declined. This points to an overall shrinking of the 
cocaine market, although the number of (recreational 
rather than regular) cocaine users in several emerging mar-
kets continues to rise. 
Cannabis
Despite major changes in some regions, global cannabis 
consumption has remained somewhat stable in recent 
years. In 2014, some 3.8 per cent of the global population 
had used cannabis in the past year, a proportion that has 
remained stable since 1998. Given the global population 
growth, this has gone in parallel with an increase in the 
total number of cannabis users since 1998. The Americas, 
followed by Africa, remain the main production and con-
sumption regions for cannabis herb, with about three quar-
ters of all cannabis herb seizures worldwide taking place 
in the Americas in 2014, the largest amounts in North 
America, while Africa accounted for 14 per cent of all can-
nabis herb seizures and Europe for 5 per cent. On the other 
hand, Europe, North Africa and the Near and Middle East 
remain the principal markets for cannabis resin, the major-
ity of which continues to be produced in Morocco and 
Afghanistan, as reflected in information provided by 
Member States on the sources of cannabis resin seized. 
Accounting for 40 per cent of the total, the largest amounts 
of cannabis resin seized in 2014 took place once again in 
Western and Central Europe.
In the United States, although outcome measures such as 
the burden on the health and criminal justice systems need 
to continue to be monitored regularly, recent data from 
the states that have legalized marijuana for recreational use 
show an increase in cannabis use, as well as in public health 
and public safety indicators (cannabis-related emergency 
room visits, hospitalizations, traffic accidents and related 
deaths), while cannabis-related arrests, court cases and 
criminal justice system referrals into treatment have 
declined. 
Synthetics: amphetamine-type stimulants 
and new psychoactive substances
After three years of relative stability, ATS seizures reached 
a new peak of more than 170 tons in 2014. Since 2009, 
global amphetamine seizures have fluctuated annually 
between about 20 and 46 tons, while “ecstasy” seizures 
more than doubled in 2014, to 9 tons, compared with the 
annual averages of 4-5 tons since 2009. For the past few 
years, methamphetamine seizures have accounted for the 
largest share of global ATS seizures annually, but, although 
methamphetamine is a feature of ATS markets worldwide, 
it is particularly dominant in East and South-East Asia 
and North America. Since 2009, those subregions together 
have annually accounted for most global methampheta-
mine seizures. Compared with other subregions, North 
Main trafficking flows of cocaine
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database.
Notes: The trafficking routes represented on this map should be considered broadly indicative and based on data analyses rather than definitive route 
outlines. Such analyses are based on data related to official drug seizures along the trafficking route as well as official country reports and responses 
to annual report questionnaires. Routes may deviate to other countries that lie along the routes and there are numerous secondary flows that may 
not be reflected. The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent 
undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. 
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has 
not yet been determined.
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America has consistently reported the largest amount of 
methamphetamine seizures each year, whereas between 
2009 and 2014, methamphetamine seizures reported in 
East and South-East Asia almost quadrupled.
In Oceania, strong increases in methamphetamine seizures 
have been recorded since 2012. There is a growing number 
of users of crystalline methamphetamine in the region, as 
well as increased frequency of use among certain user 
groups, an increase in methamphetamine purity and a 
decline in purity-adjusted prices, all of which could aggra-
vate the negative impact on the health of individuals and 
on society in general. 
Large amounts of amphetamine tablets labelled with the 
brand name “Captagon” were reported to have been seized 
in the Middle East between March 2014 and November 
2015. In 2013 and 2014, amphetamine seizures reported 
in the Middle East were mostly perceived to have origi-
nated in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Over the 
same period, some countries reporting amphetamine sei-
zures in the Middle East found that these were intended 
for trafficking onward to other destinations within the 
region.
The NPS market continues to be characterized by the large 
number of new substances being reported. Although data 
collection for 2015 is still in progress, 75 new substances 
have been reported to UNODC for the first time, com-
pared with a total of only 66 new substances reported in 
2014. Between 2012 and 2014, most substances reported 
for the first time belonged to the group of synthetic can-
nabinoids, but the data reported for 2015 so far show a 
different pattern: firstly, almost as many synthetic cathi-
nones (20) were reported for the first time as were syn-
thetic cannabinoids (21); secondly, a wide range of 
substances (21) not belonging to any of the major groups 
identified in previous years were reported for the first time, 
which included synthetic opioids (e.g., fentanyl deriva-
tives) and sedatives (e.g., benzodiazepines).
Significant quantities of NPS seized have been reported 
over the past few years. The global market for synthetic 
NPS continues to be dominated by synthetic cannabinoids 
(seizures of 32 tons), with North America (specifically the 
United States with 26.5 tons of seizures) accounting for 
the largest quantities seized worldwide in 2014, out of the 
global total of 34 tons (excluding plant-based NPS and 
ketamine). However, global seizures of synthetic cathi-
nones have been steadily increasing since they were first 
reported in 2010, with seizures tripling to 1.3 tons in 2014 
from the previous year. 
UNODC monitoring of NPS since 2008 has so far shown 
a rather dynamic supply situation with elements of per-
sistence (a small number of substances emerge, spread and 
stay for several years) and change (a considerable number 
of substances appear for a short time or only locally).
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Note: The origins of the flow arrows do not necessarily indicate the source/manufacture of methamphetamine. These arrows represent the flows as 
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ficked. The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet 
been determined.
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THE WORLD DRUG PROBLEM AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
“We welcome the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, and we note that efforts to achieve 
the Sustainable Development Goals and to 
effectively address the world drug problem are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing.” 
Outcome document of the special session of the 
General Assembly on the world drug problem, 
entitled “Our joint commitment to effectively 
addressing and countering the world drug 
problem”
The world drug problem is intertwined with all aspects of 
sustainable development. The analysis of the drug problem, 
and the response thereto, through the lens of the Sustain-
able Development Goals reveals the mechanisms of this 
interaction. All areas of sustainable development, as identi-
fied in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, shape the 
nature and dynamic of the drug problem. At the same time, 
the impact of the drug problem, and the response thereto, 
on development can be observed at the individual, com-
munity and national levels. In analysing those linkages, the 
17 Sustainable Development Goals have been divided into 
five broad areas: social development, economic develop-
ment, environmental sustainability, peaceful, just and 
inclusive societies, and partnership. 
Social development
Sustainable Development Goal 10. 
Reduce inequality within and among 
countries 
The failure to accept or understand that drug dependence 
is a health condition feeds the cycle of marginalization 
that often affects people with drug use disorders, making 
their recovery and social integration more challenging. 
Furthermore, stigmatizing attitudes towards people who 
use drugs, which may extend to staff in health-care ser-
vices, can affect the delivery of effective treatment to those 
who most need it.
Health
 Sustainable Development Goal 3. 
Ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all at all ages 
 
The Global Burden of Disease Study indicates that opi-
oids, cocaine, amphetamines and cannabis together 
accounted for almost 12 million life years lost due to pre-
mature death or disability in 2013, of which more than 8 
million were linked to opioid use disorders. One of the 
risk factors for the negative health impact of drugs stems 
from their mode of administration. Injecting drug use, in 
particular, carries a much greater risk of overdose and 
infection, including the transmission of blood-borne 
viruses, such as HIV and hepatitis C, than does smoking, 
swallowing, snorting or inhaling drugs. Drug use may have 
repercussions on the health of society in general as PWID 
may become a group through which sexually transmitted 
diseases are passed on to other subgroups and the general 
population. Some studies also corroborate the hypothesis 
that the use of certain stimulants (whether injected or not) 
may also influence sexual behaviour itself, thereby increas-
ing the likelihood of high-risk behaviour and sexual trans-
mission — a pattern that raises concern particularly in the 
case of specific at-risk groups such as men who have sex 
with men. 
Among its targets, Sustainable Development Goal 3 explic-
itly includes strengthening “the prevention and treatment 
of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse”. Drug 
policies based on scientific evidence can, through measures 
such as prevention and treatment, mitigate the negative 
health impact of drug use. But when policies are not 
appropriately tuned to the principles of the international 
drug control conventions, they can undermine the acces-
sibility of controlled drugs for both medical and research 
purposes. Three quarters of the global population still have 
little or no access to medicines containing narcotic drugs 
and have inadequate access to treatment for moderate to 
severe pain. The importance of the accessibility of essential 
medicines, which typically include controlled drugs such 
as morphine, codeine, diazepam and phenobarbital, has 
REDUCED
INEQUALITIES
GOOD HEALTH
AND WELL-BEING
The health impact of drug use increases with 
development
Sources: Human development index from the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP); data on burden of disease (dis-
ability-adjusted life years) are from the Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation, University of Washington, GBD Compare, 2015. 
Available from http://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare. 
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been recognized in target 3.b of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals.
Women, girls and youth
Drug use undermines the aspect of sustainable develop-
ment related to gender equality and the empowerment of 
women and girls. There are marked differences between 
male and female drug users in terms of preferred drugs 
and drug-related vulnerabilities. Coupled with the fact 
that users of several drug types are predominantly male, 
this leads to a danger that the entire continuum of care 
may fail to cater adequately for the needs of female drug 
users, who also have a lack of access to such services. 
Sustainable Development Goal 5. 
Achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls 
Women affected by drug dependence and HIV are more 
vulnerable and more stigmatized than men. They suffer 
from co-occurring mental health disorders to a greater 
extent than men, and they are more likely to have been 
victims of violence and abuse. Women often also bear a 
heavy burden of violence and deprivation associated with 
the drug dependence of family members, hindering the 
achievement of the sustainable development target of elim-
inating all forms of violence against all women and girls. 
Female offenders and prisoners, especially those with drug 
use disorders, face particular hardship as, in many 
instances, criminal justice systems are not yet equipped 
for the special needs of women. 
Drug use often affects people during their most produc-
tive years. When youth become trapped in a cycle of drug 
use, and even in the drug trade itself, as opposed to being 
engaged in legitimate employment and educational oppor-
tunities, distinct barriers are effectively raised to the devel-
opment of individuals and communities. 
Economic development
Sustainable Development Goal 1. 
End poverty in all its forms 
everywhere
The toll taken by the drug problem may vary in size and 
shape across countries, both developed and developing, 
but in one way or another it affects all. Vulnerability to 
drugs, be it in terms of cultivation, production, trafficking 
or use, exists in countries at all levels of development. 
The relationship between economic development and 
drugs is particularly evident in the case of the illicit culti-
vation of drug crops. In rural areas, socioeconomic ele-
ments such as poverty and a lack of sustainable livelihoods 
are important risk factors leading farmers to engage in 
illicit cultivation. They are also manifestations of poor 
levels of development which, alongside other development 
issues linked to security and governance, are enabling 
elements of large-scale illicit cultivation. 
Higher socioeconomic groups have a greater 
propensity to initiate drug use than lower 
socioeconomic groups, but it is the lower socio-
economic groups that pay the higher price as 
they are more likely to become drug dependent
Poverty also has strong links with drug use, albeit in a 
complex and mutually reinforcing manner. Indeed, the 
brunt of the drug use problem is borne by people who are 
poor in relation to the societies in which they live, as can 
be seen in stark terms in the wealthier countries. More 
broadly, there is a strong association between social and 
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economic disadvantage and drug use disorders. This pat-
tern can also be seen when looking at different reflections 
of marginalization and social exclusion, such as unemploy-
ment and low levels of education.
Beyond development, a multitude of factors, including 
geographic location, play a role in shaping the drug prob-
lem in a given country. Proximity to a drug-producing 
area or a major drug trafficking route can, for example, 
explain the above-average rates of opiate use in the Near 
and Middle East and South-West Asia, and use of cocaine, 
including “crack” cocaine, in South America and West 
Africa. A breakdown of national data on people who use 
drugs, based on income level, shows, however, that “high-
income” countries tend to have a higher prevalence of 
past-year drug use across the drug categories. Drugs that 
can command a relatively high price, and ultimately higher 
profits for traffickers, find an easier foothold in countries 
with relatively higher levels of per capita income. In the 
case of substances such as cocaine and heroin, the level of 
economic development contributes to the formation of 
consumer markets that are large in terms of both number 
of users and total revenue. 
Different levels of socioeconomic well-being within indi-
vidual countries also have an effect on the type of drugs 
used. For example, in the United States, the association 
between drug use and unemployment is much stronger in 
the case of “crack” cocaine than other types of cocaine. 
Drug markets tend to be influenced by local idiosyncrasies 
in both developed and developing countries, but sizeable 
markets for certain substances, notably cocaine and syn-
thetic substances, have taken hold in developed countries 
before subsequently expanding to developing countries. 
Prime examples are the emergence of “ecstasy” and other 
hallucinogens in North America and Europe, as well as 
the ongoing proliferation of the consumption of NPS in 
Europe, Japan and North America. The relationship 
between development and the drug problem thus needs 
to be viewed in dynamic terms. 
Environmental sustainability
 Sustainable Development Goal 
target 15.5. Take urgent and 
significant action to reduce the 
degradation of natural habitats,  
halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 
2020, protect and prevent the 
extinction of threatened species
Illicit crop cultivation often occurs in forested areas and 
contributes to deforestation when it results in the clearing 
of woodland. Moreover, illicit crop cultivation frequently 
takes place in biodiversity hotspots hosting a large number 
of species with a limited habitat, some of which are pro-
tected areas. It tends to occur close to the agricultural 
frontier, which demarcates the border between pristine 
forest and developed areas, and can result in the clearing 
of forests. Although empirical evidence and rigorous analy-
sis do not support the claim that illicit cultivation is the 
LIFE 
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The impact of income on drug use depends on the type of drug
Source: World Bank (for income levels) and UNODC estimates based on responses to the annual report questionnaire and other official 
sources (for drug use data).
* Including prescription stimulants.
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major driver of deforestation, research does suggest that a 
lack of rural development drives the phenomenon. Analy-
sis has shown, moreover, that drug trafficking can have a 
direct impact on deforestation through the construction 
of infrastructure such as landing strips and illegal roads, 
as well as indirectly through the privatization of public 
land to create “narco-estates”. When eradication induces 
a displacement of the location of drug crops it may result 
in deforestation as farmers react to eradication initiatives 
and seek places out of the reach of law enforcement. 
The disposal of chemicals used in the illicit manufacture 
of cocaine and opiates can also have negative consequences 
on the environment, contributing to pollution and health 
hazards in rural communities. In the case of synthetic 
drugs, the consequences in urban settings not only pose 
health risks but may also have an impact on the urban and 
industrial environment.
Peaceful, just and inclusive societies
Violence, rule of law, corruption, illicit financial 
flows
Sustainable Development Goal 16. 
Promote peaceful and inclusive 
societies for sustainable develop-
ment, provide access to justice for all 
and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels
Among the targets associated with Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal 16, those related to reducing violence, strength-
ening the rule of law and access to justice, and fighting 
organized crime, economic crime (corruption and bribery) 
and illicit financial flows, all have significant links with 
the world drug problem and the response to it. 
Different stages of the drug problem result in different 
manifestations of violence. Drug use may lead to violence 
related to the psychoactive effects of drugs, as well as to 
crime committed in order to obtain funds for purchasing 
drugs. The intensity of drug-related violence is greatest, 
however, when associated with drug trafficking (systemic 
violence), as the example of Latin America shows. The 
traumatic effects of violence can also increase vulnerability 
to drug use. 
Yet drug trafficking and production do not necessarily 
produce violence, as illustrated by the low levels of homi-
cide in transit countries affected by the opiate trafficking 
routes in Asia. Characteristics of the market and drug traf-
ficking organizations may explain variations: market com-
petition can generate violence in illicit markets, while 
differences in the internal structure of trafficking networks, 
which may be characterized by varying degrees of cohe-
siveness and hierarchy, can also play a role. 
The profits associated with the drug trade are a key moti-
vation for non-State armed groups, including terrorist 
organizations, to engage in or facilitate drug trafficking. 
In a number of countries, resources generated in illicit 
markets such as drug markets have played a role in com-
plicating and extending armed conflicts, often increasing 
their overall lethality. In general, the drug trade flourishes 
where State presence is weak, where the rule of law is 
unevenly applied and where opportunities for corruption 
exist. At the same time, the wealth and power of drug traf-
ficking organizations provide them with resources to buy 
protection from law enforcement agents, from politicians 
and the business sector, thereby reinforcing corruption. 
Profit is generated across the entire chain of drug produc-
tion and distribution, but it is at the final stage that it 
tends to be highest. A recent UNODC study estimated 
that almost half of the profit made along the major heroin 
trafficking route from Afghanistan to Europe was gener-
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ated in the four largest European consumer markets: 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Never-
theless, the size of the illicit economy associated with 
drugs, relative to the licit economy, tends to be higher in 
drug-producing countries, partly because of their relatively 
smaller economies. This is particularly pronounced in the 
case of Afghanistan, where, according to UNODC esti-
mates, the total value of the illicit opiate economy was 
$2.8 billion in 2014 — equivalent to 13 per cent of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The laundering 
of such illegal proceeds occurs through many different 
channels, from small, decentralized techniques such as the 
use of money orders or remittances, to sophisticated uses 
of front businesses. These forms of illicit financial flows 
are essential for the survival of criminal groups and con-
stitute a major threat to sustainable development.
Partnership
 Sustainable Development Goal 17. 
Strengthen the means of implemen-
tation and revitalize the global 
partnership for sustainable 
development
Sustainable Development Goal 17 has a strong link with 
the principles of international cooperation and shared 
responsibility, embedded in the drug control conventions. 
But when analysed together, donor development assistance 
and donor assistance in drug-related sectors show oppos-
ing trends: official development assistance has increased 
overall, whereas assistance in drug-related sectors has actu-
ally decreased significantly since 2008. 
How do drug interventions impact sustain-
able development?
Drug supply and demand reduction efforts
Efforts to eliminate illicit crop cultivation can impact the 
income source and employment opportunities of farmers 
and farm labourers. Research has also shown that such 
efforts have positive development outcomes in the affected 
communities only if they include development measures 
to ensure alternative livelihoods and restore security and 
rule of law. Examples in Colombia and Peru have shown 
that effective alternative development programmes can 
weaken the population’s ties with armed groups and drug 
trafficking. 
Law enforcement interventions aim to restore the rule of 
law, the cornerstone of governance and sustainable devel-
opment, and can also influence the availability of drugs 
in illicit markets, not only by reducing supply through 
interdiction but also by increasing the risk for traffickers, 
which raises the price of drugs in consumer markets. How-
ever, enforcement activities by authorities can also generate 
violence, particularly when they affect the internal and 
Almost one in five sentenced prisoners is serving 
time for a drug offence
Source: Note by the Secretariat on world crime trends and emerg-
ing issues and responses in the field of crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice (E/CN.15/2016/10).
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The connection between drug trafficking and 
violence in Latin American countriesa is not an 
automatic one
Sources: Estimates of the flow of cocaine based on United States, 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Cocaine Smuggling in 
2010”, January 2012; homicide data from UNODC Homicide Sta-
tistics (2016). Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/homicide.html. 
a Data were available for 13 countries.
b All flows are expressed per capita.
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external structure of illegal markets. Research suggests that 
targeting enforcement and policing on both the protago-
nists and the elements in the drug trafficking chain that 
generate the greatest profit and the most violence can be 
particularly effective in reducing violence. On the other 
hand, strategies that focus on rapidly disrupting drug traf-
ficking organizations and reducing violence in the short 
term can sometimes lead to more violence. 
Prevention, early intervention treatment, care, recovery, 
rehabilitation and social integration measures, and the 
entire continuum of care for people who use drugs, when 
based on scientific evidence, reduce drug use and thus its 
impact on public health, which is one of the most impor-
tant components of the well-being of society. Some of the 
above measures have also been shown to decrease a range 
of other risky behaviours such as aggressiveness and tru-
ancy. The benefits affect both people who use drugs them-
selves and society in general, and such efforts have proved 
effective in preventing, for example, HIV and viral 
hepatitis. 
Drug demand reduction interventions are effective when 
they rely on evidence-based measures, including those 
aimed at minimizing the adverse public health and social 
consequences of drug use, such as appropriate needle and 
syringe programmes, opiate substitution therapy, antiret-
roviral therapy and other relevant interventions that pre-
vent the transmission of HIV, viral hepatitis and other 
blood-borne diseases associated with drug use. Compul-
sory confinement in drug treatment centres, on the other 
hand, often worsens the already problematic lives of people 
who use drugs and people with drug dependence, particu-
larly the youngest and most vulnerable.
Criminal justice systems and the costs of drug 
policies
As in the case of law enforcement operations in general, 
when operations are implemented by impartial, transpar-
ent and efficient institutions in compliance with human 
rights standards, they promote the rule of law and equal 
justice. But when law enforcement operations go against 
those principles, incentives may be created for indiscrimi-
nate repression and for the violation of citizen rights. 
On the basis of limited available data, globally more than 
three quarters of all those held in prison for drug-related 
offences have been convicted for drug trafficking and less 
than a quarter for offences related to personal consump-
tion. There are differences across jurisdictions in terms of 
definitions, prosecutorial discretion or types and severity 
of sanctions for drug offences. In some regions, countries 
exercise more punitive approaches, which may result in 
incarceration, when dealing with people apprehended for 
minor drug offences, such as possession of small quanti-
ties of drugs for personal consumption. On the other 
hand, several countries have chosen to limit punishment 
by adopting alternative measures to incarceration or pun-
ishment in minor personal consumption cases without 
aggravating circumstances (for example, fines, warnings, 
probation or counselling). The excessive use of imprison-
ment for drug-related offences of a minor nature is inef-
fective in reducing recidivism and overburdens criminal 
justice systems, preventing them from efficiently coping 
with more serious crime. The provision of evidence-based 
treatment and care services to drug-using offenders, as an 
alternative to incarceration, has been shown to substan-
tially increase recovery and reduce recidivism. 
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Cost of drug policies
Many of the costs arising both directly and indirectly from 
the drug problem can be quantified in monetary terms. 
Several economic studies have done so, and their results 
show that the cost ranged between 0.07 and 1.7 per cent 
of GDP of the countries studied. Moreover, the majority 
of countries studied registered a high percentage of overall 
costs attributable to drug demand and supply reduction 
interventions (such as prevention, treatment and law 
enforcement), as opposed to productivity losses and any 
other indirect costs. It is important to bear in mind that, 
although those economic studies generally take into 
account a wide variety of costs, which arise directly and 
indirectly out of the drug problem, this is usually limited 
to costs that can be quantified in monetary terms. The 
non-tangible costs, such as loss of life and impaired qual-
ity of life, are frequently not quantified, and when quanti-
fied it is usually with reference to a non-monetary metric, 
such as years of life lost or years lived with a disability. 
While such studies can be very useful in assessing the eco-
nomic toll taken on society because of drugs, other con-
siderations also need to come into play when assessing the 
impact of the world drug problem and in devising policy 
responses.
Impact of development on the world drug 
problem
Development can reduce the vulnerability of farmers to 
engaging in illicit cultivation and production and can 
bring sustainable reduction in drug cultivation. However, 
if development interventions are not sensitive to the vul-
nerabilities of communities to specific drug issues, they 
may inadvertently trigger dynamics that increase illicit 
cultivation, as shown by the example of large development 
programmes in the early 1960s and 1970s in the Andean 
region.
Initiatives that facilitate trade and ease trade barriers are 
employed to promote economic development, but glo-
balization may also have ramifications for drug trafficking. 
By fostering the expansion of trade and global transporta-
tion networks, trade openness can also facilitate the coop-
eration and the formation of alliances among criminal 
organizations across different countries and, in some cases, 
reduce the opportunity for law enforcement agencies to 
monitor international trade.
The geographical spread of the use of certain drugs, such 
as cocaine and synthetic drugs, is less concentrated today 
than it was in the past, while Europe, North America and 
Oceania are increasingly affected by the consumption of 
NPS. At the same time, rapid economic growth is taking 
place in large parts of the world where certain drugs are 
still virtually unknown. It is therefore crucial to bear in 
mind the potential ramifications of development on drug 
use, and the experience of developed countries can be 
enlightening in this regard.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Development and countering the world 
drug problem need to work in symbiosis
Many drug policy interventions directly or indirectly result 
in an improvement in the level of development of their 
target populations, while operations designed to improve 
sustainable development often address the vulnerability 
of people or communities affected by the drug problem 
and can ultimately help address it. However, as drug and 
development policies can have an inadvertently counter-
productive effect on each other, the two streams of inter-
vention — development and countering the world drug 
problem — need to work in symbiosis. 
In order to be sustainable development-sensitive, efforts 
to address the world drug problem need:
-- To be in line with the requirements of the internation-
al human rights instruments.
-- To be gender-sensitive, so as to consider the special 
needs of women and their greater level of stigmatiza-
tion when designing prevention programmes, treat-
ment interventions for drug dependence, as well as the 
criminal justice response to drug-related offences.
-- To be environmentally friendly, so as to ensure that 
the curtailment of the illicit supply chain for drugs 
does not cause deforestation or other environmental 
damage.
-- To ensure that “no one is left behind”, by, for example, 
considering the special needs of men who have sex 
with men when targeting the spread of infectious dis-
eases among PWID, and the special needs of migrants, 
including international as well as internal migrants, 
who can be particularly vulnerable to drug use.
-- To overcome the stigmatization of drug users, as this 
can lead to further marginalization.
-- To be based on scientific evidence, so that drug poli-
cies can address the core aspects of social development 
and public health. 
At the same time, development interventions should take 
into account the complex interconnectedness of develop-
ment and the world drug problem, as well as the potential 
risks associated with social and economic change. In par-
ticular, while continuing to address lack of development 
in general, policymakers should factor in the specific needs 
and vulnerabilities of communities affected, so that devel-
opment efforts do not inadvertently open up space to drug 
markets.
Success depends on a dual track of  
development intitiatives.
As the targeting of specific communities affected by the 
drug problem with a broad sweep of general development 
strategies may be ineffective, a dual track is needed: main-
taining specialized drug interventions in synergy with gen-
eral developmental investments. This approach has already 
been embraced in the concept of alternative development 
and can be expanded to other aspects of the drug problem. 
Specific drug-related development initiatives need to be 
mainstreamed into general development initiatives. This 
can include prevention programmes built into the educa-
tional, social welfare and health systems; the strengthening 
of treatment for drug use and of the provision of care and 
rehabilitation and reintegration services in the health-care 
and social welfare systems; training and capacity-building 
in law enforcement agencies; and raising awareness of the 
complexity of the drug problem, including the promotion 
of non-stigmatizing approaches, across all relevant State 
institutions.
Promotion of an effective human rights-
based criminal justice response to the drug 
problem
Governance and the rule of law represent a crucial area in 
which the links between the drug problem and develop-
ment have not been sufficiently recognized. Guaranteeing 
the rule of law needs to be viewed as a concept wider than 
mere coercion; it also encompasses inclusive access to jus-
tice delivered fairly, in full respect of human rights, 
through a robust system that places authority in the hands 
of relevant institutions, with appropriate safeguards. 
The first option for people with drug use disorders who 
are brought into contact with the criminal justice system 
for minor offences should be an alternative to incarcera-
tion. Approaches to tackling minor offences related to 
drug use disorders through treatment and care as an alter-
native to imprisonment require effective coordination 
between the health and justice systems. A set of basic prin-
ciples to promote the use of non-custodial measures, as 
well as legal safeguards for persons subject to alternatives 
to imprisonment, are set forth in the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures 
(the Tokyo Rules) and in the United Nations Rules for the 
Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Meas-
ures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules).
The right to security also needs to be respected in the 
implementation of effective drug-control measures. This 
right requires that State authorities act in compliance with 
the rule of law and international norms and standards 
concerning, inter alia, the use of force, the protection of 
victims and the treatment of offenders. The right to 
security also implies safety from crime and violence and a 
corresponding duty of State authorities to prevent and 
suppress drug trafficking and other related organized-
criminal activities that specifically threaten individual 
citizens.
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The dynamics between violence and drug 
trafficking need to be understood better
The relationship between violence and the production or 
trafficking of drugs is complex. Violence is not a foregone 
conclusion of drug trafficking. Factors that determine vio-
lence include the level of competition between drug traf-
ficking organizations and how they operate, the 
sociopolitical conditions of a particular location, levels of 
corruption and the strength of the underlying rule of law. 
To avoid the escalation of violence, interventions to elimi-
nate drug trafficking have to be sensitive to the 
circumstances. 
Most health consequences of drug use are 
preventable 
Drug use continues to produce negative health conse-
quences, particularly in relation to injecting drug use and 
drug use disorders. Many of those consequences are pre-
ventable and can be avoided through the provision of ser-
vices such as needle and syringe programmes, overdose 
prevention, opiate substitution therapy and other evi-
dence-based drug dependence treatment that scientific 
evidence has proved to be effective. Drug overdose  is pre-
ventable if substances such as naloxone (a drug that can 
immediately reverse the effects of opioid overdose) are 
widely available to people who use opioids. 
Drug use and its health consequences 
should be prevented and treated in prisons
The human rights of people in prisons and other closed 
settings must continue to be ensured while they are in 
detention, including their right to health services, particu-
larly for drug dependence treatment and for the preven-
tion and treatment of HIV, hepatitis and tuberculosis. A 
higher risk of death for people with drug use disorders 
after release from prison points to the need for appropri-
ate interventions such as prison-based opioid substitution 
therapy, pre-release education on overdose prevention, the 
availability of naloxone on release from prison, and post-
release follow-up.
Heroin still requires the attention of the 
international community 
Drug markets have seen great diversification in the past 
few years, with the emergence of new substances, new 
combinations of polydrug use and new injecting behav-
iours involving stimulants carrying higher risks of infec-
tious diseases. Attention to recent trends should not, 
however, overshadow the importance of continuing to 
focus on trends related to a “traditional” drug such as 
heroin. The resurgence in heroin use, leading to fatal con-
sequences, has been documented in a few countries where 
it was previously in decline, demonstrating that heroin is 
not a problem unique to the older generation and that it 
still needs to be prioritized by the international commu-
nity. The recent sharp decline in opiate production in 
Afghanistan should not be overestimated as both the vul-
nerability, and opportunity, of farmers to cultivating 
opium poppy have not drastically changed.
Worrying developments in the ampheta-
mine market in the Middle East require 
closer monitoring
The recent data emerging from the Near and Middle East 
on “Captagon” (increased seizures, local manufacture and 
the availability of precursors) show worrying signals for a 
subregion where drug manufacturing and trafficking have 
the potential to exacerbate a challenging situation of 
porous borders, violent conflict, insurgency and limited 
government control in certain areas. In the past, other 
regions affected by similar vulnerabilities experienced the 
development of a drug-violence nexus in which drug man-
ufacture/trafficking and conflict become mutually rein-
forcing elements. More information, particularly on drug 
use, is needed in the Near and Middle East to help under-
stand if and how the observed increase in seizures indicates 
greater drug consumption in the subregion and what the 
potential implications for drug policy may be. 
Greater efforts needed to enhance forensic 
capacity and monitoring systems for new 
psychoactive substances 
Information on the use of NPS and their health conse-
quences remains limited. Understanding the NPS problem 
in order to address it more effectively requires efforts on 
different fronts: supporting countries to improve their 
forensic capacity relating to NPS detection and to develop 
or improve monitoring systems that can effectively collect 
information on the use of NPS and their health conse-
quences. More research is needed to understand the effects 
on and the risks to users who consume such products, and 
how to communicate those risks. Also key is understand-
ing the wide range of national legislative responses that 
have been put in place by Member States in different 
regions to address the dynamics of the NPS market.
Increased provision of science-based  
prevention and treatment programmes 
for cannabis use is needed
Cannabis has been gaining a higher level of visibility at a 
health-care policy level, in international research and as a 
result of recent changes in legalization in some parts of the 
world. An analysis of the numbers in treatment for can-
nabis use in the United States and Europe shows an 
increase over the long term. In Europe, the consistent 
increase observed in the numbers of people entering treat-
ment for cannabis use is a reflection, in part, of the expan-
sion in the provision of treatment programmes to address 
the needs of cannabis users, including several programmes 
targeted at adolescents and young adults. It is important 
that science-based prevention programmes are available 
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for adolescents and young people so as to prevent the early 
initiation of cannabis use, and that treatment interventions 
such as Screen and Brief Intervention (SBI) are available 
for people who already use cannabis, so as to prevent pro-
gression into drug use disorders. 
Continual monitoring of new cannabis 
policies is recommended 
Although it is still too early to evaluate the impact of new 
cannabis policies, the evidence collected to date in the 
United States points to an increase in cannabis use in states 
where referendums have led to the legalization of recrea-
tional marijuana use. New challenges have emerged in 
some states of the United States (notably Colorado), 
including the marketing of unregulated cannabis products 
(edibles) with a high content of tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC). Moreover, there is evidence of an increasing 
number of cannabis users driving under the influence, as 
well as an increase in cannabis-related emergency room 
visits and hospitalizations. However, cannabis-related 
arrests and court cases related to cannabis offences have 
decreased. All of these outcome measures would need to 
be rigorously monitored and evaluated over a period of 
time before a final assessment can be made.
Treatment and care: greater focus on  
polydrug use is a necessity
Polydrug use and the increased complexity of shifts 
between the use of different drug types pose challenges to 
people responding to emergencies related to drug use, as 
well as to those treating drug use disorders. In such 
instances polydrug use can compromise treatment efforts 
that are drug specific. Pharmacologically assisted treatment 
of disorders related to opioid use has proved effective, 
whereas for other drugs such as stimulants and cannabis, 
the treatment interventions available are mostly psycho-
social and behavioural. This situation requires policymak-
ers and practitioners to be more aware of emerging trends 
in drug use and to have mechanisms in place to detect and 
diagnose a wider range of substances used. Furthermore, 
there is a need to develop guidelines that are science-based 
for pharmacologically assisted treatment and behavioural 
therapies for treating people suffering from drug use dis-
orders as a result of multiple drug use.
Legislation, technical assistance and  
capacity building are key for dealing with 
the growing importance of the “dark net”
Law enforcement and the criminal justice system in many 
countries are still not in a position to deal effectively with 
the anonymous online marketplace known as the “dark 
net”. Apart from practical problems, there are a number 
of other difficult legal issues that need to be addressed, 
including: the identification of the responsible jurisdic-
tion, combined with the routine international sharing of 
information, especially when the physical location of sell-
ers and buyers is unknown; the use of undercover agents 
(both online and offline) to infiltrate such networks in 
order to gather evidence and undermine the criminal busi-
ness model; and the development and implementation of 
legislation to require suspects to reveal passwords/decryp-
tion information when charged with an offence. The pro-
vision of technical assistance and capacity-building for 
Member States to collect and exploit digital evidence is 
key to addressing the threat posed by drug trafficking via 
the Internet.
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A. EXTENT OF DRUG USE
Overall drug use remains stable  
globally
It is estimated that 1 in 20 adults, or a quarter of a billion 
people aged 15-64 years, used at least one drug in 2014. 
Although trends in drug use vary across regions, as does 
updated reporting on data, the extent of drug use among 
the world population has remained stable over the past 
four years. Almost 12 per cent of the total number of 
people who use drugs, or over 29 million people, are esti-
mated to suffer from drug use disorders.  
Cannabis remains the world’s most widely used drug, with 
an estimated 183 million people having used the drug in 
2014, and amphetamines remain the second most widely 
used drug. With an estimated 33 million users, the use of 
opiates and prescription opioids may not be as widespread 
as the use of cannabis, but opioids remain major drugs of 
potential harm and health consequences. Where updated 
data are available, as an overall trend, global use of cannabis 
has remained stable over the past three years, although in 
some subregions, particularly North America and Western 
1 Wouter Vanderplasschen and others, Poly Substance Use and Mental 
Health Among Individuals Presenting for Substance Abuse Treatment, 
Science and Society Series (Gent, Belgium, Academia Press, 2012). 
and Central Europe, cannabis use has increased. In the 
absence of recent survey data on drug use in Africa, experts 
in the region also perceive an increase in cannabis use. 
Moreover, the global trend in cocaine use, which was stable 
after 2010, has shown a recent trend, mainly as a result of 
an increase in cocaine use in South America. The global 
trend in the use of amphetamines is stable, although this 
may underplay the situation in regions where recent infor-
mation on the extent of drug use is unavailable. This is 
particularly the case in Asia, where expert perceptions of 
trends and treatment admission reports suggest an increase 
in the use of amphetamines in the region, specifically in 
East and South-East Asia (see map 1). 
The global picture of drug use is compounded by the fact 
that many people who use drugs, both occasionally and 
regularly, tend to be polydrug users,1, 2 meaning that they 
use more than one substance concurrently or sequentially, 
usually with the intention of enhancing, potentiating or 
counteracting the effects of another drug.3 The non-med-
ical use of prescription drugs, synthetic stimulants and 
new psychoactive substances (NPS) in lieu of, or in com-
bination with, conventional drugs gives a picture that blurs 
2 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA), “Polydrug use: patterns and response” (Lisbon, 
November 2009).
3 World Health Organization (WHO), Lexicon of Alcohol and Drug 
Terms (Geneva, 1994).
FIG. 1 Global trends in the estimated prevalence  
of drug use, 2006-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Estimated percentage of adults (ages 15-64) who used drugs in 
the past year.
FIG. 2 Global trends in the estimated number of 
people who use drugs, 2006-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Estimates are for adults (ages 15-64), based on past-year use.
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2the distinction between users of a particular drug, present-
ing an interlinked or cyclical epidemic of drug use and 
related health consequences in recent years. Additionally, 
such a pattern of drug use presents challenges to health 
professionals responding to emergencies related to drug 
use, as well as to those treating people with disorders 
related to the use of multiple drugs. 
Recent trends in polydrug use and  
substitution between drugs
Polydrug use encompasses wide variations in patterns of 
drug use, ranging from occasional alcohol and cannabis 
use to the daily use of a combination of heroin, cocaine, 
alcohol and benzodiazepines.4, 5 
Within polydrug use, the concomitant use of opiates and 
stimulants such as cocaine and amphetamines is fairly 
common and has been widely reported.6, 7 In the past 
decade, the use of amphetamine and methamphetamine 
has become quite widespread in different regions, while 
the number of NPS that are stimulants seems to be con-
stantly increasing. Data on polydrug use are seldom sys-
tematically collected, but amphetamines and NPS seem 
to be reported increasingly in polydrug use patterns in 
different regions. 
4 EMCDDA (see footnote 2).
5 Danielle Horyniak and others, “How do drug market changes affect 
characteristic of injecting initiation and subsequent patterns of drug 
use? Findings from a cohort of regular heroin and methampheta-
mine injectors in Melbourne, Australia”, International Journal of 
Drug Policy, vol. 26, No. 1 (2015), pp. 43-50. 
6 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bicket, “Poly drug use in heroin 
addicts: a behavioral economic analysis”, Addiction, vol. 93, No. 3 
(1998), pp. 321-335. 
7 Mim J. Landry, Understanding Drugs of Abuse: The Processes of 
Addiction, Treatment and Recovery (Arlington, Virginia, American 
Psychiatric Publishing, 1994).
Tolerance, cross-tolerance and substitution: 
managing the effects of drugs
The interplay of individual, biological, cultural, social and 
environmental factors increases or attenuates the vulner-
ability of a person to use or to continue using drugs. Con-
tinuing to use a drug is considered a conditioned response 
to the positive reinforcement that the person receives as a 
result of using the drug.8 However, in later stages a person 
continues to use drugs merely to maintain drug depend-
ence, which is characterized by, among other things, the 
desire and compulsion to use drugs despite evidence of 
harmful consequences, the development of tolerance — 
by increasing the quantity of the drug or drugs to achieve 
the same effects and a state of withdrawal — and the nega-
tive consequences experienced when the person stops using 
the drug or drugs.9 
Drugs taken together can have a cumulative or synergistic 
effect, which increases the overall psychoactive experience; 
that is one way in which drug users may address the devel-
opment of tolerance.10 A related phenomenon is “cross-
tolerance” — the pharmacological ability of one drug to 
have generally the same effect on the nervous system as 
another drug. The phenomenon of cross-tolerance explains 
in part the frequent substitution of drugs that have a similar 
effect. Examples of such patterns of drug use include the 
use of alcohol with benzodiazepines, cannabis or cocaine; 
concurrent use of heroin, benzodiazepines and antihista-
mines; the use of alcohol or other opioids (methadone, 
fentanyl etc.); and the use of cocaine and other stimu-
lants.11, 12, 13, 14
In other situations, people who use drugs may offset the 
negative effects of the drugs by concurrently or sequen-
tially using additional drugs with opposite effects. One 
such pattern is “speedballing” — when cocaine is injected 
with heroin or other opioids or when heroin is used with 
methamphetamine or amphetamine.15
Market dynamics: substitution and  
complementarity of drugs
Market dynamics, reflected by changes in availability, 
purity or price, can affect the choice of drugs. In such cir-
cumstances, people who use drugs can turn to substituting 
8 WHO, Neuroscience of Psychoactive Substance Use and Dependence 
(Geneva, 2004).
9 WHO, The ICD 10, Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disor-
ders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines (Geneva, 1992).
10 Neuroscience of Psychoactive Substance Use (see footnote 8).
11 Mim J. Landry (see footnote 7). 
12 Charles P. O’Brien, “Benzodiazepine use, abuse and dependence”, 
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, vol. 66, Suppl. 2 (2005), pp. 28-33. 
13 Vanderplasschen and others, “Poly substance use and mental health” 
(see footnote 1).
14 “Polydrug use” (see footnote 2).
15 Francesco Leri, Jule Bruneau and Jane Stewart, “Understanding 
polydrug use: review of heroin and cocaine co-use” Addiction, vol. 
98, No. 1 (2003), pp. 7-22.
Estimates of the extent of drug use 
and problem drug use reflect the 
best information available in 2014
As in previous years, global estimates of the extent of drug use 
and problem drug use reflect the best available information 
in 2014, and changes compared with previous years largely 
reflect information updated by 20 countries, mostly in North 
America, South America and Western and Central Europe, for 
which new data on the extent of drug use or problem drug 
use were made available in 2014. The concept of problem 
drug use has been used in prior editions of the World Drug 
Report as a proxy for estimating the number of people with 
drug use disorders. In 2014, the estimated number of problem 
drug users increased by 2 million over the previous year, which 
reflects an increase in the estimated number of opiate users 
in North America and Western and Central Europe, as well 
as in the total number of users of cocaine, amphetamines 
and “ecstasy”.
CHAPTER I
Extent of drug use
3
WORLD DRUG REPORT 2016
ÇÇÇÇÇÇÇ
ÇÇ
Ç
Ç
Ç
ÇÇ
Trend
Large increase
Some increase
Stable
Some decrease
Large decrease
Not known
No data available or 
no ARQ received
Data older than 2014
with different drugs; transitioning to alternative routes of 
drug administration; decreasing their consumption of the 
drug; or deciding to enter treatment.16, 17 Common exam-
ples are heroin being substituted by oxycodone, desomor-
phine or other opioids and vice versa, as reported in 
various regions.18 
Economic factors and cross-price elasticity may also affect 
polydrug use.19 An increase in the price of one drug may 
result in the use of another (substitution) or it may decrease 
the use of another, even though its price remains the same 
(complementarity). For example, a study showed that an 
increase in the price of heroin resulted in an increase in 
benzodiazepine and cocaine purchases.20 In another study, 
cross-price elasticity analysis showed that in the case of 
heroin there was significant substitution with prescription 
16 Jenny Chalmers, Deborah Bradford and Craig Jones, “The effect of 
methamphetamine and heroin price on polydrug use: a behavioural 
economics analysis in Sydney, Australia”, International Journal of 
Drug Policy, vol. 21, No. 5 (2010), pp. 381-389.
17 Horyniak and others, “How do drug market changes affect charac-
teristics of injecting initiation and subsequent patterns of drug use?” 
(see footnote 5).
18 World Drug Report 2014 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.14.X1.7).
19 Jonathan P. Caulkins and Peter H. Reuter, “The meaning and 
utility of drug prices”, Addiction, vol. 91, No. 9 (1996), pp. 1261-
1264.
20 Petry and Bicket, “Poly drug use in heroin addicts: a behavioral  
economic analysis”, (see footnote 6). 
opioids and, to a lesser extent, benzodiazepines and meth-
amphetamine.21 The same study showed that there was 
limited substitution with other drugs as the price of meth-
amphetamine increased. 
Recent trends in the use of heroin and the  
non-medical use of prescription opioids in the 
United States
In the United States of America, over the past decade the 
non-medical use of prescription opioids and the use of 
heroin have continued to interplay in the market. Since 
the high prevalence and associated morbidity and mortal-
ity of the non-medical use of prescription opioids have 
become a major public health issue,22 a recent increase in 
heroin use has triggered a sharp increase in heroin-related 
overdose deaths.23, 24 Several aspects have driven this 
21 Chalmers and others, “The effect of methamphetamine and heroin 
price on poly drug use” (see footnote 16).
22 Wilson M. Compton, Christopher M. Jones and Grant T. Bald-
win, “Relationship between nonmedical prescription-opioid use 
and heroin use”, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 374, No. 2 
(2016), pp. 154-163. 
23 United States, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 
Behavioral Health Trends in the United States: Results from the 2014 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, HHS Publication No. 
SMA 15-4927, NSDUH Series H-50 (Rockville, Maryland, 2015). 
24 Christopher M. Jones, “Heroin use and heroin use risk behaviors 
among nonmedical users of prescription opioid pain relievers: 
United States, 2002-2004 and 2008-2010”, Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, vol. 132, Nos. 1 and 2 (2013), pp. 95-100.
MAp 1 Expert perceptions of changes in trends in the use of 
amphetamines,* 2014 or latest year available since 2010
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
Note: The information presented in the map is for 2014 or the latest year since 2010 for which the information is available. The boundaries and 
names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent 
undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. 
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has 
not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
* Includes both amphetamine and methamphetamine.
4change: law enforcement and regulatory actions to address 
the irrational prescribing and reformulation of prescrip-
tion opioids with abuse-deterrent technologies; implemen-
tation of programmes for monitoring prescription drugs 
and education of health-care professionals and the public 
about their appropriate use;25 and increased accessibility, 
reduced prices and high purity of heroin in the United 
States.26 
In 2014, an estimated 914,000 people aged 12 years or 
older had used heroin in the past year — a 145 per cent 
increase since 2007 — while mortality related to heroin 
use has increased fivefold since 2000.27, 28, 29, 30 
From the period 2002-2004 to the period 2011-2013, 
there was an increase in heroin use, particularly among 
people who also reported the use of other substances. The 
highest rate of past-year heroin use was among cocaine 
users (91.5 per 1,000 users),31 followed by those who 
reported non-medical use of prescription opioids. Nine 
out of 10 people who used heroin self-reported co-use of 
heroin with at least one other drug, and most used heroin 
25 Ibid.
26 Compton and others, “Relationship between nonmedical prescrip-
tion” (see footnote 22).
27 It is recognized that households surveys do not capture the full 
extent of heroin use and are an underestimation. Nevertheless, in 
the absence of other trend data, this is used to inform the trends in 
heroin use.
28 Jones, “Heroin use and heroin use risk behaviors” (see footnote 24). 
29 World Drug Report 2014 (see footnote 18).
30 Many of the heroin-related deaths in the United States have also 
been attributed to the presence of fentanyl in certain parts of 
the country (United States, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
National Drug Threat Assessment Summary (October 2015).
31 Ibid.
with at least three other drugs.32 Moreover, the proportion 
of heroin users diagnosed with disorders related to non-
medical use of prescription opioids more than doubled, 
32 Christopher M. Jones and others, “Vital signs: demographic and 
substance use trends among heroin users – United States, 2002-
2013”, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, vol. 64, No. 26 
(2015). 
FIG. 3 Trends in the use of heroin and  
prescription opioids in the United States, 
2002-2014
Source: Wilson M. Compton, Christopher M. Jones and Grant T. 
Baldwin, “Relationship between nonmedical prescription-opioid 
use and heroin use”, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 374, 
No. 2 (2016), pp. 154-163. 
FIG. 4 Age-adjusted rates of death related to 
prescription opioids and heroin in the 
United States, 2000-2014
Source: Wilson M. Compton, Christopher M. Jones and Grant T. 
Baldwin, “Relationship between nonmedical prescription-opioid 
use and heroin use”, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 374, 
No. 2 (2016), pp. 154-163.
FIG. 5 Trends in polydrug use among heroin  
users in the United States, 2002-2013
Source: Christopher M. Jones and others, “Vital signs: demo-
graphic and substance use trends among heroin users – United 
States, 2002-2013”, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, vol. 
64, No. 26 (2015). 
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from 20.7 per cent in the period 2002-2004 to 45.2 per 
cent in the period 2011-2013. 
The increase in heroin use in the United States has been 
more pronounced among a subgroup of people aged 18-25 
who report a higher frequency of non-medical use of pre-
scription opioids.33 Among this group, the likelihood of 
using heroin in the past year, ever injecting prescription 
opioids or becoming dependent on heroin increased with 
the frequency of non-medical use of prescription opioids 
in the previous year. Those reporting non-medical use of 
prescription opioids for over 100 days in the past year were 
nearly eight times more likely to report dependence on 
heroin than those who reported less frequent non-medical 
use of prescription opioids. 
It appears that the increase in heroin use in the United 
States had already begun around 2006 and had preceded 
the changes introduced in policies and practices related to 
prescription opioids. Nevertheless, given the large number 
of non-medical users of prescription opioids, even a small 
proportion who switch to heroin use has translated into a 
much higher number of people using heroin. 
Analysis suggests that the problem of opioid use is not 
substance-specific and requires holistic approaches to 
address the interconnected epidemic through prevention 
33 Jones, “Heroin use and heroin use risk behaviors” (see footnote 24).
of initiation and treatment interventions for people with 
opioid use disorder.34
Shift between injecting heroin, amphetamines 
and new psychoactive substances in Europe
In some European countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Spain and 
the United Kingdom), small, localized groups of high-risk 
drug users who are in contact with low-threshold services, 
psychiatric facilities and treatment centres for drug users 
and who used to inject heroin and amphetamines have 
switched to injecting NPS such as synthetic cathinones. 
Reports to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) suggest that drug users 
who inject synthetic cathinones are primarily those who 
have been injecting heroin and amphetamines and have 
now either started injecting synthetic cathinones or 
included it in their drug use repertoire.35 People who inject 
synthetic cathinones include those who are on opioid sub-
stitution treatment, as well as young people beginning 
their drug-injecting use. 
In Hungary, in the period 2009-2012 a shortage of heroin 
and an increase in local availability of synthetic cathinones 
contributed to high-risk drug users switching to injecting 
NPS, primarily synthetic cathinones. A corresponding 
change in the patterns of injecting was reported both 
among clients of needle and syringe programmes (NSP) 
and those entering treatment. In 2009, the majority of 
34 Compton and others, “Relationship between nonmedical  
prescription opioids use” (see footnote 22).
35 EMCDDA, “Perspectives on drugs: injection of synthetic  
cathinones”, 28 May 2015.
FIG. 6 Likelihood of past-year heroin use  
and other indicators depending on  
the frequency of non-medical use of  
prescription opioids in the past year
Source: Christopher M. Jones and others, “Vital signs: demo-
graphic and substance use trends among heroin users – United 
States, 2002-2013”, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, vol. 
64, No. 26 (2015). 
a Odds ratio adjusted for the influence of (confounders) other variables.
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Hungary, 2009-2012
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6people who inject drugs (PWID) were injecting heroin or 
amphetamine, whereas by 2012 about 43 per cent of 
PWID were primarily injecting synthetic cathinones and 
another 40 per cent were injecting amphetamine.36 This 
trend was self-reported, as well as confirmed through sam-
ples obtained from injecting equipment. Of the main syn-
thetic cathinones injected by PWID, the predominant 
substance was pentedrone; the other substances reported 
were 3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV), mephe-
drone and 4-methylethcathinone (4-MEC), all of which 
are stimulants. 
There is evidence of similar trends in treatment settings, 
where the proportion of heroin users dropped consider-
ably and the proportion of clients entering treatment for 
injecting amphetamine and other stimulants increased 
substantially in 2012. 
In Hungary, the reduced availability of heroin did not 
change injecting practices but made users switch to other 
injecting substances (such as NPS and amphetamine) that 
were more affordable and readily available and also gave 
intense effects.37 
Drug market changes and patterns of injecting 
drug use in Australia
In Australia, the heroin market changed considerably after 
2000; heroin went from being highly accessible (cheap, 
high in purity and available) and the most commonly 
injected drug in Australia to being less accessible as a result 
of a heroin shortage.38 The change resulted in a decrease 
in the prevalence and frequency of injecting heroin, as well 
as a decline in adverse health consequences related to 
heroin use.39 
The subsequent years (2001-2004) saw a sustained decrease 
in the availability and use of heroin in Australia. During the 
same period, methamphetamine emerged on the market at 
a relatively low price per gram of pure methamphetamine, 
which was readily available, and that led to an increase in 
methamphetamine use.40 In the years from 2004 onwards, 
the illicit markets for both heroin and methamphetamine 
continued to be very dynamic, with the price and purity of 
both drugs fluctuating. In the same period, the increased 
practice of prescribing opioids and their non-medical use 
(among PWID) was also observed.41
36 Anna Péterfi and others, “Changes in patterns of injecting drug use 
in Hungary: a shift to synthetic cathinones”, Drug Test and Analysis, 
vol. 6, Nos. 7 and 8 (2014), pp. 825-831.
37 Ibid.
38 Horyniak and others, “How do drug market changes affect charac-
teristics of injecting initiation and subsequent patterns of drug use?” 
(see footnote 5).
39 Louisa Dagenhardt and others, “Effects of a sustained heroin short-
age in three Australian States”, Addiction, vol. 100, No. 7 (2005), 
pp. 908-920.
40 Louisa Dagehhardt and others, “The epidemiology of methamphet-
amine use and harm in Australia”, Drug and Alcohol Review, vol. 27, 
No. 3 (2008), pp. 243-252. 
41 Horyniak and others, “How do drug market changes affect charac-
A cohort study of PWID in Melbourne, who were recruited 
between November 2008 and March 2010, examined the 
impact that the changing market dynamics might have had 
on drug use patterns.42 Among the participants in the study, 
initiation with injecting heroin remained the most common 
practice in all three of the periods examined, although it 
declined in the period when heroin availability was low. In 
that period, the proportion of PWID who initiated injecting 
methamphetamine increased. In the later period (from 2004 
onwards), the proportion of PWID initiating injecting with 
methamphetamine decreased, counterbalancing an increase 
in initiating injecting with heroin and other drugs, primarily 
prescription opioids.
In 2013, most of the participants in the study were polydrug 
users (44 per cent) or users primarily injecting heroin (41 per 
cent). Among current PWID, the practice of primarily inject-
ing methamphetamine was not common, but the participants 
who initiated injecting during the period when heroin avail-
ability was low were almost twice as likely to be current poly-
drug injectors. Also, a combination of heroin and 
methamphetamine was more commonly used by current 
PWID, and drugs such as heroin were often used to counter 
the “comedown effects” of methamphetamine.43 
teristics of injecting initiation and subsequent patterns of drug use?” 
(see footnote 5).
42 Ibid.
43 Brendan Quinn and others, “Methamphetamine use in Mel-
bourne, Australia: baseline characteristics of a prospective meth-
FIG. 8 Trends in the initiation of injecting  
drug use, by substance, in Melbourne, 
Australia, 2001, 2001-2004 and since 
2004 
Source: Danielle Horyniak and others, “How do drug market 
changes affect characteristics of injecting initiation and subse-
quent patterns of drug use? Findings from a cohort of regular 
heroin and methamphetamine injectors in Melbourne, Australia”, 
International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 26, No. 1 (2015), pp. 
43-50.
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The findings of the study suggest that the first drug 
injected reflects the characteristics of the drug market at 
the time, while later patterns of drug use, including poly-
drug use, appear to be the result of compensation or sub-
stitution mechanisms brought on by market dynamics. 
These patterns may reflect the cyclical nature of drug epi-
demics and may continue to change as drug markets 
evolve.
Methamphetamine smoking among heroin users 
and polydrug users in Greece
In recent years in Greece, both low-threshold services and 
treatment agencies have reported the smoking of crystal-
line methamphetamine on a regular basis among injecting 
opioid users. This practice has been reported particularly 
among marginalized migrant subpopulations of persons 
who inject opioids in Athens.44 
Polydrug use in Greece is common among drug users in 
treatment. In 2013, almost 71 per cent of clients in treat-
ment reported having used more than one substance, with 
polydrug use being more common among cocaine (80 per 
cent) and opioid users (77 per cent). Misuse of prescrip-
tion drugs and use of cannabis and cocaine were most 
frequently reported among users of opioids, while primary 
cocaine users more frequently reported use of cannabis 
and opioids.45
Emerging methamphetamine use among opiate 
users in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, where opiates remain the 
main drug consumed by problem drug users, metham-
phetamine use has emerged as another drug of concern in 
recent years. Methamphetamine use has also been 
described as a new form of polydrug use among opiate 
users.46 Many local studies of opiate users in methadone 
treatment have reported the use of methamphetamine 
among the clients of treatment centres. For example, a 
study at an opioid substitution treatment clinic in Zahedan 
Province showed that methamphetamine use among 
opioid users in treatment increased from 6 per cent in 
2009 to almost 20 per cent in 2011.47 Another study of 
378 people seeking treatment at a therapeutic community 
centre found that the urine samples of nearly 7 per cent 
of those people had tested positive for methampheta-
amphetamine-using cohort and correlates of methamphetamine 
dependence”, Journal of Substance Use, vol. 18, No. 5 (2013), pp. 
349-362. 
44 EMCDDA, “Perspectives on drugs: health and social responses for 
methamphetamine users In Europe”, 27 May 2014.
45 EMCDDA, 2014 National Report to the EMCDDA (2013 Data) by 
the Reitox Greek National Focal Point: Greece − New Developments, 
Trends (Athens, 2014). 
46 Zahra A. Mehrjerdi, Alasdair M. Barr and Alireza Noroozi, “Meth-
amphetamine-associated psychosis: a new health challenge in Iran”, 
DARU Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences (2013).
47 Zahra A. Mehrjerdi, “Crystal in Iran: methamphetamine or heroin 
kerack”, DARU Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 2013.
mine.48, 49 Methamphetamine use has reportedly had a 
negative influence on opioid-dependent patients in treat-
ment who wrongly believed that methamphetamine use 
could help control their opiate dependence and associated 
problems such as depression and poor sexual performance 
and increase their physical energy, attention and concen-
tration and improve social relationships.50 Methampheta-
mine use among heroin users has also been reported in 
other parts of Asia.51
Problem drug use as reflected in demand 
for treatment for drug use
Information about people in treatment for drug use dis-
orders can be taken as a proxy for understanding the 
nature, as well as a latent indicator, of trends in drug use 
resulting in severe health consequences. 
According to global estimates, nearly one in six people 
with drug use disorders access treatment services each year. 
Opioids stand out as a major drug of concern in North 
America, Europe (particularly Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe) and Asia. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, 
nearly three out of every four people in treatment for drug 
use disorders are treated for opioid use. The number of 
people in treatment for cocaine use disorders remains quite 
high in Latin America and the Caribbean, where nearly 
half of people in treatment for drug use disorders are 
treated for cocaine use. Treatment related to cannabis use 
disorders is more prominent in Africa and Oceania than 
in other regions. This may be related to the limited treat-
ment options for users of other drugs in Africa, where 
nearly half of all admissions to treatment for drug use dis-
orders are for the use of non-specified substances, which 
masks the true extent of the use of drugs of concern other 
than cannabis. Amphetamines remain a problem primar-
ily in East and South-East Asia and to some extent in 
North America; while the number of people in treatment 
for disorders related to the use of amphetamines has been 
increasing in Asia, half of the people in treatment for drug 
use in the region are treated for opioid use disorders. 
The number and characteristics of people seeking treat-
ment for the first time are indirect indicators of trends in 
health consequences caused by the use of different sub-
stances in a region. At the global level, the proportion of 
48 Zahra Alam-Mehrjerdi, Azarakhsh Mokri and Kate Dolan,  
“Methamphetamine use and treatment in Iran: a systematic review 
from the most populated Persian Gulf country”, Asian Journal of 
Psychiatry, vol. 16, 2015, pp. 17-25.
49 Nasrindokht Sadir and others, “Outcome evaluation of therapeutic 
community model in Iran”, International Journal of Health Policy 
and Management, vol. 1, No. 2 (2013), pp. 131-135. 
50 Schwann Shariatirad, Masoomeh Maarefvand and Hamed Ekhiari, 
“Methamphetamine use and methadone maintenance treatment: 
an emerging problem in the drug addiction treatment network in 
Iran”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 24, No. 6 (2013), 
pp. e115 and e116. 
51 Darshan Singh and others, “Substance abuse and HIV situation in 
Malaysia”, Journal of Food and Drug Analysis, vol. 21, Suppl. No. 4 
(2013), pp. S46–S51. 
8FIG. 9 Total number of people in treatment for drug use, including people in treatment for the first time, 
by drug type and region, 2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
Note: The figures are based on data for 2014 or the latest year since 2010 for which data are available. For each region, the number of people in 
treatment for the use of different drugs in the region is weighted by the total number of people treated in a country. Member States in Oceania (in 
particular, Australia and New Zealand) do not provide information on the proportion of people in treatment for the first time, and therefore informa-
tion for Oceania is not reflected in the figures.
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people seeking treatment for cannabis use disorders for 
the first time remains high — nearly 50 per cent. In Asia, 
among those being treated for disorders related to the use 
of amphetamines, nearly 60 per cent are reported to be in 
treatment for the first time; in Europe and Latin America, 
nearly 40 per cent of those being treated for cocaine use 
disorders are reported to be in treatment for the first time. 
People seeking treatment for disorders related to the use 
of cannabis and amphetamines are younger (on average, 
24 and 25 years of age, respectively) than people seeking 
treatment for disorders related to the use of other drugs, 
including those seeking such treatment for the first time. 
This reflects increasing trends in the use of cannabis and 
amphetamines and the resulting increase in people seeking 
treatment for disorders related to the use of those drugs. 
Fewer people are in treatment for the first time for opioid 
or cocaine use disorders; however, they are typically in 
their thirties and, in many subregions, reflect an ageing 
cohort of users in treatment52 and show an overall decrease 
in the proportion of treatment demand. 
Moreover, based on data reported by Member States, it is 
estimated that between 40 and 80 per cent of people in 
treatment for drug use are diagnosed with polydrug use, 
which reflects the complexity of drug use patterns and the 
challenges of treating people with drug use disorders 
effectively.
Trends in treatment demand over the past decade also cor-
roborate the changing patterns of drug use observed in 
52 Joseph Gfroerer and others, “Substance abuse treatment need 
among older adults in 2020: the impact of the aging baby-boom 
cohort”, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 69, No. 2 (2003), pp. 
127-135.
different regions and subregions. While demand for treat-
ment for cannabis use disorders has increased in all regions 
since 2003, it has done so to a much greater extent in the 
Americas, Western and Central Europe and Oceania. At 
the same time, in the Americas, the proportion of people 
in treatment for cocaine use has decreased over the past 
decade. In Asia, there has been a substantial increase in 
treatment for the use of amphetamine-type stimulants 
(ATS) and a decrease in treatment for disorders related to 
opioid use. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, treat-
ment for opioid use disorders has been a matter of concern 
over the past decade.
The increase in treatment demand related to cannabis use 
in some regions warrants special attention.53 There is great 
variability in the definition and practice of what consti-
tutes treatment of cannabis use disorders. Treatment at 
present consists of behavioural or psychosocial interven-
tions that may vary from a one-time online contact, or a 
brief intervention in an outpatient setting, to a more com-
prehensive treatment plan including treatment of other 
co-morbidities in an outpatient or inpatient setting.54 
53 Wayne Hall, Maria Renström and Vladimir Poznyak, eds.,  
The Health and Social Effects of Nonmedical Cannabis Use  
(Geneva, WHO, 2016).
54 Jan Copeland, Amie Frewen and Kathryn Elkins, Management 
of Cannabis Use Disorder and Related Issues: A Clinician’s Guide 
(Sydney, National Cannabis Prevention and Information Centre, 
University of New South Wales, 2009); Divya Ramesh and Mar-
garet Haney, “Treatment of cannabis use disorders”, in Textbook of 
Addiction Treatment: International Perspectives, N. El-Guebaly, G. 
Carrà and M. Galanter, eds. (Milan, Italy, Springer, 2015); and 
Alan J. Budney and others, “Marijuana dependence and its treat-
ment”, Addiction Science and Clinical Practice, vol. 4, No. 1 (2004), 
pp. 4-16. 
FIG. 10 Primary drug used among people in drug treatment, by region, 2003, 2009 and 2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
Note: Data used for each point in time are based on reporting from countries in each region for the year cited or the latest year for which data are 
available.
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What are the potential driving forces 
behind changes in the number of people in 
treatment for cannabis use?
The nature and extent of the potential health risks and 
harms associated with cannabis use are continually under 
debate.55 Cannabis use can be perceived to be relatively 
harmless56, 57 when compared with the use of other con-
trolled psychoactive substances and also in relation to the 
use of tobacco or alcohol. However, lower risk does not 
mean no risk: there are harmful health effects associated 
with a higher frequency of cannabis use and initiation at 
a very young age, especially among adolescents during the 
time of their cognitive and emotional development.58 
Adverse health effects of cannabis use associated with cog-
nitive impairments or psychiatric symptoms are well docu-
mented in the scientific literature.59, 60, 61 Hence, cannabis 
use disorders require clinically significant treatment inter-
ventions. The transition from drug use to drug dependence 
occurs for a much smaller proportion of cannabis users 
than for opioid, amphetamine or cocaine users.62 How-
ever, because so many people use cannabis, this translates 
into a large number who experience cannabis use disorders; 
for example, in the United States, of the 22.2 million cur-
rent cannabis users in 2014, 4.2 million people aged 12 
or older had a cannabis use disorder diagnosed in the pre-
vious year.63 
Cannabis use disorders are estimated to occur in approxi-
mately 1 out of every 11 persons (9 per cent) who have 
55 Nora D. Volkow and others, “Adverse health effects of marijuana 
use”, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 370, No. 23 (2014), 
pp. 2219-2227.
56 David Nutt and others, “Development of a rational scale to assess 
the harm of drugs of potential misuse”, The Lancet, vol. 369, No. 
9566 (2007), pp. 1047-1053. 
57 Dirk W. Lachenmeier and Jürgen Rehm, “Comparative risk assess-
ment of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis and other illicit drugs using the 
margin of exposure approach”, Scientific Reports, vol. 5, No. 8126 
(2015).
58 Wayne Hall, “The adverse health effects of cannabis use: what are 
they, and what are their implications for policy?”, International 
Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 20, No. 6 (2009), pp. 458-466; Robin 
Room and others, Cannabis Policy: Moving Beyond Stalemate 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010); and Dan I. Lubman, Ali 
Cheetham and Murat Yücel, “Cannabis and adolescent brain devel-
opment”, Pharmacology and Therapeutics, vol. 148 (2015), pp. 1-16. 
59 Wayne Hall, “What has research over the past two decades revealed 
about the adverse health effects of recreational cannabis use?”, 
Addiction, vol. 114, No. 1 (2015), pp. 19-35; and Wayne Hall and 
Louisa Degenhardt, “Adverse health effects of non-medical cannabis 
use”, The Lancet, vol. 374, No. 9698 (October 2009),pp. 1383-
1391. 
60 World Drug Report 2014, footnotes 180 and 181, p. 44. 
61 Wayne Hall and others, The Health and Social Effects of Nonmedical 
Cannabis Use (see footnote 53). 
62 James C. Anthony, Lynn A. Warner and Ronald C. Kessler, “Com-
parative epidemiology of dependence on tobacco, alcohol, con-
trolled substances, and inhalants: basic findings from the National 
Comorbidity Survey”, Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacol-
ogy, vol. 2, No. 3 (1994), pp. 244-268.
63 Behavioral Health Trends in the United States: Results from the 2014 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (see footnote 23). 
ever used cannabis,64 and the proportion increases signifi-
cantly to one out of every six persons (17 per cent) who 
started using cannabis in their teens65 and to 25-50 per 
cent of daily cannabis users.66, 67 
Factors that may influence the number of people in treat-
ment when cannabis is the primary drug of concern68 
include: changes in the number of people who actually 
need treatment; changes in referrals to treatment; changes 
in awareness of potential problems associated with can-
nabis use; and changes in the availability of treatment for 
cannabis. Unfortunately, detailed information on trends 
in the number of people in treatment and on potential 
driving forces is sparse, and consequently the analysis pre-
sented below is limited to the situation in the United States 
and in European countries.
Are changing patterns of treatment for  
cannabis use a result of more harmful  
consumption patterns? 
The risk of adverse health effects increases with harmful 
patterns of cannabis use that include high-frequency (daily 
or near-daily) use, an earlier age of initiation and con-
sumption of higher-potency cannabis.
In the United States, the number of daily (or near-daily) 
cannabis users, measured by the number using cannabis 
on 20 or more days in the past month and the number 
using cannabis on 300 or more days in the past year, rose 
significantly after 2006, by 58 and 74 per cent, respectively. 
However, this increase in daily (or near-daily) cannabis use 
has not translated into an increased number of people 
seeking treatment, even when those in treatment referred 
by the criminal justice system are excluded.
In Europe, where treatment for cannabis use disorders has 
been on the increase, approximately 1 per cent of the pop-
ulation aged 15-64 are daily (or near-daily) cannabis users; 
although data on daily use are sparse, there is little evidence 
64 C. Lopez-Quintero and others, “Probability and predictors of tran-
sition from first use to dependence on nicotine, alcohol, cannabis, 
and cocaine: results of the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alco-
hol and Related Conditions (NESARC)”, Drug and Alcohol Depen-
dence, vol. 115, Nos. 1 and 2 (2011), pp. 120-130.
65 James C. Anthony, “The epidemiology of cannabis dependence”, in 
Cannabis Dependence: Its Nature, Consequences and Treatment, Roger 
A. Roffman and Robert S. Stephens, eds. (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 58-105.
66 Wayne Hall and Rosalie L. Pacula, Cannabis Use and Dependence: 
Public Health and Public Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
67 EMCDDA, Prevalence of Daily Cannabis Use in the European Union 
and Norway (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2012). 
68 In the context of this section of the present report, cannabis treat-
ment refers to the situation where cannabis was the primary drug 
of concern. People in treatment when other drugs were the primary 
drug of concern might be treated for their cannabis use at the same 
time. Therefore, the total number of people receiving who use 
cannabis is actually far greater than the number presented here, 
especially since the use of cannabis is frequent among users of other 
drugs. 
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that this rate has changed over the past decade.69 In several 
countries in Europe with some of the highest numbers of 
people in treatment for cannabis use (Germany, Spain and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land), the prevalence of past-month cannabis use has been 
stable or declining in the past decade, although the number 
of persons in treatment for cannabis use has risen 
continually.
One factor that could explain increased negative health 
effects of cannabis use could be decreasing age of initia-
tion, but there is little evidence that cannabis users are 
now starting at an earlier age. The age of initiation of can-
nabis use reported by those in treatment has changed little 
69 Prevalence of Daily Cannabis Use (see footnote 67).
over time in the United States and has followed no clear 
trend in Europe; therefore, it has probably not been an 
important factor influencing the trends observed in the 
number of persons in treatment.70, 71 
Increases in the potency of cannabis products (the del-
ta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol or tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC) content), including in the ratio of THC to can-
nabidiol (a cannabinoid with anti-psychotic properties 
that may partially counterbalance the harm caused by 
THC), have received considerable attention in relation to 
possible increases in adverse health effects. There is evi-
dence in some countries that there is now a large variety 
of cannabis products on the market and that high-potency 
preparations have become more widely available.72, 73 Nev-
ertheless, the interplay between high-potency cannabis 
products and dosage and how it translates into harm for 
users is not well understood. Users may adjust (titrate) the 
amounts of cannabis they consume to achieve the desired 
psychoactive effect, although this has been shown to be 
more difficult for inexperienced users74 and users of 
high-potency cannabis.75 
Are changing patterns of treatment for  
cannabis use a result of changes in referrals 
from the criminal justice system?
Several countries have adopted alternative measures to 
incarceration in minor cases involving possession of can-
nabis for personal consumption without aggravating cir-
cumstances (for example, fines, warnings, probation, 
counselling or even exemption from punishment). In the 
United States and the majority of countries in Europe, 
there is the option of referral or diversion away from crimi-
nal sanctions and into treatment. Thus, the criminal justice 
response to cases involving possession of cannabis for per-
sonal use can have an impact on the number of persons 
in treatment for cannabis use. 
In the United States, persons referred to treatment from 
the criminal justice system constitute a significant propor-
tion (47-58 per cent in the period 1992-2012) of those in 
70 United States, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA), Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 
Treatment Episode Data Set: Admissions (TEDS-A) Concatenated, 
1992 to 2012, ICPSR 25221 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, Inter-univer-
sity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2015). 
71 EMCDDA, Statistical Bulletin, various years.
72 For more details, see World Drug Report 2015 ((United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.15.XI.6), pp. 62-64).
73 James R. Burgdorf, Beau Kilmer and Rosalie L. Pacula, “Heteroge-
neity in the composition of marijuana seized in California”, Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 117, No. 1 (2011), pp. 59-61.
74 Tom P. Freeman and others, “Just say ‘know’: how do cannabi-
noid concentrations influence users’ estimates of cannabis potency 
and the amount they roll in joints?”, Addiction, vol. 109, No. 10 
(2014), pp. 1686-1694.
75 Peggy van der Pol and others, “Cross-sectional and prospective 
relation of cannabis potency, dosing and smoking behaviour with 
cannabis dependence: an ecological study”, Addiction, vol. 109, No. 
7 (2014), pp. 1101-1109.
FIG. 11 Number of daily (or near-daily) users  
of cannabis and number of people in 
treatment for cannabis use in the United 
States, 2002-2012
Sources: United States, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA), Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use 
and Health: Summary of National Findings, NSDUH Series H-48, 
HHS Publication No. (SMA) 14-4863 (Rockville, Maryland, 
SAMHSA, 2014); United States, Department of Health and Human 
Services, SAMHSA, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and 
Quality, Treatment Episode Data Set: Admissions (TEDS-A) –  
Concatenated, 1992 to 2012, ICPSR25221 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2015).
Note: The data presented in the figure are for people aged 12 years  
and older; persons in treatment are those for whom cannabis was the 
primary drug of concern.
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
N
um
be
r o
f d
ai
ly
 (o
r n
ea
r-
da
ily
)
ca
nn
ab
is
 u
se
rs
 (m
ill
io
ns
)
N
um
be
r i
n 
tr
ea
tm
en
t
Total number of people in treatment for whom
cannabis was the primary drug of concern
Number of people in treatment for whom 
cannabis was the primary drug of concern referred 
by themselves or health-care or community 
services or school/employer
Number who used cannabis on 20 or more days
in the past month (millions)
Number who used cannabis on 300 or more days
in the past year (millions)
12
treatment for cannabis use.76 However, over the same 
20-year period, 40 per cent of those referred from the 
criminal justice system reported that they had not used 
cannabis in the month prior to entering treatment, and 
only 22 per cent reported daily use of cannabis. The 
number of arrests for cannabis possession follows a pattern 
that is for the most part similar to the number of people 
in treatment for cannabis, suggesting that changes in treat-
ment for cannabis use in the United States are possibly a 
reflection of changes in arrests for cannabis possession.
In Europe, referrals from the criminal justice system (from 
the police, the courts and probation services) also make 
an important contribution to the number of persons in 
treatment as a result of their cannabis use. Typically, one 
in five persons who are in treatment and for whom can-
nabis was the primary drug of concern were referred from 
the criminal justice system,77 with the proportion ranging 
76 Treatment Episode Data Set: Admissions (TEDS-A) – Concatenated, 
1992 to 2012 (see footnote 70).
77 Median of 21 per cent from 26 reporting countries using data for 
2013 or the most recent year available.
FIG. 12 Number of people in treatment for canna-
bis use and the prevalence of past-month 
cannabis use in Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, 2006-2013
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire; and 
EMCDDA, Statistical Bulletin, 2015.
Note: The data presented in the figures are for persons in treatment for 
whom cannabis was the primary drug of concern; for the United King-
dom, the treatment data refer to the second year in the range given and 
are for the whole country, but the prevalence rates refer to England and 
Wales only; for Spain, the prevalence rate given for 2007 refers to the 
years 2007/08. 
FIG. 13 Number of people in treatment for  
cannabis use and number of arrests for 
possession of cannabis in the United 
States, 1992-2012
Sources: United States, Department of Health and Human Services, 
SAMHSA, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 
Treatment Episode Data Set: Admissions (TEDS-A) – Concatenated, 
1992 to 2012, ICPSR25221 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2015); United States, 
Executive Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy: 
Data Supplement 2014 (Washington, D.C., 2014). 
Note: The data on treatment presented in the figure are for people aged 
12 years and older for whom cannabis was the primary drug of concern. 
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from 3.9 per cent in the Netherlands to 80.6 per cent in 
Hungary.78 Unfortunately, information is not available 
with regard to changes over time. 
Have barriers and facilitators of access to  
treatment influenced the trend in treatment  
for cannabis use? 
Given that persons who are dependent on cannabis are 
often reluctant to seek treatment,79 an awareness and 
understanding, particularly among youth, of the potential 
harm associated with cannabis use may encourage users 
to seek help. In the United States there has been a con-
tinuous decline in the perception among youth that can-
nabis use is harmful. The proportion of secondary school 
students who see a “great risk” from regular cannabis use 
has declined since the early 1990s and there has been a 
particularly rapid decline since the mid-2000s. In 2014, 
less than 40 per cent of twelfth-grade students (ages 17-18) 
perceived a “great risk” from regular cannabis use, down 
from nearly 80 per cent in the early 1990s.80 In Europe, 
the perception of harm from cannabis use is higher among 
youth than in the United States and has not shown a 
decline. According to European surveys conducted in 
2003, 2007 and 2011, the percentage of students perceiv-
ing “great risk” of harm from regular cannabis use has been 
maintained at 70-72 per cent.81 The greater perception of 
risk from cannabis use observed in Europe may have been 
a factor in the increasing numbers in treatment.
There could be considerable unmet demand for treatment 
for cannabis use in Europe. It is estimated that there are 
3 million daily (or near-daily) cannabis users (persons who 
used cannabis 20 or more days in the previous month) in 
the region.82 Based on a number of studies, cannabis 
dependence has been estimated to occur in 25-50 per cent 
of daily users.83, 84 In Europe, a total number of approxi-
mately 206,000 persons received treatment in 2010 for 
which cannabis was either the primary or secondary reason 
for entering treatment,85 suggesting that 10-30 per cent 
of all daily dependent cannabis users were receiving 
treatment. 
78 EMCDDA, Data and statistics, Statistical Bulletin 2015, table 
TDI-0291. Available at www.emcdda.europa.eu/.
79 Peter Gates and others, “Barriers and facilitators to cannabis treat-
ment”, Drug and Alcohol Review, vol. 31, No. 3 (2012), pp. 311-
319. 
80 Richard A. Miech and others, Monitoring the Future National Survey 
Results on Drug Use: 1975-2014, vol. 1, Secondary school students 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Institute for Social 
Research, 2015), chap. 2.
81 Bjorn Hibell and others, The 2011 ESPAD Report: Substance Use 
among Students in 36 European Countries; The 2007 ESPAD Report: 
Substance Use Among Students in 35 European Countries; and The 
2003 ESPAD Report: Alcohol and other Drug Use among Students in 
35 European Countries (Stockholm, Swedish Council for Informa-
tion on Alcohol and Other Drugs, 2012, 2009 and 2004).
82 Prevalence of Daily Cannabis Use (see footnote 67).
83 Hall and Pacula, “Cannabis use and dependence” (see footnote 66).
84 Prevalence of Daily Cannabis Use (see footnote 67). 
85 Ibid.
At the health-care policy level and in international research, 
treatment for cannabis use has been receiving a relatively 
high level of visibility and public funding in Europe.86 
Since 2008, the number of persons in treatment for can-
nabis use has been increasing in Europe, which in part is 
a reflection of the expansion in the provision of treat-
ment.87 In many countries in Europe, important strides 
have been made in the provision of treatment with pro-
grammes that have been implemented, expanded or modi-
fied to address the needs of cannabis users, some having 
adolescents and young adults as their target groups.88, 89
Gender and drug use
Men are considered to be three times more likely than 
women to use cannabis, cocaine or amphetamines, whereas 
women are more likely than men to engage in the non-
medical use of prescription opioids and tranquillizers. 
Gender disparities in drug use are more attributable to 
opportunities to use drugs in a social environment than 
to either gender being more or less susceptible or vulner-
able to the use of drugs.90 Men are considered to have 
more opportunities than women to use drugs, but both 
genders are equally likely to use drugs once an opportunity 
to do so occurs.91, 92
Gender divide in drug use is narrowing among 
the younger generation
In most surveys, the prevalence of drug use is reportedly 
higher among young people than among adults and the 
gender divide in drug use is narrower among young people 
than among adults.93 In Europe, for every two girls who 
use cannabis there are three boys, whereas the prevalence 
of cannabis use among adults is nearly twice as high among 
men than among women.94 In the United States, the use 
86 Sharon R. Sznitman, “Cannabis treatment in Europe: a survey of 
services”, in A Cannabis Reader: Global Issues and Local Experiences 
− Perspectives on Cannabis Controversies, Treatment and Regulation 
in Europe, vol. 2, S. R. Sznitman, B. Olsson and R. Room, eds., 
EMCDDA Monograph Series No. 8, (EMCDDA, Lisbon, 2008).
87 J. Schettino and others, Treatment of Cannabis-related Disorders in 
Europe, EMCDDA Insights Series (Lisbon, EMCDDA, 2015).
88 Eva Hoch and others, “CANDIS treatment program for cannabis 
use disorders: findings from a randomized multi-site translational 
trial”, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 134 (2014), pp. 185-193.
89 Treatment of Cannabis-related Disorders in Europe (see footnote 87).
90 See World Drug Report 2015.
91 Michelle L. van Etten and James C. Anthony, “Male-female differ-
ences in transitions from first drug opportunity to first use: search-
ing for subgroup variation by age, race, region, and urban status”, 
Journal of Women’s Health and Gender-based Medicine, vol. 10, No. 8 
(2001).
92 Michelle L. van Etten, Yehuda D. Neumark and James C. Anthony, 
“Male-female differences in the earliest stages of drug involvement”, 
Addiction, vol. 94, No. 9 (1999), pp. 1413-1419.
93 Jessica H. Cotto and others, “Gender effects on drug use, abuse, 
and dependence: a special analysis of results from the National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health”, Gender Medicine, vol. 7, No. 5 
(2010), pp. 402-413.
94 The 2011 ESPAD Report; and the unweighted average of the prev-
alence of past-year drug use for European Union member States 
reported by EMCDDA. 
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of cannabis, cocaine and prescription opioids among 
young people (ages 12-17) was fluctuating over the past 
decade but overall the gender gap has remained similar. 
Gender divide in drug use is changing 
In recent years, in countries with established drug use, the 
gender divide in drug use has also been changing in the 
adult population, partly reflecting increasing opportuni-
ties to use a particular substance. In the United States, 
among the population aged 12 and older, heroin use 
remains higher among men than among women. However, 
over the past decade more women than men have started 
using heroin: the prevalence of past-year heroin use among 
women was 0.08 per cent in the period 2002-2004 and 
twice that figure (0.16 per cent) in the period 2011-2013, 
whereas the prevalence of past-year heroin use among men 
increased by half in the same period. The increase in heroin 
use was significantly higher among men and women who 
were younger (18-25 years old) and more frequent users 
of prescription opioids.95 
In the United Kingdom, overall drug use in the adult 
population declined between 1996 and the period 2013-
2014. However, this decline was more marked among 
women (-30 per cent) than men (-13 per cent). While the 
prevalence of amphetamine use declined by 75 per cent 
95 Christopher M. Jones and others, “Vital signs: demographic and 
substance use trends among heroin users − United States, 2002-
2013, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, vol. 64, No. 26 
(2015), pp. 719-725. 
for both men and women, the decline in cannabis use was 
greater among women (-40 per cent) than among men 
(-20 per cent).96 
B. HEALTH IMPACT OF DRUG USE
Almost 12 million people inject drugs 
worldwide
The joint UNODC/WHO/UNAIDS/World Bank esti-
mate for the number of people who inject drugs (PWID) 
for 2014 is 11.7 million (range: from 8.4 to 19.0 million), 
or 0.25 per cent (range: 0.18-0.40 per cent) of the popu-
lation aged 15-64. PWID experience some of the most 
severe health-related harms associated with unsafe drug 
use, overall poor health outcomes, including a high risk 
for non-fatal and fatal overdoses, and a greater chance of 
premature death.97 This is exacerbated by poor access to 
evidence-informed services for the prevention and treat-
ment of infections, particularly HIV, hepatitis C and 
tuberculosis.98 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe is the subregion with 
by far the highest prevalence of injecting drug use: 1.27 
per cent of the population aged 15-64. The subregion 
accounts for almost one in four (24 per cent) of the total 
number of PWID worldwide; almost all PWID in the 
subregion reside in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. 
In Central Asia and Transcaucasia and in North America, 
the prevalence of injecting drug use is also high: 0.72 per 
cent of the population aged 15-64 in Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia; and 0.65 per cent in North America. Those 
three subregions combined account for 46 per cent of the 
total number of PWID worldwide. Although the preva-
lence of injecting drug use in East and South-East Asia is 
at a level below the global average, a large number of 
PWID (27 per cent of the total number of PWID in the 
world) reside in the subregion, given that it is the most 
populated subregion. Three countries (China, Russian 
Federation and United States) together account for nearly 
half of the total number of PWID worldwide.
Drug use is a major risk factor for the  
transmission of infectious diseases
Among people who inject drugs, one in seven  
is living with HIV and one in two is living with 
hepatitis C 
PWID represent a key at-risk population for HIV and 
hepatitis infections, with almost a third of new HIV infec-
tions outside sub-Saharan Africa occurring among 
96 United Kingdom, Home Office, Drug Misuse: Findings for the 
2013/14 Crime Survey for England and Wales (July 2014).
97 Mathers M. Bradley and others, “Mortality among people who 
inject drugs: a systematic review and meta-analysis”, Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization, vol. 91, No. 2 (2013), pp. 102-123.
98 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), The 
GAP Report 2014 (Geneva, 2014). 
FIG. 14 Ratio of males to females among young 
people (ages 12-17) who use cocaine, 
prescription opioids and cannabis in the 
United States, 2002-2013
Source: United States, SAMHSA, Center for Behavioral Health Sta-
tistics and Quality, Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug 
Use and Health: Mental Health Detailed Tables (Rockville, Mary-
land, 2014). 
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PWID.99 Compared with non-injecting drug users, PWID 
are approximately three times more likely to acquire 
HIV,100 as the sharing of contaminated needles and 
syringes is a major risk for the transmission of HIV and 
viral hepatitis. According to joint UNODC/WHO/
UNAIDS/World Bank estimates for 2014, 14.0 per cent 
(or 1.6 million) of PWID are living with HIV, 52 per cent 
(or 6.0 million) of PWID are infected with hepatitis C 
and 9.0 per cent (or 1.1 million) are infected with hepa-
titis B.
99 Ibid.
100 Isabel Tavitian-Exley and others, “Influence of different drugs on 
HIV risk in people who inject: systematic review and meta-analy-
sis”, Addiction, vol. 110, No. 4, pp. 572-584.
HIV prevalence is particularly high among PWID in 
South-West Asia and in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, 
where 28.2 and 22.9 per cent of PWID, respectively, are 
living with HIV. The two subregions combined account 
for 53 per cent of the total number of PWID living with 
HIV worldwide. Although both the prevalence of inject-
ing drug use and the prevalence of HIV among PWID in 
East and South-East Asia are below the global averages, a 
large number of PWID living with HIV (330,000, or 21 
per cent of the world total) reside in the subregion. Four 
countries combined (China, Pakistan, Russian Federation 
and United States) account for 64 per cent of the total 
number of PWID living with HIV. 
Risk behaviour and HIV among users of  
stimulants remain high
Studies have found that people who inject stimulants 
engage in higher-risk sexual behaviours and have higher 
HIV prevalence than people who inject opiates. People 
FIG. 15 Estimated number and prevalence of  
people who inject drugs among the  
general population, by region, 2014
Sources: Responses to the annual report questionnaire; progress 
reports of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) on the global AIDS response (various years); the former 
Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV and Injecting Drug 
Use; and government reports.
Note: The 2014 estimate of the total number of PWID worldwide (11.7 
million) is slightly lower than the estimate published in the World Drug 
Report 2015 (12.2 million), although the prevalence of injecting drug 
use among the population aged 15-64 remains stable. In particular, esti-
mates are now included for five countries in Africa (including for highly 
populated countries such as Nigeria) for which no data were previously 
available. This has led to an increase in the coverage of PWID estimates 
among the population aged 15-64 for Africa, from 29 to 50 per cent, 
and an improved overall estimate for PWID in Africa, with a correspond-
ing reduction in the level of uncertainty of the regional estimate.
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FIG. 16 Estimated number of people who inject 
drugs living with HIV and prevalence of 
HIV among people who inject drugs, by 
region, 2014
Sources: Responses to the annual report questionnaire; progress 
reports of UNAIDS on the global AIDS response (various years); 
the former Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV and 
Injecting Drug Use; and government reports.
Note: The prevalence of HIV among PWID in Western and Central 
Europe has been updated from 7.6 per cent (World Drug Report 2015) 
to 11.2 per cent. This is the result of updated information supplied by 
Italy, where nationally representative information became available to 
replace previously reported subnational data.
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FIG. 17 HIV prevalence among people who inject stimulants and among people who use stimulants 
but do not inject them 
Note: Based on a comprehensive review of studies commissioned by UNODC. (For details on the studies, see the relevant table in the online Statistical 
Annex to the World Drug Report.) Where available, the upper and lower bounds of 95 per cent confidence intervals are shown.
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who inject stimulants (cocaine and amphetamines) have 
been found to have more sexual partners and more fre-
quent intercourse with casual partners and regular partners 
than PWID who inject other drugs. Moreover, a systematic 
review found that the risk of acquiring HIV was 3.6 times 
greater among people who injected cocaine than among 
non-injecting users of cocaine, and 3.0 times greater 
among people who injected ATS than among non-inject-
ing users of ATS.101 
The use of stimulants (particularly methamphetamine and 
amphetamine) to enhance and prolong sexual activity is 
well documented, particularly among men who have sex 
with men (MSM).102 There is strong evidence of higher-
risk sexual behaviours and higher HIV prevalence among 
MSM who use methamphetamine or amphetamine than 
among those who use other drugs.103 These high-risk 
sexual behaviours include unprotected sex (or inconsistent 
condom use) and the selling of sex (in exchange for money 
101 Ibid.
102 Lydia N. Drumright and others, “Unprotected anal intercourse and 
substance use among men who have sex with men with recent HIV 
infection”, Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, vol. 
43, No. 3 (2006), pp. 344-350.
103 Nga Thi Thu Vu, Lisa Maher, and Iryna Zablotska, “Amphet-
amine-type stimulants and HIV infection among men who have 
sex with men: implications on HIV research and prevention from 
a systematic review and meta-analysis”, Journal of the International 
AIDS Society, vol. 18, No. 1 (2015).
or drugs), as well as a higher frequency of sexual activity 
and an increased number of sexual partners.104, 105, 106 
As many stimulants (particularly NPS that are stimulants) 
have a shorter duration of action, compared with users of 
opiates, users of stimulants report a high frequency of 
injecting, with compulsive re-injecting and a greater like-
lihood to report the sharing and reuse of needles and 
syringes that might be contaminated.107, 108 
104 Francisco I. Bastos and Neilane Bertoni, Pesquisa Nacional sobre o 
uso de crack: quem são os usuários de crack e/ou similares do Brasil? 
Quantos são nas capitais brasileiras? (Rio de Janeiro, ICICT/
FIOCRUZ, 2014).
105 Tavitian-Exley and others, “Influence of different drugs on HIV 
risk in people who inject” (see footnote 100).
106 John S. Atkinson and others, “Multiple sexual partnerships in a 
sample of African-American crack smokers”, AIDS and Behavior, 
vol. 14, No. 1 (2010), pp. 48-58; and J. A. Inciardi and others, 
“The effect of serostatus on HIV risk behaviour change among 
women sex workers in Miami, Florida”, AIDS Care: Psychological 
and Socio-Medical Aspects of AIDS/HIV, vol. 17, Suppl. No. 1 
(2005), pp. S88-S101. 
107 Marie C. Van Hout and Tim Bingham, “A costly turn on”: patterns 
of use and perceived consequences of mephedrone based head shop 
products amongst Irish injectors”, International Journal of Drug 
Policy, vol. 23, No. 3 (2012), pp. 188-197. 
108 United Kingdom, Public Health England, Health Protection Scot-
land, Public Health Wales, and Public Health Agency Northern 
Ireland, “Shooting up: infections among people who inject drugs in 
the United Kingdom” (London, November 2015). 
Sustainable Development Goals related to the prevention and treatment of 
drug use and HIV
The General Assembly at its seventieth 
session adopted the outcome document 
of the United Nations summit for the 
adoption of the post-2015 development 
agenda, containing the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and the Sustain-
able Development Goals.a The 17 Goals 
address the different dimensions of sustain-
able development. Many of the Sustainable 
Development Goals and their targets are 
related to the intersection between drugs, 
peace and justice, but only those related to 
health and well-being are mentioned here. 
For a broader discussion on the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the world drug 
problem see chapter II of the present report.
Under Goal 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all at all ages”), 
global leaders have, for the first time, 
addressed issues related to the prevention 
and treatment of substance use. Target 
3.5 is to strengthen the prevention and 
treatment of substance abuse, including 
narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of 
alcohol. Achieving that target requires, 
inter alia, expanding the coverage and 
quality of a range of evidence-based and 
gender-responsive interventions for the 
prevention of drug use, as well as for the 
care, treatment and rehabilitation of drug 
use disorders. In this context, UNODC has 
developed the International Standards on 
Drug Use Prevention and the International 
Standards on the Treatment of Drug Use 
Disorders that have already been recog-
nised by Member States as useful guides 
to improving their services in numerous 
Resolutions, as well as in the Outcome doc-
ument of the special session of the General 
Assembly. Measuring access to treatment 
for substance use requires, at the national 
level, reliable estimates of the number of 
people in need of treatment for, or those 
suffering from, drug use disorders and a 
reliable estimate of the number of people 
provided with treatment interventions for 
the use of different drugs. 
The second main target under Goal 3, 
namely target 3.3, is to end, by 2030, the 
epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and neglected tropical diseases and combat 
hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other 
communicable diseases. Other Goals 
related to addressing HIV and AIDS include 
those on achieving gender equality (Goal 
5); reducing inequality (Goal 10); promoting 
inclusive societies and providing access to 
justice (Goal 16); and revitalizing the Global 
Partnership for Sustainable Development 
(Goal 17). The UNAIDS Strategy 2016-2021 
mirrors these Sustainable Development 
Goals, setting the following targets for 
HIV and AIDS treatment and prevention:b
1. The 90-90-90 treatment targets (and by 
2030, the 95-95-95 treatment targets): 
by 2020: 
(i) 90 per cent of people (children, ado-
lescents and adults) living with HIV 
know their status; 
(ii) 90 per cent of people living with HIV 
who know their status are receiving 
treatment; 
(iii) 90 per cent of people in treatment 
have suppressed viral loads;
2. The prevention target is to reduce the 
number of new HIV infections to fewer 
than 500,000 per year by 2020 (and to 
fewer than 200,000 per year by 2030);
3. Zero discrimination (overcoming human 
rights, gender-related and legal barriers 
to HIV services).
a General Assembly resolution 70/1.
b UNAIDS, UNAIDS 2016–2021 Strategy:  
On the Fast-Track to End AIDS (2015).
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It is difficult to quantify the contribution of stimulant use 
in increasing HIV infection rates but, compared with use 
of other drugs, the preponderance of evidence points 
towards a positive association between stimulant use, 
higher-risk sexual and injecting behaviours and HIV infec-
tions.109, 110 
Outbreaks of HIV among people who use drugs, especially 
PWID, are a particular concern because HIV can spread 
very rapidly among PWID when appropriate harm reduc-
tion services are not available, discontinued or scaled 
down.111 In 2011, such outbreaks occurred among PWID 
in Greece (Athens) and Romania, where a significant 
increase in the number of new HIV cases among PWID 
was reported to be attributable, in part, to the increased 
use of stimulants (NPS in Romania and mostly cocaine 
in Greece, as a replacement for opioids in both cases), 
which was associated with a higher frequency of injecting 
and an increase in the sharing of needles and syringes 
among new and young PWID.112, 113
Drug-related deaths remain  
unacceptably high
Number of drug-related deaths worldwide 
remains stable 
In 2014, there were an estimated 207,400 (range: 113,700-
250,100) drug-related deaths114 worldwide, corresponding 
to 43.5 (range: 23.8-52.5) deaths per million people aged 
15-64. Overdose deaths account for between approxi-
mately one third and one half of all drug-related deaths 
worldwide, and in most cases those overdose deaths 
involved opioids.115, 116 
The highest drug-related mortality rate continues to be in 
North America, which accounts for approximately one in 
four (25 per cent of ) drug-related deaths worldwide. The 
high mortality rate in North America is attributable in 
part to better monitoring and reporting of drug-related 
deaths and to the comparatively higher rates of opioid use 
in that subregion. In the United States, nearly half a mil-
lion people are estimated to have died from drug overdoses 
109 Louisa Degenhardt and others, “Meth/amphetamine use and asso-
ciated HIV: implications for global policy and public health”, Inter-
national Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 21, No. 5 (2010), pp. 347-358.
110 Tavitian-Exley and others, “Influence of different drugs on HIV 
risk in people who inject” (see footnote 100).
111 For the purpose of the present report, harm reduction is understood 
to refer to the set of the measures defined by WHO, UNODC and 
UNAIDS to prevent HIV and other blood-borne infections among 
people who inject drugs (also referred to in the Commission for 
Narcotic Drugs resolution 56/6) for the provision of comprehensive 
HIV prevention, treatment and care services among people who 
inject drugs’. See also the discussion in WHO “Community man-
agement of opioid overdose” 2014.
112 EMCDDA, “HIV outbreak among injecting drug users in Greece” 
(Lisbon, November 2012).
113 Andrei Botescu and others, “HIV/AIDS among injecting drug users 
in Romania: report of a recent outbreak and initial response poli-
cies” (Lisbon, EMCDDA, 2012).
114 The definition of drug-related deaths varies between Member States 
but includes some or all of the following: fatal drug overdoses; 
since 2004; the country experienced a record number of 
fatal drug overdoses in 2014, 61 per cent of which were 
associated with prescription opioids and heroin.117 
Fentanyl-related overdose deaths reported in 
many countries
Fentanyl,118 a synthetic opioid, has recently been impli-
cated in a significant and increasing number of deaths in 
a number of countries. Recent concerns have been raised 
in a number of European countries, especially in Estonia, 
which has one of the highest drug-related mortality rates 
in Europe (127 drug-related deaths per million people 
aged 15-64 in 2013), and where overdoses are mostly asso-
ciated with the use of fentanyl.119, 120 In Canada, during 
the six-year period 2009-2014 there were at least 655 
 deaths due to HIV acquired through injecting drug use; suicide; 
and unintentional deaths and trauma due to drug use.
115 Louisa Degenhardt and others, “Illicit drug use”, in Comparative 
Quantification of Health Risks: Global and Regional Burden of Disease 
Attributable to Selected Major Risk Factors, vol. 1, M. Ezzati and 
others, eds. (Geneva, WHO, 2004).
116 EMCDDA, Mortality related to Drug Use in Europe: Public Health 
Implications (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2011).
117 Rose A. Rudd and others, “Increases in drug and opioid overdose 
deaths: United States, 2000-2014”, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report, vol. 64, No. 50 (2016), pp. 1378-1382. 
118 EMCDDA, “Fentanyl drug profile”. Available at www.emcdda.
europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/fentanyl.
FIG. 18 Drug-related mortality rate and number 
of drug-related deaths, by region, 2014
Sources: responses to the annual report questionnaire; Inter-Amer-
ican Drug Abuse Control Commission; and Louisa Degenhardt 
and others, “Illicit drug use”, in Comparative Quantification of 
Health Risks: Global and Regional Burden of Disease Attributable 
to Selected Major Risk Factors, vol. 1, Majid Ezzati and others, eds. 
(Geneva, World Health Organization (WHO), 2004), p. 1,109.
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deaths in which fentanyl was determined to be the cause 
or a contributing cause of death, the number of deaths 
increasing markedly in the four largest provinces.121 In 
the United States, there were more than 700 deaths related 
to fentanyl use between late 2013 and late 2014. One 
matter of concern is that heroin is often laced with fenta-
nyl before being sold, and so heroin users have no know-
ledge of having consumed fentanyl. That situation could 
be exacerbated by the recent increase in heroin use in the 
United States.122 
Prisons are a high-risk environment for 
infectious diseases 
Among vulnerable people who use drugs, particularly 
PWID, imprisonment is a common outcome. According 
to studies conducted in a large number of countries, 
between 56 and 90 per cent of PWID have been impris-
oned at some stage.123 Initiation and use of drugs are also 
119 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014: Trends and Developments 
(Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014).
120 Jane Mounteney and others, “Fentanyls: are we missing the signs? 
Highly potent and on the rise in Europe”, International Journal on 
Drug Policy, vol. 26, No. 7 (2015), pp. 626-631.
121 Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, “Canadian Community 
Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (CCENDU) Bulletin: deaths 
involving fentanyl in Canada, 2009-2014” (August 2015).
122 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary.
123 WHO, Multi-city study on drug injecting and risk of HIV infec-
tion: a report prepared on behalf of the WHO International 
reported by many prisons and other closed settings.124 
According to the limited data made available to UNODC, 
recent use of drugs (drug use in the previous 12 months) 
is reported to be around 23 per cent among the prison 
population, with cannabis use at around 19 per cent and 
heroin or amphetamine use among approximately 5 per 
cent. Similarly, a large number of studies in countries 
throughout the world have found high levels of injecting 
drug use among both male and female prisoners.125 
Collaborative Group (WHO/PSA/94.4); Chris Beyrer and others, 
“Drug use, increasing incarceration rates, and prison-associated 
HIV risks in Thailand”, AIDS and Behavior, vol. 7, No. 2 (2003), 
pp. 153-161; and Sheila M. Gore and others, “Drug injection and 
HIV prevalence in inmates of Glenochil prison”, British Medical 
Journal, vol. 310, No. 6975 (1995), pp. 293-296.
124 Rhidian Hughes and Meg Huby, “Life in prison: perspectives of 
drug injectors”, Deviant Behavior, vol. 21, No. 5 (2000), pp. 451-
479; and S. Chu and K. Peddle, Under the Skin: A People’s Case for 
Prison Needle and Syringe Programs (Toronto, Canadian HIV/AIDS 
Legal Network, 2010). 
125 Anne Marie DiCenso, Giselle Dias and Jacqueline Gahagan, 
Unlocking Our Futures: A National Study on Women, Prisons HIV, 
and Hepatitis C (Toronto, Prisoners’HIV/AIDS Support Action 
Network (PASAN), 2003); Ruth E. Martin and others, “Drug use 
and risk of bloodborne infections: a survey of female prisoners 
in British Columbia”, Canadian Journal of Public Health, vol. 96, 
No. 2 (2005), pp. 97-101; and Kate Dolan and others, “People 
who inject drugs in prison: HIV prevalence, transmission and pre-
vention”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 26, Suppl. No. 
1 (2015), pp. S12-S15; Chloé Carpentier and others, “Ten Years 
of Monitoring Illicit Drug Use in Prison Populations in Europe: 
Issues and Challenges”, The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 
51: 37–66. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2311.2011.00677.x (2012). 
Are we underestimating the number of drug-related deaths? 
Accurate estimates of the extent and pat-
terns of drug-related deaths are vital for 
monitoring the most extreme form of harm 
that can result from drug use and for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of interventions put 
in place to reduce drug-related mortality.
The definition of drug-related deaths 
varies from country to country, but could 
include all, or at least some, of the follow-
ing: fatal drug overdoses; deaths due to 
AIDS acquired through injecting drug use; 
intentional self-poisoning by exposure to 
psychotropic substances (suicide); and unin-
tentional deaths and trauma (motor vehicle 
accidents and other forms of accidental 
death) due to drug use. However, many 
countries only report overdose deaths. This 
definition is framed from a health perspec-
tive, considering drug-related deaths in the 
context of the burden of disease. However, 
a broader perspective could also include 
deaths resulting from the functioning of 
illicit drug markets and could include, for 
example, deaths as a result of violence 
associated with the illicit supply of and 
trafficking in drugs.
Ascertaining the cause of death can be 
complicated in cases where drug use 
is suspected of playing a part or in the 
absence of information surrounding the 
circumstances of the death or the envi-
ronment in which the death occurred. The 
process for determining the cause of death 
may vary from country to country and even 
within the same country. Depending on 
the discretion of the certifying physician 
and the available information about the 
deceased person’s prior medical history and/
or circumstances of death, more compre-
hensive, investigative procedures, including 
post-mortem toxicological investigations, 
may or may not be initiated. Although 
procedures may be well established for 
identifying overdose deaths resulting from 
the use of drugs such as heroin, the process 
may become complex if multiple drugs are 
involved, as in many fatal overdose cases. 
Also, the role of NPS in fatal overdose cases 
may be more difficult to determine, given 
the unknown toxicology of many NPS, 
particularly when they are used in combi-
nation with other drugs (including alcohol), 
in which case the risk of overdose can be 
higher. Mortality registers often contain a 
significant number of deaths classified as 
unknown or ill-defined or cases in which 
the true underlying cause of death may 
be miscoded, depending on the coding 
practices and information available to the 
responsible physician. Thus, drug-related 
deaths are likely to be underreported. 
Very few studies have attempted to estimate 
the level of underreporting of drug-related 
deaths. In France, for example, significant 
differences were apparent in official num-
bers from three different institutions with 
a very low rate of overlapping cases; there 
was underreporting of approximately a 
third of the total drug-related deaths.a In a 
study conducted in Italy, using an approach 
that examined multiple causes of death (the 
analysis of all conditions reported on the 
death certificate), it was estimated that 
there were 60 per cent more drug-related 
deaths than determined from traditional 
reporting on a single underlying cause of 
death.b
a Eric Janssen, “Drug-related deaths in France 
in 2007: estimates and implications”, Sub-
stance Use and Misuse, vol. 46, No. 12 
(2011), pp. 1495-1501. 
b Francesco Grippo and others, “Drug 
induced mortality: a multiple cause 
approach on Italian causes of death Regis-
ter”, Epidemiology Biostatistics and Public 
Health, vol. 12, No. 1 (2015).
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The risk of HIV, hepatitis and tuberculosis infection in 
prisons continues to be a matter of significant concern. In 
some settings, the burden of HIV among prisoners may 
be up to 50 times higher than among the general 
population,126 the incidence of tuberculosis is, on average, 
23 times higher than among the general population127 and 
an estimated two out of every three prisoners with a his-
tory of injecting drug use are living with hepatitis C.128 
Despite the high-risk environment and the scientific evi-
dence of the effectiveness of interventions for the treat-
ment of drug use disorders, and the prevention and 
treatment of HIV, hepatitis C and tuberculosis,129 there 
are significant gaps in the provision of these services in 
most prisons throughout the world. Prisons and other 
closed settings often lack adequate health services, confi-
dentiality and privacy; furthermore, mandatory (non-vol-
untary) HIV testing remains a common practice.130
Available evidence indicates that drug dependence treat-
ment and harm reduction interventions can be effectively 
implemented within prisons without compromising secu-
rity or increasing drug use.131 In a number of countries, 
however, there are political, legal and regulatory barriers 
126 The Gap Report, 2014 (see footnote 98).
127 Iacopo Baussano and others, “Tuberculosis incidence in prisons: a 
systematic review”, PLoS Medicine, vol. 7, No. 12 (2010).
128 Sarah Larney and others, “Incidence and prevalence of hepatitis C 
in prisons and other closed settings: results of a systematic review 
and meta-analysis”, Hepatology, vol. 58, No. 4 (2013), pp. 1215-
1224.
129 UNODC/ILO/UNDP/WHO/UNAIDS policy brief entitled “HIV 
prevention, treatment and care in prisons and other closed settings: 
a comprehensive package of interventions” (2013).
130 UNAIDS, UNAIDS 2016–2021 Strategy: On the Fast-Track to End 
AIDS (2015). 
131 Thomas Kerr and others, “Harm reduction in prisons: a ‘rights 
based analysis’”, Critical Public Health, vol. 14, No. 4 (2004), pp. 
4-16.
to introducing or expanding those services in prisons. In 
2014, opioid substitution therapy was available in prisons 
in only 43 countries, whereas 80 countries reported the 
availability of such therapy in the community. The avail-
ability of needle and syringe programmes in prisons was 
reported in only 8 countries, whereas 90 countries reported 
the availability of such programmes in the community. 
Most of the above-mentioned 8 countries are in Europe 
and Central Asia, and such interventions are not available 
in all prison settings.132 
Substantially higher risk of drug-related death 
soon after release from prison
The period shortly after release from prison is associated 
with a substantially increased risk of drug-related death 
(primarily fatal overdose), with a mortality rate much 
higher than from all causes of death among the general 
population.133 The first two weeks after release from prison 
is a period of particular vulnerability, with a risk of drug-
related death 3-8 times higher than in the subsequent 10 
weeks.134 Moreover, the drug-related mortality rate after 
release from prison has been found to be 50-100 times 
higher than the mortality rate of the general population. 
According to the very limited data available, female ex-
prisoners appear to experience poorer outcomes than male 
ex-prisoners, and older ex-prisoners experience poorer out-
comes than younger ex-prisoners. This may reflect differ-
ent histories and patterns of drug use depending on the 
gender and age of ex-prisoners. 
132 Harm Reduction International, The Global State of Harm Reduction 
2014, Katie Stone, ed. (London, 2014).
133 WHO, Preventing Overdose Deaths in the Criminal Justice System 
(Copenhagen, 2014).
134 Elizabeth L. C. Merrall and others, “Meta-analysis of drug-related 
deaths soon after release from prison”, Addiction, vol. 105, No. 9 
(2010), pp. 1545-1554.
TAblE 1 Ratio of drug-related mortality rates among ex-prisoners to all-cause mortality rates among the 
general population 
Source: WHO, Preventing Overdose Deaths in the Criminal Justice System (Copenhagen, 2014). 
Note: The numbers presented are standardized mortality ratios. They express the ratio of deaths from drug-related causes observed among ex-prisoners 
compared to the number of deaths from all causes that would be expected among people of comparable age and gender in the general population. 
a First and second weeks calculated separately. b Not time-limited (median = 4.4 years). c Not time-limited (median = 7.7 years).
Country or area Time since release from prison
1 week 2 weeks 45 days 1 year 3 years 4-5 years 7-8 years 15 years
United Kingdoma 37.1 12.4
United States 129
Denmark 61.9
Switzerland 50
Taiwan Province of China 29.3
United Statesb 10.3
United States 3.5
United Kingdoma Males 28.9 15.8
 Females 68.9 56.3
Australiac Males 14.5
 Females 50.3
France Males aged 15-34 124.1
 Males aged 35-54 274.2
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The increased risk of drug-related death after release from 
prison is principally attributable to two causes: first, 
decreased tolerance to drugs, especially heroin, after a 
period of relative abstinence that occurs in prison, where 
drug use may be more infrequent and the purity of drugs 
lower than outside of prison; and second, the use of mul-
tiple drugs after release from prison, particularly the com-
bination of depressants (such as benzodiazepines and 
alcohol) with heroin, which can considerably increase the 
risk of fatal overdose.135 
C. EXTENT OF DRUG SUPPLY
Over the period 2009-2014, the cultivation of cannabis 
plants was reported to UNODC by 129 countries, far 
more than the 49 countries (mostly in Asia and the Ameri-
cas) that reported opium poppy cultivation and the 7 
countries (in the Americas) that reported coca bush culti-
vation.136 According to the latest UNODC estimates, in 
terms of area, cannabis is also the most extensively grown 
drug crop,137 particularly if wild growth is included.138 
The extent of, and trends in, cannabis cultivation and 
production are, however, difficult to assess, given that sys-
tematic measurements do not exist. 
Despite diverging trends in opium poppy 
and coca bush cultivation, the production 
of opium and cocaine has returned to the 
levels of the late 1990s 
Information relating to the area under illicit cultivation is 
more reliable in the case of coca bush and opium poppy 
cultivation than in the case of cannabis plant cultivation, 
as it is largely based on scientifically validated surveys. 
Although fluctuating, the total area under opium poppy 
cultivation in 2015 was higher than in 1998 (18 per cent), 
the year in which the General Assembly held its previous 
special session dedicated to the world drug problem; and 
the total area under opium poppy cultivation has increased 
sharply (by 51 per cent) since 2009 (the year of adoption 
of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on Inter-
national Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced 
Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem) largely as 
a result of increased cultivation in Afghanistan. In contrast, 
the total area under coca bush cultivation has followed a 
downward trend, falling by 31 per cent since 1998 and by 
19 per cent since 2009. 
135 Preventing Overdose Deaths (see footnote 133).
136 Based on reports from countries on the cultivation, eradication and 
seizure of cannabis, opium poppy and coca plants, the main source 
of the seizures being domestic drug production.
137 World Drug Report 2009 (United Nations publication Sales No. 
E.09.XI.12). 
138 United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Research 
Section, “Cannabis as an illicit narcotic crop: a review of the global 
situation of cannabis consumption, trafficking and production”, 
Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. XLIX, Nos. 1 and 2 (1997), and vol. L, 
Nos. 1 and 2 (1998) (United Nations publication), pp. 45-83. 
Global estimates show that illicit opium production 
declined sharply in 2015 (by 38 per cent) to 4,770 tons, 
the level of the late 1990s. Of that amount, the part 
estimated to have been transformed into heroin would 
result in an output of 327 tons of heroin of export purity, 
largely from heroin manufacture in Afghanistan. Cocaine 
production, estimated at 746 tons (based on the “old” 
conversion ratio) or 943 tons (based on the “new” 
conversion ratio) of pure cocaine hydrochloride in 2014, 
also declined in the period 2007-2014, returning to its 
1998 level. Thus, despite a significant decline in coca bush 
cultivation, cocaine production has not fallen in relation 
to its 1998 level, mainly because of increases in the 
efficiency of cocaine-processing laboratories in the Andean 
subregion. 
FIG. 19 Estimated total area under opium poppy 
and coca bush cultivation, 1998-2015
Sources: UNODC coca and opium surveys in various countries; 
responses to the annual report questionnaire; and United States, 
Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, various years. 
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“Old” versus “new” conversion 
ratios for estimating cocaine  
production
The last step in calculating cocaine production requires each 
producing country to estimate factors for converting coca leaf 
to cocaine hydrochloride. In the present report, two conversion 
factors are used for global estimates: (i) an “old” conversion 
ratio, as estimated by the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), for the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and Peru in the 1990s, and a study by the Government of 
Colombia and UNODC, for Colombia; (ii) a “new” conver-
sion ratio, based on studies undertaken by DEA in Peru in 
2005, and in the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2007-2008. 
However, these ratios have not been reconfirmed in national 
studies. The “new” ratio also considers the conversion factor 
for Colombia established in 2004. (For more details, see World 
Drug Report 2010 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.
XI.13, pp. 251 and 252) and the online methodology section 
of the present report).  
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Strong increase in trafficking in synthetic 
drugs at the global level 
Although there were 234 substances under international 
control in 2014 (244 in January 2016), seizure data indi-
cate that the bulk of the trafficking involved a far smaller 
number of substances. Cannabis in its various forms con-
tinued to be the most widely trafficked drug in 2014 (as 
cannabis was seized in 95 per cent of the reporting coun-
tries in 2014 and cannabis seizure cases accounted for over 
half of the 2.2 million drug seizure cases reported to 
UNODC that year); it was followed by ATS (16 per cent), 
opioids and coca-related substances (accounting for 12 
per cent each). 
Global quantities of cannabis, cocaine, heroin and mor-
phine seized almost doubled over the period 1998-2008 
but have remained largely stable since then. In contrast, 
ATS seizures have risen more than seven-fold since 1998, 
suggesting that growth in drug trafficking has been more 
in synthetic stimulants than in the usual plant-based drugs. 
Growth has been particularly strong in the case of meth-
amphetamine seizures and, to a lesser extent, amphetamine 
seizures. Improvements in precursor control brought the 
quantities of intercepted “ecstasy” down from the 2008 
level to a low in 2011, but recent innovations in the manu-
facture of “ecstasy” (in particular, the use of pre-precursor 
chemicals not under international control) can already be 
seen on the market, as suggested by a doubling of the 
amounts seized between 2011 and 2014.
Increases in trafficking have been even greater in the group 
of NPS in recent years. Accounting for 3 per cent of all 
drug seizure cases in 2014, seizures of NPS are still com-
paratively small (up from 1 per cent in 2009 and 0.1 per 
cent in 1998). In terms of the quantity seized, seizures of 
NPS (excluding plant-based NPS such as khat (Catha 
edulis) and kratom (Mitragyna speciosa)) rose 15-fold 
between 1998 and 2014. Ketamine and synthetic can-
nabinoids have been seized the most; the total quantity of 
ketamine seized worldwide increased from an annual aver-
age of 3 tons in the period 1998-2008 to 10 tons in the 
period 2009-2014. 
Interpreting drug seizures
A direct indicator of drug law enforcement activity, drug sei-
zures are the result of those successful operations that end in 
drug interceptions and are thus influenced by law enforcement 
capacity and priorities. At the same time, drug seizures are 
one of the key elements in understanding illicit drug market 
dynamics, drug availability and drug trafficking patterns and 
trends, particularly if broad geographical entities are considered 
and long periods are analysed.
FIG. 20 Global production of opium and cocaine, 
1998-2015
Sources: UNODC coca and opium surveys in various countries; 
responses to the annual report questionnaire; and United States, 
Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, various years.
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FIG. 21 Breakdown of drug seizure cases reported 
worldwide, by type of drug, 2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Information presented in the figure is based on 2.2 million seizure 
cases reported to UNODC by 63 countries. 
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Drug offences, cultivation and gender 
Men are more involved than women  
in drug-related crime
In all countries, more men than women are brought into 
formal contact with the criminal justice system for pos-
session of drugs for personal use and for trafficking in 
drugs. In the period 1998-2014, the number of women 
reported to have been arrested for drug-related offences 
increased in absolute terms (as did the number of countries 
providing to UNODC a breakdown of arrests by gender), 
whereas the proportion of women in drug-related cases, 
while fluctuating, followed a downward trend, particularly 
for offences related to drug trafficking. 
According to information from 100 countries, during the 
period 2010-2014, women accounted for around 10 per 
cent of all cases in which people were brought into formal 
contact with the criminal justice system for drug-related 
offences. The proportion was slightly lower for the pos-
session of drugs for personal use (9 per cent) and slightly 
higher for drug trafficking (11 per cent); however, those 
proportions are substantially lower than the proportion of 
women who use drugs (about a third of the total number 
of people who use drugs). 
The proportion of women brought into formal contact 
with the criminal justice system in drug trafficking cases 
is clearly above the global average (12 per cent) in Oceania 
(19 per cent) and in the Americas (15 per cent) and below 
average in Africa (2 per cent). Data for Asia show a pro-
portion above the global average in East and South-East 
Asia (13 per cent), while in other Asian subregions the 
proportion is below the global average (less than 1 per cent 
in the Near and Middle East and in South Asia). Data for 
Europe show a below-average proportion of women 
brought into formal contact with the criminal justice 
system (10 per cent), with the proportion being above 
average in Eastern Europe (12 per cent) and below average 
in Western and Central Europe (9 per cent) and in South-
Eastern Europe (6 per cent). 
FIG. 22 Quantities of drugs seized worldwide, by 
type of drug, 2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
Note: Based on information from 120 countries. 
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FIG. 23 Trends in the quantities of drugs seized 
worldwide, 1998-2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
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Women in opium poppy cultivation: attitudes, 
perceptions and practices
While women play only a limited role in drug trafficking 
in countries in the Near and Middle East (less than 1 per 
cent), they are involved in the illicit cultivation of drug 
crops, particularly opium poppy in Afghanistan. As part 
of the annual opium survey conducted by UNODC and 
the Government of Afghanistan, in 2015 focus group dis-
cussions were held for the first time with women in four 
northern provinces in order to learn more about their atti-
tudes and participation in opium poppy cultivation and 
production. 
The discussions revealed that women in Afghanistan took 
part in many of the labour-intensive processes in opium 
poppy production, such as weeding and clearing fields, as 
well as lancing and later (indoors) breaking opium poppy 
capsules, removing and cleaning seeds, preparing opium 
gum for sale and processing by-products such as oil and 
soap. Men were mainly involved in ploughing fields, cul-
tivating and, at times, lancing capsules. 
In most rural communities in Afghanistan, women were 
less empowered than men and had only a limited role in 
decision-making. Decisions about opium poppy cultiva-
tion were thus primarily taken by men, although it 
appeared that women were increasingly being consulted, 
including about the decision to cultivate opium poppy. 
In the absence of access to adequate health-care facilities 
in rural areas, opium had been used for generations by 
women in northern Afghanistan as a remedy for the most 
common ailments among children, such as coughs, colic, 
aches and pains, restlessness and diarrhoea. Self-medica-
tion with opium continued to be a common practice for 
the treatment of ailments among adults, such as aches and 
pains, sleeplessness and chest pains, which were probably 
due to respiratory illnesses. Older women may have been 
more regular or dependent users of opium, but younger 
women were becoming increasingly aware that regular 
opium use could cause dependence and thus tended to 
rely more on “modern medicines”, when available, for the 
treatment of common illnesses. 
The discussions also revealed that women in Afghanistan 
were generally aware that opium could produce depen-
dence and that its use for non-medicinal purposes was 
forbidden by their religion. They were also concerned that 
the next generation could become dependent on opium, 
although resolving their economic problems continued to 
be their main concern. In the absence of economic oppor-
tunities or alternatives, women considered that income 
generated from opium poppy production could be used 
to pay household expenses, enabling them to buy essentials 
such as food, as well as furniture, clothes and jewellery, 
and it enabled families to repay their debts and to pay for 
their children’s education and marriages. The production 
of opium poppy not only brought cash income to house
holds, but it was also a mainstay in rural areas, as poppy 
seeds were used to extract oil for cooking and poppy straw 
was used for fuel in the kitchen, as well as for preparing 
soap and making poppy tea.
Drug purchases via the “dark net”  
are gaining in importance 
The purchasing of drugs via the Internet, particularly the 
“dark net”, may have increased in recent years. This trend 
raises concerns in terms of the potential of the “dark net” 
to attract new populations of users by facilitating access 
to drugs in a setting that, although illegal, allows users to 
avoid direct contact with criminals and law enforcement 
authorities. As the “dark net” cannot be accessed through 
traditional web searches, buyers and sellers access it 
through the “Onion Router” (TOR) to ensure that their 
identities remain concealed. Products are typically paid 
for in bitcoins or in other crypto-currencies and are most 
often delivered via postal services.
A number of successful law enforcement operations world-
wide have taken place in recent years to shut down trading 
platforms on the “dark net”, such as “Silk Road” in Octo-
ber 2013 or “Silk Road 2.0” in November 2014, as part 
of Operation Onymous, coordinated by the European 
Police Office (Europol), which also led to the closure of 
other sites on the “dark net”, including 33 high-profile 
marketplaces. Law enforcement pressure also prompted 
some “voluntary” temporary shutdowns, such as “Agora” 
in August 2015. However, as one marketplace closes, the 
next most credible marketplace tends to absorb the bulk 
of the displaced business.139
A global survey140 of more than 100,000 Internet users 
(three quarters of whom had taken illegal drugs) in 50 
countries in late 2014 suggested that the proportion of 
drug users purchasing drugs via the Internet had increased 
from 1.2 per cent in 2000 to 4.9 per cent in 2009, 16.4 
per cent in 2013 and 25.3 per cent in 2014. The propor-
tion of Internet users making use of the “dark net” for 
drug purchases had also increased, reaching 6.4 per cent 
(lifetime) in 2014, including 4.5 per cent (70 per cent of 
6.4 per cent) who had purchased drugs over the “dark net” 
in the previous 12 months (ranging from less than 1 per 
cent to 18 per cent). 
Among “recent” drug users, the proportion rose by more 
than 25 per cent from 2013 to 2014 (from 4.6 to 5.8 per 
cent). In the period 2012-2014, the proportion doubled 
in Australia (from 4.3 to 10.4 per cent) and in the United 
Kingdom (from 8.0 to 15.1 per cent), and in the period 
2013-2014, the proportion also increased among “recent” 
users in the United States (from 7.7 per cent in 2013 to 
9.6 per cent in 2014). 
139 Based on the findings of an international conference on joint inves-
tigations to combat drug trafficking via the virtual market (“dark 
net”) in the European Union, Bad Erlach, Austria, 10-12 November 
2015.
140 Global Drug Survey 2015 findings (www.globaldrugsurvey.com).
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Survey respondents reported a number of advantages to 
purchasing drugs on the “dark net”. Some of those advan-
tages were related to the drug products themselves, which 
were reported to be generally of better quality and more 
readily available. Other advantages included the fact that 
the purchaser’s interactions were virtual, thus decreasing 
the risk to personal safety during transactions, including 
through the absence of exposure to physical violence; in 
addition, there was a perceived decrease in the risk of being 
apprehended by law enforcement authorities.141 This may 
help explain why, in general, drug users seem ready to pay 
a premium for drugs purchased via the “dark net”142 and 
why people who have never previously used drugs may be 
tempted to purchase them online: the survey showed that 
around 4 per cent of “dark net” drug users had not used 
any drugs prior to accessing them through the “dark 
net”.143 At the same time, 30 per cent of people who pur-
chased drugs via the “dark net” reported having consumed 
a wider range of drugs than they did before they began 
purchasing drugs via the “dark net”.
141 Ibid.
142 International conference on joint investigations to combat drug 
trafficking via the virtual market (“dark net”) in the European 
Union, Bad Erlach, Austria, 10-12 November 2015.
143 Global Drug Survey 2015 (see footnote 140).
FIG. 25 Proportion of survey respondents who had purchased drugs on the “dark net”, by country and 
region, 2014
Source: Global Drug Survey 2015 (www.globaldrugsurvey.com).
Note: The figure shows the proportion of people participating in the Global Drug Survey who bought drugs via the “dark net” between November 
and December 2014. a Based on the replies of fewer than 600 respondents. b Regional results show the national (and subnational) results weighted 
by population.
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FIG. 26 Drugs purchased n the “dark net”,  
by type of drug, 2014
* Hydroponically grown cannabis.
Source: Global Drug Survey 2015 (www.globaldrugsurvey.com).
Note: Proportion of survey respondents who bought each drug on the 
“dark net” among participants in the Global Drug Survey between 
November and December 2014. 
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Note: Opioids include the non-medical use of prescription opioids and opiates (opiates include opium and heroin). 
D. MARKET ANALYSIS BY DRUG TYPE 
OPIATES
Key figures
Opiate market developments
Special conditions led to a 38 per cent decline 
in global production of opium in 2015 
The main areas of opiate production are in three subre-
gions. Countries in South-West Asia (mostly Afghanistan) 
supply markets in neighbouring countries and in countries 
in Europe, the Near and Middle East, Africa and South 
Asia, with small proportions going to East and South-East 
Asia, North America and Oceania. Countries in South-
East Asia (mostly Myanmar and, to a lesser extent, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic) supply markets in East and 
South-East Asia and in Oceania, with smaller proportions 
going to South Asia. Countries in Latin America (mostly 
Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala), supply markets in 
countries in North America (except Canada, which is pre-
dominantly supplied by opiates originating in Afghani-
stan) and the more limited markets in South America. In 
addition, in a number of countries, important quantities 
of opium poppy are cultivated for the domestic market 
(for example, in India). Thus, opium is illicitly produced 
in nearly 50 countries worldwide.
In 2015, the total area under opium poppy cultivation 
worldwide decreased by 11 per cent from the level of the 
previous year, to around 281,000 hectares (ha); that 
decline is primarily a reflection of a drop in cultivation 
reported by Afghanistan (-19 per cent), although, at 
183,000 ha, Afghanistan still accounted for almost two 
thirds of the total area under illicit opium cultivation. 
Myanmar accounted for 20 per cent (55,500 ha) of the 
total, Mexico accounted for 9 per cent and the Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic for 2 per cent. 
Global opium production in 2015 fell by 38 per cent from 
the previous year, to some 4,770 tons144 (i.e. to the level 
of the late 1990s). The decrease was primarily the result 
of a decline in opium production in Afghanistan (-48 per 
cent compared with the previous year), mainly attribut-
able to poor yields in the country’s southern provinces.
144 Data for 2015 are preliminary, as information from a number of 
smaller opium-producing countries is still missing. For the purposes 
of the present report, it is assumed that global opium poppy culti-
vation and opium production remained unchanged from 2014 to 
2015.
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Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains the world’s largest 
opium producer, accounting for some 70 per cent (3,300 
tons) of global opium production; it is followed by Myan-
mar, accounting for 14 per cent (650 tons) of global pro-
duction. Opium production in Latin America more than 
doubled over the period 1998-2014, reaching some 500 
tons and accounting for almost 11 per cent of the esti-
mated global opium production in 2015. 
After deducting the estimated quantities of opium con-
sumed from the 4,770 tons of opium produced in 2015, 
potential heroin manufacture from the 2015 global opium 
poppy harvest can be estimated at 327 tons of heroin (of 
export purity). As demand does not generally change rap-
idly and the data on heroin seizures suggest a somewhat 
steady supply (see the discussion in this section), it is likely 
that the supply of heroin to the market remained signifi-
cantly higher than the latter. Following the 1998 special 
session of the General Assembly, data also indicate a sig-
nificant increase in the global interception rate for opiates, 
which more than doubled between the periods 1990-1997 
and 2009-2014.
Global opiate market appears to be stable despite 
important regional changes 
UNODC estimates suggest that the global number of users 
of opiates (i.e. opium, morphine and heroin) has changed 
little in recent years and that opiate use continued to affect 
some 0.4 per cent of the global population aged 15-64, or 
the equivalent of some 17 million people, in 2014. 
Although there continue to be large data gaps that may 
mask changes, the prevalence of the use of opiates has not 
changed in more than a decade, and it continues to be 
relatively high in West Asia (0.9 per cent), Central Asia 
(0.8 per cent), Europe (0.56 per cent) and North America 
(0.5 per cent). 
There are indications of a recent increase in heroin use in 
some markets in Western and Central Europe, suggesting 
that the long-term downward trend in heroin use may 
have come to an end. In fact, heroin use has been stable 
or declining in Western and Central Europe since the late 
1990s. This can be seen, inter alia, in household survey 
data, even though they only cover a certain proportion of 
all heroin users. Recently, however, some increases in large-
scale seizure cases and rising heroin purity indicate that 
FIG. 27 Opium poppy cultivation and opium 
production, 1998-2015
Source: Calculations based on UNODC illicit crop monitoring  
surveys and responses to the annual report questionnaire.
Note: Data for 2015 are preliminary, as production data for a few coun-
tries in South America are still missing.
FIG. 28 Trends in the global interception rate for 
opiates, 1980-2014
Source: Calculations based on responses to the annual report 
questionnaire and UNODC opium poppy cultivation surveys. 
Note: For details of the calculation methods see the online methodology 
section of the present report.  
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First results of the opium poppy  
cultivation survey in Mexico,  
2014-2015
In the period 2014-2015, the Government of Mexico, with 
support from UNODC, conducted the first joint opium poppy 
survey in Mexico. The areas under opium poppy cultivation, 
estimated to have amounted to up to 28,100 ha, are mostly 
located in the mountainous areas of the western part of the 
country. It should be noted, however, that the new figures for 
Mexico, for methodological reasons, are not comparable with 
those published previously. 
The project so far has not been able to produce estimates of 
opium production. For the purpose of the present report, yield 
estimates established from data provided by the United States 
for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 were used to produce esti-
mates of opium production.a The figure for opium production 
will be adjusted once new yield data become available from 
the crop monitoring project and an appropriate methodology 
for opium production estimates has been developed.
a The Government of Mexico does not validate the estimates 
provided by the United States up to 2014, as they are not 
part of its official figures and it does not have information on 
the methodology used to calculate them.
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supply may have increased.145 In at least one major Euro-
pean heroin market (the United Kingdom),146, 147 heroin-
related deaths also increased markedly between 2012 and 
2014. In addition, estimates of problem opiate users in 
France showed a marked increase in recent years. Moreo-
ver, heroin prevalence rates in Italy, based on household 
surveys, showed a significant increase between  2008 and 
2014.
145 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report, In-depth  
Analysis, Lisbon and The Hague 2016, pp. 73-94.
146 Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin: Deaths Related  
to Drug Poisoning in England and Wales: 2014 registrations,  
3 September 2015.
147 National Records of Scotland, Drug-related deaths in Scotland in 
2014, revised 15 March 2016.
In North America, heroin use has been on the increase for 
some time; a development reflected in national household 
surveys and in the number of heroin-related deaths. Based 
on perceived trends reported to UNODC, the use of opi-
oids has also increased in Africa. 
Opiate use in Asia, however, is reported to have remained 
largely unchanged over the period 1998-2014, whereas 
opiate use in Oceania declined. The decline in opiate use 
in Oceania largely reflects changes in Australia, the largest 
opiate market in the region, where prevalence of past-year 
FIG. 29 Prevalence of past-year heroin use according to household surveys in Europe, selected countries, 
1999-2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
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Increasing heroin use among 
15-year-old boys in Italy 
There are signs that heroin use may be on the increase among 
young people in Italy. According to the latest youth survey on 
drug use (2015), the use of heroin among 15-year-old boys 
doubled to 2 per cent in 2015, although there was a slight 
decrease (from 1.3 per cent in 2014 to 1 per cent in 2015) 
in the rate among 15-19 year olds of both sexes. The Italian 
health authorities have also reported an increase in treatment 
admissions related to heroin use. 
The use of cannabis and stimulants increased slightly, while the 
use of cocaine and hallucinogens decreased in 2015. Around 
1.4 per cent of males and 0.6 per cent of females had injected 
drugs in the past year. 
Source: Istituto de Fisiologia Clinica del Cnr, Italian Report for the 
European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD), 
Pisa, quoted in Corriere Della Sera, “Il Raporto ESPAD – Droga a Scuola: 
Crese il consumo de eroina tra i 15enni”, 8 April 2016.
FIG. 30 Prevalence of past-year heroin use and 
number of heroin-related deaths per 
100,000 population in the United States, 
1999-2014
Source: United States, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and 
Quality, Behavioral Health Trends in the United States: Results 
from the 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, HHS 
Publication No. SMA 15-4927, NSDUH Series H-50 (Rockville, 
Maryland, 2015); and Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2015.
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heroin use declined from a peak of 0.8 per cent in 1998 
to 0.2 per cent in 2001 (following a “heroin drought” 
induced by intensified law enforcement activity) before 
falling further to 0.1 per cent by 2013, more than offset-
ting increases in the non-medical use of synthetic 
opioids. 
West Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe  
continue to dominate opiate seizures
In 2014, the largest quantities of opiates were seized in 
South-West Asia, followed by Europe. At the country level, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran reported the largest opiate 
seizures worldwide in 2014, accounting for 75 per cent of 
global opium seizures, 61 per cent of global morphine 
seizures and 17 per cent of global heroin seizures. The next 
largest heroin seizures were reported by Turkey (account-
ing for 16 per cent of global heroin seizures), China (12 
per cent), Pakistan (9 per cent), Kenya (7 per cent), the 
United States (7 per cent), Afghanistan (5 per cent) and 
the Russian Federation (3 per cent).
Seizure data, though they reflect the priorities and 
resources of law enforcement, also suggest an increase in 
the smuggling of opiates from the “Golden Triangle”, in 
South-East Asia, to illicit markets in that subregion, as 
well as an increase in the smuggling of heroin from illicit 
opium poppy cultivation areas in Latin America to the 
United States since 2007. Seizures involving Afghan opi-
ates account for some 80 per cent of global seizures of 
opiates. Partly as a consequence of decreasing opiate sei-
zures in Afghanistan, increases in opiate seizures have been 
reported in recent years in the countries of the so-called 
“Balkan route” (through Iran (Islamic Republic of ) and 
Turkey via South-Eastern Europe to Western and Central 
Europe), the so-called “northern route” (through Central 
Asia to the Russian Federation) and the so-called “south-
ern route” (southwards to the Gulf region, South Asia and 
Africa). Nonetheless, seizure data suggest that the Balkan 
route, which accounts for almost half of all heroin and 
morphine seizures worldwide, continues to be the world’s 
most important opiate trafficking route.
The Balkan route is the most important conduit 
for heroin trafficking 
A recent UNODC study on opiate trafficking on the 
Balkan route suggests that the majority of the opiates leav-
ing Afghanistan over the period 2009-2012 were smuggled 
on the Balkan route (i.e. through Iran (Islamic Republic 
of ) and Turkey via South-Eastern Europe to Western and 
Central Europe).148 Seizures of heroin and morphine on 
the Balkan route amounted to some 48 tons in 2014, up 
from 36 tons in 2012, but down from a peak of 66 tons 
in 2009. While the Balkan route is the main heroin traf-
ficking route leading to Western and Central Europe, not 
all of the heroin smuggled to that subregion arrives via 
that trafficking route. The authorities of the United King-
dom, for example, reported that, although most of the 
heroin entering that country continues to be smuggled on 
the Balkan route towards the Netherlands and France 
before being shipped into the United Kingdom, significant 
amounts of heroin also enter the United Kingdom each 
year on direct flights from Pakistan. Similarly, Belgium 
and Italy reported that important quantities of heroin had 
been trafficked via the southern route in recent years. 
The southern route has grown in importance 
Changes in seizures, supported by intelligence reports, 
suggest that the smuggling of Afghan opiates via the south-
ern route (i.e. leaving Pakistan or the Islamic Republic of 
Iran by sea for shipment to the Gulf region, Africa (par-
148 UNODC, Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the 
Balkan route (Vienna, 2015), p. 72. 
FIG. 31 Prevalence of past-year opioid use in  
Australia, 1998-2013
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey Detailed Report 2013, Drug statistics 
series No. 28 (Canberra, 2014).
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FIG. 32 Quantities of heroin and morphine seized 
worldwide, by trafficking route,  
1998-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
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ticularly Eastern Africa), South Asia and, to a lesser extent, 
South-East Asia, Oceania and North America) have 
increased in recent years.149 
The main southern route countries are in Asia, the Gulf 
area and neighbouring countries in the Near and Middle 
East and in Africa. Average annual heroin and morphine 
seizures reported by southern route countries rose by more 
than 80 per cent, to 3.6 tons per year, between the periods 
1998-2008 and 2009-2014. The increase was primarily 
due to a sixfold increase in seizures reported in Africa 
(mostly in East Africa). The amount of opiates seized on 
the southern route was smaller than that reported on the 
Balkan route but, at 9 tons of heroin and morphine, 
exceeded the amount seized on the northern route in 2014. 
Given the limited capacity of law enforcement in many 
of the countries on the southern route, the actual impor-
tance of trafficking on this route may be greater than sug-
gested by the amount seized. 
Trafficking on the northern route has started to 
recover from the decline in the period 2004-2012 
The northern route leaves Afghanistan for neighbouring 
countries in Central Asia, the Russian Federation and 
other members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. Traditionally, the northern route was mainly sup-
plied by opium produced in the north-eastern and north-
ern provinces of Afghanistan, although over the past 
decade the route has also been supplied by opium pro-
duced in southern Afghanistan. Following strong increases 
in trafficking over the period 1998-2004, in line with 
149 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route 
(Vienna, June 2015).
major increases in opium production in northern parts of 
Afghanistan, seizures declined between 2004 and 2012, 
in parallel with declines in opium production, before start-
ing to recover in the subsequent years, reaching 6.3 tons 
in 2014, having returned to the level reported in 2009. 
Trafficking in opiates from the Golden Triangle 
is on the increase 
Partly as a result of changes in opium production in Myan-
mar, seizures of opiates (mainly heroin) leaving the area 
known as the Golden Triangle have picked up since 2008, 
following decreases between 2001 and 2008. The quantity 
of seized heroin and morphine increased from a low of 5.7 
tons in 2008 to 13 tons in 2014. 
Not all of the opiates seized in South-East Asia and Oce-
ania originated in Myanmar. In the responses to the annual 
report questionnaire submitted by countries in South-East 
Asia and Oceania, Afghanistan and Pakistan accounted 
for 27 per cent of all the countries mentioned as countries 
of origin or departure of seized opiates in the period 2009-
2014, although that proportion fell to 11 per cent in 2014. 
Data provided by China suggest that by 2010, the propor-
tion of heroin smuggled into the country from South-East 
Asia may have fallen to around 70 per cent while the pro-
portion of heroin from Afghanistan increased to nearly 30 
per cent.150 By 2013, the proportion of heroin from 
150 China, National Narcotics Control Commission, Annual Report 
on Drug Control in China 2011 and previous years; UNODC, 
FIG. 33 Opium production in Afghanistan and 
heroin and morphine seizures in key 
countries along the Balkan route,  
1998-2015
Source: UNODC Afghanistan opium survey, 2015 and previous 
years; and responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
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FIG. 34 Opium production in northern and  
north-eastern Afghanistan and quantities 
of heroin and morphine seized in key  
countries and subregions along the  
northern route, 1998-2015
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
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Afghanistan had fallen to 10 per cent, and by 2014, 
Afghanistan was no longer mentioned among the key 
source countries of shipments of opiates to China; the 
“new” main source countries for heroin shipments were 
Myanmar, followed by the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Viet Nam. 
Based on the forensic analysis of seizures, a similar trend 
was reported by Australia. Traditionally, almost all of the 
heroin found in Australia originated in South-East Asia. 
Heroin originating in South-East Asia accounted for 79 
per cent of the total in 2005, but that proportion fell to 
just 26 per cent in 2008 before recovering in subsequent 
years to 72 per cent of the total over the period January-
June 2014.151 
Heroin trafficking in the Americas continues to 
increase
Heroin and morphine seizures in the Americas rose from 
an average of 4 tons per year over the period 1998-2008 
to 7 tons per year over the period 2009-2014 (8 tons in 
2014). In parallel, opium production reported in Latin 
America doubled, from an average of 151 tons per year 
over the period 1998-2008 to 309 tons per year over the 
period 2009-2014. 
Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat 
Assessment (2013); and Afghan Opiate Trafficking.
151 Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2013-2014  
(Canberra, 2014).
More than 70 per cent of all heroin and morphine seizures 
in the Americas over the period 2009-2014 were made in 
the United States, where such seizures more than doubled 
from an average of around 2 tons per year over the period 
1998-2008 to 5 tons per year over the period 2009-2014 
(6 tons in 2014). Heroin trafficking and use emerged in 
2015 as the main national drug-related threat for law 
enforcement agencies in the United States (increasing in 
perception as the main threat from 8 per cent of all drug 
threats in 2007 to 33 per cent in 2015).152 
Given the volatile nature of opium  
production, what is happening in the 
heroin market? 
While the amount of opiates available for consumption, 
expressed in opium equivalent (calculated on the basis of 
opium production from which seizures of opiates were 
deducted), showed strong annual fluctuations (declining 
by more than 75 per cent in one year and increasing four-
fold in the next year), changes in the number of opiate 
users were far less marked over the period 1998-2014. The 
number of opiate users seems to follow the long-term 
linear trend of opiates available for consumption rather 
than the annual increases and decreases in the amount of 
opium available. How can that be explained? 
One hypothesis is that the number of drug users changes 
in line with the year-on-year availability of opium, but 
those changes are not reflected in estimates of the number 
of opiate users because of limitations in the data. Another 
hypothesis is that the likely number of opiate users may 
152 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, U.S. Department of 
Justice. Drug Enforcement Administration. 
FIG. 35 Opium production in South-East Asia and 
quantities of heroin and morphine seized 
in key countries and regions affected by 
that production, 1998-2014
Source: UNODC opium surveys in South-East Asia; and responses 
to the annual report questionnaire. 
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FIG. 36 Quantities of heroin and morphine seized 
in the Americas and opium production in 
Latin America, 1998-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire;  
government reports. 
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be correct but per capita use changes in line with availabil-
ity. The third hypothesis is that stockpiling of inventories 
smoothes year-on-year variations in production. While 
the first two hypotheses basically assume that the con-
sumption of opiates reacts to year-on-year changes in 
supply, the third hypothesis suggests that the short-term 
adjustments are in the form of changes in inventories held 
along the supply chain. 
Hypothesis 1. The number of opiate users 
changes regularly in line with the availability of 
opium 
There are important margins of error around the estimates 
of opiate users, which do not exclude the possibility that 
some adjustments to short-term supply changes may take 
place but remain unnoticed in estimates of opiate users. 
UNODC estimates are based on a limited number of 
reporting countries, most of them in Europe, the Americas 
and Oceania, with very poor reporting in Africa and only 
limited reporting in Asia. This is a problem, as only indi-
rect indicators (such as registered drug users or law enforce-
ment data) are available, while there are no regularly 
monitored prevalence data for some of the potentially large 
opiate markets in countries in Asia (notably China and 
India). Prevalence rates for most emerging opiate markets 
in Africa do not exist, and estimates are based on extrapo-
lations from only a few countries. 
However, a distinction should be made between data limi-
tations concerning the ability to peg the level correctly 
(which is an issue) and limitations concerning the ability 
to detect short-term trends in consumption. Increases in 
supply could prompt traffickers to expand the opiate 
market, selling opiates to new groups of users in new mar-
kets, although such a development would probably be 
reflected in opiate seizures. It is even more difficult to 
imagine, given the highly addictive nature of opiates, that 
millions of users would give up consuming opiates within 
a year if the supply were to be reduced — and that none 
of this would be noticed. 
UNODC also received data on perceived trends from a 
far larger number of countries over the period 1998-2014. 
Transforming the answers into a simple index153 reveals a 
largely stable level of opium use over the period 1998-2014 
and suggests that after some initial increases over the 
period 1998-2008, heroin use may have stabilized over 
the period 2009-2014. Moreover, these data do not indi-
cate any sharp upward or downward year-on-year move-
ment and are broadly in line with estimates of opiate use 
(and trends in heroin seizures). 
Hypothesis 2. Opiate users react to changes in 
supply by increasing or decreasing per capita 
consumption levels 
Opiate users may adjust their consumption patterns to the 
amounts available. Opiates available for consumption rose 
by an annual increase of more than 30 per cent six times 
153 See the online methodology section of the present report.
FIG. 37 Opium production, opiate seizures,  
opiates available for consumption and  
number of opiate users, 1998-2015
Source: Calculations based on UNODC opium surveys and 
responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: A conversion ratio of 10 kg of opium for 1 kg of morphine or 
heroin was used. Estimates for 2015 are preliminary; seizure data from 
2014 were used as a proxy for seizures in 2015, and consumption esti-
mates for 2014 were used as a proxy for consumption in 2015. 
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FIG. 38 Global trends in the number of past-year 
opiate users and the heroin and opium 
use perception indices, 1998-2014 
Source: World Drug Report, 2000-2016; UNODC, Global Illicit 
Drug Trends, 2001-2003; and responses to the annual report 
questionnaire. 
Note: The uncertainty intervals for the estimated number of opiate users 
were calculated by UNODC for the period 2007-2014; for data prior to 
2007, the average value of the uncertainty intervals found over the 
period 2007-2014 was used as a proxy. For more details of perception 
indices, see the online methodology section of the present report. 
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over the period 1998-2015, and by more than 50 per cent 
four times. Increases of such magnitude in supply would 
most likely have resulted in strong increases in opiate 
purity levels and, as a consequence, in increasing drug-
related deaths in specific years, but there is no evidence of 
this. Even taking into consideration that the capacity of 
the human body to adjust may be rather strong, dramatic 
increases in opiate consumption would still lead to an 
increase in drug-related deaths. 
Similarly, massive declines in per capita opiate consump-
tion would have been noticed. On four occasions, the 
amount of opiates available for consumption fell by more 
than 30 per cent compared with the previous year. It could 
be argued that in many developed countries substitution 
treatment therapy could result in a shift from using illegal 
heroin to using legally available opioids. However, such 
short-term shifts into substitution treatment would prob-
ably have been recorded. Moreover, once they are in sub-
stitution treatment, the majority of clients do not quickly 
shift back to using heroin once heroin becomes available 
again. In addition, there have not been reports from key 
consumer countries of any drastic year-on-year changes in 
heroin prices or purity levels in recent years that could 
have prompted such reaction patterns. Similarly, heroin 
seizures, which should reflect such changes, followed a 
rather smooth trend over the period 1998-2014.
Hypothesis 3. Inventory levels buffer  
fluctuating supply from one-year shifts  
in opium production 
Finally, there is the possibility that not all of the opium 
produced in a given year is actually consumed and that 
inventories change accordingly. Such inventories are 
common in all types of trade, with stored wholesale mate-
rial used to top up irregular supply to help satisfy stable 
demand. In addition, opium is known to store well for 
several years and opium stocks may be accumulated as a 
financial reserve and for speculation purposes.154 
Several UNODC and World Bank studies have indicated 
the existence of opium inventories in Afghanistan, and a 
number of opium price changes in Afghanistan since 1998 
can only be explained once such inventories have been 
considered.155 Their existence became most obvious in 
154 Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, eds., Afghanistan’s Drug 
Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for 
Counter-Narcotics Policy (UNODC and World Bank, 2006);  
William A. Byrd, “Responding to Afghanistan’s opium economy 
challenge: lessons and policy implications from a development per-
spective”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4545 (Washington, 
D.C, World Bank, March 2008).
155 The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.X.6); William A. Byrd 
and Christopher Ward, Drugs and Development in Afghanistan, 
World Bank Social Development Papers, Paper No. 18, December 
2004; Afghanistan’s Drug Industry; “Responding to Afghanistan’s 
opium economy challenge”; UNODC and Ministry of Counter 
Narcotics of Afghanistan, Afghanistan: Opium Winter Rapid Assess-
ment Survey (February, 2008); World Drug Report 2010 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.XI.13); Addiction, Crime and 
2001, when an opium ban was enforced in Taliban-con-
trolled territory, resulting in a massive decline in opium 
production in Afghanistan and a decline of 65 per cent in 
global opium production. Global consumption, however, 
did not decline by such a large percentage and the total 
quantity of heroin seized worldwide did not decrease. Even 
a year later, in 2002, heroin seizures declined by only 11 
per cent before recovering again in 2003. All of this can 
only be explained by the previous build-up of large opium 
stocks in Afghanistan that were subsequently used to guar-
antee the supply of heroin to the consumer markets. Thus, 
heroin seizures do not change much from year to year, 
even though global opium production is highly volatile. 
There is a rather strong correlation between the quantity 
of heroin seized and the number of opiate users (r = 0.82 
over the period 1998-2014), suggesting a common under-
lying factor (supply). There is also a positive correlation 
between the production of opium and the quantity of 
opium seized (r = 0.63). The correlation between opium 
production and heroin seizures, however, is weak (r = 0.45), 
although it improves once opium production is correlated 
with heroin seizures made the following year (r = 0.59), 
which tallies with reports that it often takes a year (or more) 
until opium, transformed into heroin, reaches the main 
consumer markets. There is, however, a strong correlation 
between a four-year average of opium production and the 
quantity of heroin seized a year later (r = 0.81). 
Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.IV.15); The Global Afghan 
Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.11.XI.11); and World Drug Report 2014.
FIG. 39 Illicit opium production compared with 
the quantity of heroin seized in the  
following year, 1998-2015 
Source: UNODC opium surveys in key opium-producing countries; 
and responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Standard deviation of changes on a year earlier over the period 
1998-2014: Opium production: 0.53; Heroin seizures: 0.14. 
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
 -
 1,500
 3,000
 4,500
 6,000
 7,500
 9,000
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15 Q
ua
nti
ty
 o
f h
er
oi
n 
se
iz
ed
 (t
on
s)
O
pi
um
 p
ro
du
cti
on
 (t
on
s)
Global illicit opium production
Heroin seizures
Trend in opium production
Trend in heroin seizures
R² = 0.2
3
R² = 0.
85
34
All of this suggests that there may be a constant supply of 
heroin reaching the market, irrespective of the opium har-
vest in a given year. Given the durability of opium, which 
lasts several years, it is possible that most inventories are 
in the form of opium, rather than morphine or heroin. 
Large individual seizures of opium, rather than of heroin 
or morphine, also point in that direction. 
Differences in opium available for consumption, in the 
model represented in figure 40, suggest either a build-up 
or a depletion of inventories in specific years. 
Holding such quantities in inventory would seem to be 
feasible because opium is so compact. Its volume and 
weight are relatively small compared with those of con-
ventional goods. Global opium production amounted to, 
on average, some 5,800 tons per year over the period 2009-
2015 (range: 4,730-7,720 tons). This is equivalent to an 
average of 233 containers (range: 189-309 containers), 
given that a 20-foot dry general-purpose container has a 
capacity of around 25 tons. As the largest modern con-
tainer ships can hold more than 19,000 containers, storing 
all the opium produced in the world in a single year would 
require only 1.2 per cent of the capacity of one such ship 
(1.0-1.6 per cent in the period 2009-2015). 
Inventories need not be held by one individual or organi-
zation; they can be dispersed among a large number of 
players, including opium poppy growers, laboratory 
owners, small-, medium- and large-scale opium traffickers 
(both in and outside the opium-producing countries) or 
local warlords. There is no recent information about pos-
sible inventories about opium in Afghanistan. However, 
a UNODC and World Bank study in 2005 suggested that, 
when they had inventories, opium poppy growers (of 
whom there are several hundred thousand in Afghanistan) 
typically held in stock 2-10 kg of opium as a financial 
reserve, accumulated over several years. The study also 
suggested that some 40 per cent of opium purchases were 
kept as inventory for sale until the next harvest and that 
large-scale traffickers, purchasing 2 tons of opium per year, 
may have built up a total long-term stock of opium of at 
least 1 ton over the previous 4-5 years.156 
Strong decline in opium production in 2015  
is unlikely to lead to major shortages in the 
global heroin market 
It is likely that none of the three hypotheses of reaction 
patterns to changes in opium supply can be completely 
refuted. Indeed, these hypothesis are in no way mutually 
exclusive. All three hypotheses may help to explain how 
the market reacts to changes in supply. There can be adap-
tions to changes in supply by changes in the number of 
opiate users, by increases or decreases in per capita con-
sumption and by building up or depleting inventories. 
The massive decline in opium production of almost 40 
per cent in 2015 is unlikely, however, to result in a decline 
of the same magnitude within a year in either the global 
number of opiate users or the average per capita consump-
tion of opiates. It seems more likely that inventories of 
opiates, built up in previous years, will be used to guaran-
tee the manufacture of heroin (some 450 tons of heroin 
per year would be needed to cater for annual consumption) 
and that only a period of sustained decline in opium pro-
duction could have any real effect on the global heroin 
market. 
156 Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, pp. 86-87 (see previous footnote).
FIG. 40 Model of opiates available for consump-
tion, opiate consumption and changes in 
inventories, 1998-2015 
Source: Calculations based on UNODC opium surveys and 
responses to the annual report questionnaire. 
Note: A conversion ratio of 10 kg of opium for 1 kg of morphine or 
heroin was used. Estimates for 2015 are preliminary; seizure data from 
2014 were used as a proxy for seizures in 2015, and consumption esti-
mates for 2014 were used as a proxy for consumption in 2015. For 
details of the calculation methods, see the online methodology section 
of the present report. 
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COCAINE
Key figures
Note: Cocaine seizures are mostly of cocaine hydrochloride (of varying purity), but also include other cocaine products (paste, base and “crack”).  
Cocaine market developments
Strong decline in coca bush cultivation 
since 1998 
Although global coca bush cultivation in 2014 increased 
by 10 per cent compared with the previous year, the total 
area under coca bush cultivation worldwide, 132,300 ha, 
was the second smallest since the late 1980s. Global coca 
bush cultivation in 2014 was 19 per cent lower than in 
2009, 40 per cent lower than the peak level in 2000 and 
31 per cent lower than in 1998.157
Of the three main countries cultivating coca bush, Colom-
bia has shown the strongest decrease in the total area under 
coca bush cultivation (-58 per cent) since the peak of 
2000; that decline was initially related to widespread aerial 
spraying, followed by manual eradication and, after 2007, 
by increased alternative development efforts. However, 
2014 saw a strong increase (of 44 per cent) in the total 
area under coca bush cultivation in Colombia, price 
157 The same patterns are found when the comparisons are based on an 
average of several years. The average annual area under coca bush 
cultivation fell by 12 per cent when comparing the periods 1990-
1997 and 1998-2008 and by 19 per cent when comparing the peri-
ods 1998-2008 and 2009-2014. 
increase and expectations among farmers that they might 
benefit more from alternative development if they were 
growing coca bush during the peace negotiations.158 There 
are also indications that the new upward trend in coca 
bush cultivation in Colombia continued into 2015. In 
2014, the total area under coca bush cultivation in Colom-
bia amounted to 69,000 ha, accounting for 52 per cent 
of global coca bush cultivation. 
Linked to the interruption of the so-called “air bridge”, 
which transported coca paste or base from growing areas 
in Peru to cocaine-processing laboratories in Colombia, 
and thus falling coca prices, coca bush cultivation in Peru 
declined in the 1990s. Coca bush cultivation in Peru, how-
ever, rose by 44 per cent between 2000 and 2011, as the 
use of the “air bridge” strategy was brought to an end and 
coca prices subsequently increased. Over the period 2011-
2014, the total area under coca bush cultivation in Peru 
decreased once more (by 31 per cent). It is now, at 42,900 
ha (accounting for 32 per cent of global coca bush culti-
vation), back to its 2000 level. The latest decrease can be 
linked to achievements in alternative development, as well 
as intensified eradication efforts. 
158 UNODC and Government of Colombia, Colombia: Coca Cultiva-
tion Survey 2014 (Bogotá, July 2015), p 13. 
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In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the total area under 
coca bush cultivation decreased in the late 1990s as a result 
of increased government interventions, including in the 
form of alternative development (Plan Dignidad), which 
was able to count on strong external assistance. However, 
the total area under cultivation doubled between 2000 
and 2010 before falling again (by 34 per cent) in the period 
2010-2014. The latest decline was linked to alternative 
development efforts (done with very limited external 
assistance)159 as well as strong social pressure placed on 
coca bush growers by the authorities and unions to limit 
coca bush cultivation to 1 cato (0.16 ha) per family. The 
total area under coca bush cultivation in the country in 
2014 (20,400 ha, or 15 per cent of the world total) was 
less than half the total area under such cultivation in the 
period 1990-1997, but still 40 per cent larger than in 
2000. 
Global production of cocaine (expressed at a purity of 100 
per cent) can be estimated for 2014 at 746 tons (using the 
“old” conversion ratio) and 943 tons (using the “new” 
conversion ratio); those values are slightly higher than in 
the previous year but still 24-27 per cent lower than the 
peak in 2007, and thus back to the levels reported in the 
late 1990s. There are, however, indications that the overall 
upward trend observed in 2014 continued into 2015.
Data suggest that the global cocaine interception rate, 
based on cocaine production estimates and quantities of 
cocaine seized, reached a level of between 43 and 68 per 
cent in 2014. 
Most of the increases in the global cocaine interception 
rate occurred after 1998, when the General Assembly held 
159 World Drug Report 2015, chapter II. 
its twentieth special session, dedicated to countering the 
world drug problem together. The global cocaine intercep-
tion rate almost doubled between the periods 1990-1997 
and 2009-2014. 
Cocaine continues to be trafficked primarily 
from South America to North America and 
Western and Central Europe 
A total of 153 countries reported cocaine seizures over the 
period 2009-2014. Most of the cocaine trafficking, how-
ever, continues to be from the Andean subregion to North 
America and Europe. The bulk of the cocaine seizures in 
2014 occurred in the Americas, which accounted for 90 
FIG. 41 Global coca bush cultivation and cocaine production, 1998-2014 
Source: UNODC coca bush cultivation surveys in Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia and Peru conducted in 2014 and in previous 
years.
Note: See box on cocaine conversion ratios in the section entitled “Extent of drug supply“ (p. 21). 
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per cent of global cocaine seizures (in particular, in South 
America (60 per cent)). Cocaine seizures in Western and 
Central Europe accounted for 9 per cent of global cocaine 
seizures. 
Stabilization of cocaine trafficking in  
South America 
The total quantity of cocaine seized more than doubled 
in South America over the period 1998-2014 (reaching 
392 tons in 2014), although recent data suggest a levelling 
off. In the period 2009-2014, Colombia accounted for 56 
per cent of all the cocaine seizures in South America (and 
more than a third of global cocaine seizures); it was fol-
lowed by Ecuador (accounting for 10 per cent of total 
cocaine seizures in South America), Brazil (about 7 per 
cent), the Plurinational State of Bolivia (about 7 per cent), 
Peru (about 7 per cent) and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (6 per cent). The increase in cocaine seizures 
between the periods 1998-2008 and 2009-2014 was par-
ticularly pronounced in Ecuador, where the increase was 
linked to intensified law enforcement activity. In Brazil, 
the increase in the quantity of cocaine seized was attribut-
able to a combination of improved law enforcement 
efforts, the growing domestic market for cocaine and 
increasing cocaine shipments to overseas markets. 
North American cocaine largely stable after a 
decline in recent years 
North America has been the world’s largest cocaine market 
for years. Given the falling cocaine production in Colom-
bia and the increased violence linked to the drug cartels 
in Mexico,160 the supply of cocaine to Canada and the 
United States has declined. That has raised the purity-
adjusted price of cocaine and prompted a decline in con-
sumption. In the United States, the prevalence of past-year 
cocaine use among the general population fell by 32 per 
cent between 2006 and 2014, while cocaine-related deaths 
decreased by 34 per cent between 2006 and 2013 (the 
latest year for which data are available), treatment admis-
sions related to cocaine use fell by 54 per cent between 
2006 and 2012 (the latest year for which data are 
available)161 and a decrease was also reported in cocaine-
positive urine tests among the general workforce, by 66 
per cent over the period 2006-2014. Cocaine seizures in 
North America fell by some 50 per cent, to 100 tons, in 
the same period. 
The largest cocaine seizures in North America over the 
period 2009-2014 were reported by the United States 
(accounting for 90 per cent of the seizures in North Amer-
ica), Mexico (8 per cent) and Canada (2 per cent). The 
United States accounted for 15 per cent of global cocaine 
seizures over the period 2009-2014 and was second only 
to Colombia. 
According to the Cocaine Signature Program of DEA,162 
more than 90 per cent of the cocaine trafficked to North 
America originates in Colombia. Cocaine is often smug-
160 See also chapter II on violence.
161 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary (see footnote 30). 
162 Ibid. 
Fig. 43 Quantities of cocaine seized, by region, 
1998-2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
Note: The seized forms of cocaine included cocaine hydrochloride, coca 
paste and base and “crack” cocaine, and the quantities seized were not 
adjusted for purity.
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Fig. 44 Quantities of cocaine seized in North 
America and prevalence of past-year 
cocaine use in Canada and the United 
States, 2002-2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire, the United 
States National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health and 
the Canadian Tobacco, Alcohol and Drugs Survey (CTADS) 2013.
Note: Data for 2002 have been used as baseline data, as the United 
States National Household Survey changed its methodology several 
times between 1998 and 2002. 
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gled by boat or semi-submersible directly to Mexico or via 
Central America to Mexico and then by land to the United 
States and Canada. Organized criminal groups based in 
Mexico continue to dominate the transportation of cocaine 
across the border into the United States, as well as the 
large-scale transportation of cocaine in the United States, 
supplying local organized criminal groups. Although the 
volume of cocaine has been declining, United States esti-
mates for 2014 suggest that 87 per cent of the cocaine 
continues to be transported through the Central Ameri-
can-Mexican corridor, while around 13 per cent of the 
cocaine reaching the United States passes through the Car-
ibbean subregion, primarily via the Dominican Republic 
and Puerto Rico.163
European cocaine market is now stagnating
In line with reports of massive increases in the European 
cocaine market, cocaine seizures in Europe quadrupled 
between 1998 and 2006, reaching some 120 tons, before 
falling to 62 tons in 2014. Member States of the European 
Union accounted for 98 per cent of the total amount of 
cocaine intercepted in Europe over the period 2009-2014. 
The prevalence of cocaine use in the European Union 
member States appears to have declined from a peak in 
2007 and is now rather stable, at a level of about 1 per 
cent of the population aged 15-64. However, this masks 
trends and patterns at the subregional and national levels; 
in particular, prevalence of cocaine use tends to be above 
average in several Western European countries and lower 
in the rest of Europe, and several countries with high prev-
alence of cocaine use showed a decrease while some smaller 
countries with low prevalence showed an increase. 
163 Ibid., pp. 55-63.
Analysis of benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite, in 
waste-water, based on information from 67 cities located 
in 20 countries in Western, Central and South-Eastern 
Europe, indicates marked differences across cities in terms 
of cocaine consumption and trends, but also indicates 
overall stable cocaine consumption levels over the period 
2011-2014.164
Of the main coca-producing countries, the main country 
of origin or departure for cocaine shipments to Europe 
continues to be Colombia (mentioned in 42 per cent of 
responses by European countries in the annual report ques-
tionnaire over the period 2009-2014), followed Peru (31 
per cent) and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The 
importance of Colombian cocaine in Europe, however, 
has been declining compared with the situation during 
the period 1998-2008. 
The most frequently mentioned non-European countries 
of departure for cocaine shipments over the period 2009-
2014 were Brazil, followed by Colombia, Ecuador, the 
Dominican Republic, Argentina and Costa Rica. Coun-
tries in Africa (mostly in West Africa) were mentioned as 
164 For the data used in the analysis and details of the calculations, see 
the online methodology section of the present report.
FIG. 45 Quantities of cocaine seized in Europe 
and prevalence of past-year cocaine use 
in European Union member States, 
1998-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire and data 
from EMCDDA.
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FIG. 46 Benzoylecgonine (a cocaine metabolite) 
found in wastewater in 67 European 
cities: averages and ranges, 2011-2014
Source: Sewage Analysis CORe group Europe (SCORE).
Note: (a) The cities were in the following countries: Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The analysis in 
each city was based on the amounts of benzoylecgonine identified in 
the wastewater over a 7-day period and was weighted by the popula-
tion of the wastewater catchment area. (b) The population-weighted 
average of 11 cities reporting each year in the wastewater catchment 
area were located in Belgium, Croatia, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway 
and Spain were located. 
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non-European transit countries in 10 per cent of responses 
to the annual report questionnaire over the period 2009-
2014. The main points of entry in Europe were the coun-
tries of the Iberian peninsula, notably Spain, followed by 
the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Cocaine trafficking via Africa may be regaining 
importance 
Cocaine seizures in Africa increased from 0.8 ton in 1998 
to 5.5 tons in 2007, reflecting the rapidly growing impor-
tance of West Africa as a transit area. In 2014, cocaine 
seizures in Africa fell to 1.9 tons. Given the limited law 
enforcement capacity, the decline in seizures in 2014 does 
not necessarily reflect a decline in cocaine trafficking in 
Africa, though the decline went in parallel with fewer 
reports from Europe indicating that Africa had been used 
as a transit area. In the meantime, the situation may have 
changed again: over the period December 2014-March 
2016, at least 22 tons of cocaine were seized en route from 
South America via West Africa to Europe, although most 
of those seizures took place outside Africa.165 
Over the period 2009-2014, the proportion of the total 
cocaine seizures in Africa accounted for by West Africa 
rose to 78 per cent; North Africa accounted for 11 per 
cent of the cocaine seizures made in Africa. The largest 
quantity of cocaine seized was reported by Cabo Verde, 
followed by the Gambia, Nigeria and Ghana. 
Africa is often supplied with cocaine departing from Brazil 
(accounting for 51 per cent of all mentions of South Amer-
ican countries in responses to the annual report question-
naire by African countries over the period 2009-2014), 
Colombia (18 per cent), Peru (13 per cent) and Chile (9 
per cent). The African country most frequently mentioned 
(by other African countries) as countries of departure or 
transit countries for shipments of cocaine within Africa 
was Nigeria, followed by Ghana, Mali and Guinea. 
The main countries of final destination for cocaine traf-
ficked to Africa are in Europe (accounting for 58 per cent 
of all mentions; notably Italy, Spain, France, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands), Africa (26 per cent), 
North America (notably the United States (12 per cent)) 
and Asia (3 per cent, notably China and Malaysia). Most 
of the cocaine shipments transiting Africa left the region 
by air. In recent years, of the cocaine shipments leaving 
165 The UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa 
reported the following in February 2016: in two operations close to 
Cabo Verde in 2015, the Spanish authorities seized some 3 tons of 
cocaine; in March 2015, the Bolivian authorities arrested two West 
Africans and seized 5.9 tons of cocaine en route to countries in 
West Africa (mainly Ghana and Burkina Faso); at the beginning of 
2016, more than 1.4 tons of cocaine were seized in Mauritania; in 
January 2016, the Bolivian authorities reported the seizure of 8 tons 
of cocaine (concealed among 80 tons of barium sulphate), destined 
for West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire), that had been shipped via Argentina 
and Uruguay; and in 2015 shipments of less than a ton of cocaine 
– mostly departing from Brazil and organized by Nigerian criminal 
groups – were seized in Benin (almost 0.3 ton), the Gambia (0.2 
ton) and Guinea (81 kg). 
Nigeria for other countries, 50-70 per cent left the country 
by air, 20 per cent left the country on roads leading to 
neighbouring countries and 5 per cent left the country by 
boat; this is in contrast to reports that, of the cocaine ship-
ments leaving Ghana, 61 per cent left the country by boat 
and 39 per cent by air.
Signs of increased smuggling of cocaine to Asia
Cocaine seizures in Asia tripled from an average of 0.4 ton 
over the period 1998-2008 to 1.5 tons per year over the 
period 2009-2014, in line with indications that cocaine 
consumption among the upper classes in several of the 
more developed Asian countries has started to rise. 
Most of the cocaine seizures in Asia over the period 2009-
2014 were made in East and South-East Asia (59 per cent) 
and in the Middle East (39 per cent). In 2014, however, 
the share of cocaine seizures in the Middle East rose to 49 
per cent. 
The most frequently mentioned Latin American countries 
of origin, departure and transit for cocaine shipments to 
Asia in the period 2009-2014 were Brazil, followed by 
Colombia, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Argen-
tina and Mexico. The African countries used as trans-ship-
ment areas were mainly Nigeria and South Africa, and the 
countries of departure and transit countries in Asia were 
mostly in the Middle East (United Arab Emirates, followed 
by Jordan and Lebanon) and in South Asia and South-East 
Asia (Thailand, followed by Malaysia, Philippines and 
India). The most frequently mentioned final destination 
in Asia was Israel, followed by China. 
Rapid growth in the cocaine market in Oceania 
over the past decade 
Cocaine seizures in Oceania more than doubled, from an 
annual average of 0.5 ton over the period 1998-2008 to 
1.2 tons over the period 2009-2014, with Australia 
accounting for 99 per cent of total cocaine seizures in the 
region from 1998 to 2014. The increase is in line with 
reports of rapidly growing prevalence of cocaine use: the 
prevalence of past-year cocaine use among the general 
population (aged 14 and older) in Australia doubled from 
1 per cent in 2004 to 2.1 per cent in 2010 and remained 
stable at this level in 2013. 
Is the global cocaine market shrinking? 
Estimated global coca bush cultivation fell by more than 
30 per cent over the period 1998-2014 — by 40 per cent 
after 2000, when it reached its peak. The decline was far 
less pronounced in the case of estimated cocaine produc-
tion, reflecting improvements in yields and in laboratory 
efficiency in the Andean subregion. Cocaine production 
decreased by 10 per cent between 1998 and 2014, accord-
ing to calculations based on the “old” conversion ratio 
(available for both years), but comparison of the estimates 
based on the “new” conversion ratio for 2014 with the 
1998 estimate (based on the assumption that the “old” 
40
conversion ratio may have still been correct in 1998) indi-
cates a small increase in cocaine production (some 14 per 
cent between 1998 and 2014). 
The deduction of purity-adjusted seizures from cocaine 
production shows a reduction in cocaine available for con-
sumption over time, irrespective of whether estimates are 
based on the “old” or the “new” cocaine conversion ratio. 
At the same time, global prevalence of past-year cocaine 
use among the population aged 15-64 remained largely 
stable over the period 1998-2014, fluctuating between 0.3 
and 0.4 per cent, while the number of cocaine users 
increased (by 30 per cent) from some 14 million in 1998 
to 18.3 million in 2014. The increase in the number of 
cocaine users is attributable to population growth.
The fact that the quantities of cocaine available for con-
sumption declined over the period 1998-2014 while there 
was an increase in the number of cocaine users (30 per 
cent) over the same period (the number of users was largely 
stable over the period 2007-2014) seems somewhat con-
tradictory. Three different hypotheses may help to explain 
this development.
Hypothesis 1. No increase in the number of 
cocaine users 
One hypothesis could be that the number of cocaine users 
did not actually increase over the period 1998-2014 and 
that the number may have even declined between 2007 
and 2014. The margins of error around the prevalence 
estimates are large, mainly reflecting the lack of reliable 
information for Africa and Asia; thus, the possibility that 
there was no increase in the number of cocaine users over 
the period 1998-2014 cannot be totally excluded. How-
ever, this hypothesis is not supported by data on perceived 
drug use reported by Member States, which indicate a 
clear upward trend in cocaine use (including in Africa and 
Asia), particularly between 1998 and 2008, followed by a 
period of stabilization or slight decline since 2009. 
FIG. 47 Global cocaine production and seizures, 
1998-2014
Source: UNODC coca bush cultivation surveys conducted in Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), Colombia and Peru in 2014 and in previ-
ous years.
Note: As production is shown in pure cocaine equivalent, reported sei-
zures have been purity-adjusted. Individual seizures reported to UNODC 
indicate that more than 99 per cent of the seized cocaine (measured in 
terms of quantity) was intercepted at the wholesale level. The seizures 
were therefore adjusted to the purity level at wholesale and expressed in 
quantities of pure cocaine. 
FIG. 48 Cocaine available for consumption,  
1998-2014
Source: UNODC coca bush cultivation surveys conducted in 2014 
and in previous years, responses to the annual report question-
naire and government reports. 
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FIG. 49 Global trends in the number of past-year 
cocaine users and the cocaine use percep-
tion index, 1998-2014
Source: World Drug Report, 2000-2016; UNODC, Global Illicit 
Drug Trends, 2001-2003; and responses to the annual report 
questionnaire. 
Note: For more details of perception indices, see the online methodol-
ogy section of the present report.
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Hypothesis 2. Decline in per capita consumption 
among cocaine users (shifting from mature to 
new markets) 
Another hypothesis is that the cocaine users’ per capita 
consumption may have decreased, with a number of indi-
cators seeming to be consistent with this hypothesis. 
There seems to have been a shift in the composition of the 
cocaine user population, towards an increase in the number 
of occasional users relative to the number of high-fre-
quency or dependent users as a consequence of a geo-
graphical shift. 
Based on the amount of cocaine available for consumption 
and the number of cocaine users, table 2 suggests that the 
mean amount consumed per cocaine user may have 
increased over the period 1998-2007, from 37 to 41 grams 
per user, before decreasing to 29 grams per user by 
2014.166 
Such changes in per capita consumption may have 
occurred, as cocaine use has declined in established mar-
kets, where per capita consumption was high, and 
increased in new markets, where per capita consumption 
is still low, as the cocaine epidemic in the new markets is 
still at an early stage. 
The number of cocaine users showed a marked decline in 
North America and less significant decreases in Europe 
over the period 2007-2014. Increases in cocaine use, by 
contrast, could be found in emerging markets in South 
America, notably between 2009 and 2014, as well as in 
Oceania and, most probably, in Africa and Asia (although 
the quantitative evidence is weak for these two regions). 
A UNODC analysis on the retail and wholesale value of 
the illicit drug market, based on data for the period 2002-
2003,167 suggested that per capita consumption of cocaine 
in North America (44 grams per user) was above the global 
166 Such levels are similar to the findings of previous UNODC 
research. A study on the value of the illicit drug market, based on 
data from the period 2002-2003, arrived at an average per capita 
consumption level of 37 grams of pure cocaine per user at the 
global level (World Drug Report 2005, Volume 1: Analysis (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.XI.10), table 3, p. 131). 
UNODC has suggested a decline of per capita consumption levels 
to 30 grams per user at the global level (World Drug Report 2010 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.XI.13), table 8, p. 71).
167 World Drug Report 2005, table 3, p. 131.
average (37 grams per user). In the other regions, where 
per capita consumption was below the global average, 
cocaine use had been increasing. This suggests that heavy 
cocaine consumption was concentrated in North America, 
which was indirectly confirmed by a comparatively high 
proportion of people using cocaine in the United States 
being treated for cocaine use and a higher proportion of 
people using cocaine dying from cocaine use. This is of 
importance as — in parallel — indicators for North Amer-
ica showed that not only recreational use of cocaine but 
also heavy use had fallen strongly over the past decade. 
Estimates for the United States suggested that the number 
of “chronic cocaine users”, defined as users who consumed 
cocaine four or more days in the past month, had fallen 
by 22 per cent over the period 2006-2010168 (i.e. almost 
as much as the overall number of past-year cocaine users 
during that period) and there were no indications of any 
reversal of that development in subsequent years.169 
Heavy cocaine users, although they account for only a 
small proportion of the total number of users, are respon-
sible for the bulk of cocaine consumed. Earlier analysis of 
the United States cocaine market suggested that cocaine 
use typically followed a Pareto distribution, with one quar-
168 Beau Kilmer and others, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal 
Drugs: 2000-2010, Research Reports Series, document No. RR-
534-ONDCP (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 
2014), p. 5. 
169 United States, SAMHSA, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics 
and Quality, Results from the 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health: Detailed Tables (Rockville, Maryland, 2015), table 7.2A. 
TAblE 2 Per capita consumption of pure cocaine among people who use cocaine, 1998, 2007 and 2014
Source: UNODC calculations based on information provided by Member States.
Year Amount of cocaine  
available for consumption 
(tons)
Number of (annual) 
cocaine users (millions)
Average number of pure grams of 
cocaine consumed per user per year 
1998 512  14.0  36.6 
2007 747  18.2  41.0 
2014 537  18.8  28.6 
FIG. 50 Number of past-year cocaine users, by 
region, 1998-2014
Source: World Drug Report, various years.
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ter of cocaine users being responsible for two thirds of 
cocaine consumption.170 A recent update171 indicated 
that more than weekly consumers of cocaine (18 per cent 
of all cocaine users in 2010) accounted for two thirds of 
total cocaine consumption in the United States in 2010. 
Reducing the number of heavy cocaine users can thus 
effectively reduce the cocaine market. A recent study in 
the United States showed that cocaine consumption and 
spending on cocaine fell by 50 per cent between 2000 and 
2010 (mostly between 2006 and 2010). The reduction in 
spending among a small group of high-frequency cocaine 
users (“more than weekly” users) accounted for around 75 
per cent of the aggregate reduction in spending and thus 
in cocaine consumption over the period 2000-2010.172 
The change in the United States is likely to have affected 
the size of the global cocaine market, and thus the global 
per capita consumption level. 
Hypothesis 3. Supply-side estimates are  
incorrect 
The possibility that cocaine production estimates may 
have been incorrect cannot be excluded. There are, indeed, 
knowledge gaps when it comes to cocaine production esti-
mates and this has long been recognized by UNODC. 
While there can be discussions about the “correct” esti-
mates of total amounts of cocaine produced, it seems 
unlikely that there was any strong increase in cocaine pro-
duction over the period 1998-2014. First, it is unlikely 
that any new coca-producing countries, apart from those 
in the Andean subregion, have emerged in the past two 
decades; and if they had, such a development would not 
170 United States, Executive Office of the President, The National Drug 
Control Strategy: 1996 (Washington, D.C., Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, 1996), p. 25, and previous years.
171 What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (see footnote 168).  
172 Ibid., p. 34.
have remained completely unnoticed. Secondly, the total 
area under coca bush cultivation in the Andean subregion 
has decreased in size (by over 30 per cent), as shown by 
scientifically validated remote-sensing surveys. Even 
though there have been changes in yields and increases in 
laboratory efficiency, it is unlikely that total cocaine pro-
duction increased by over 30 per cent (corresponding to 
the increase in the number of cocaine users). 
A shrinking global cocaine market should not 
lead to complacency 
Having analysed all three hypotheses, the most likely is 
that the global cocaine market has indeed been shrinking, 
prompted by a decline both in cocaine available for con-
sumption, mainly linked to a decrease in cocaine produc-
tion in the Andean subregion, and in cocaine consumption 
in North America and, to some extent, in Europe. Assum-
ing that, as suggested by estimates of the prevalence of 
cocaine use, the number of cocaine users has not declined, 
less cocaine is consumed on an average per capita basis 
today than in previous years. 
The net result of this, in the short term, should be posi-
tive in terms of reducing drug-related crime and the nega-
tive health impact, as heavy cocaine users account for most 
of the harm arising from cocaine use. However, with a 
larger number of people worldwide experimenting with 
cocaine, particularly in developing countries, a certain 
proportion of them may eventually develop into heavy 
cocaine users, as can already be seen by the patterns emerg-
ing in some countries. As many of the countries in which 
cocaine consumption is now emerging do not have the 
health and social infrastructure to deal with such problems, 
a shrinking global cocaine market should definitely not 
lead to complacency. Moreover, the overall downward 
trend in global cocaine production may have come to an 
end, exacerbating the vulnerability of numerous develop-
ing countries. 
FIG. 51 Distribution of cocaine consumption in 
the United States, 2010
Source: UNODC calculations based on ONDCP, What America’s 
Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 2000-2010, February 2014.
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CANNABIS
Key figures
Cannabis market developments
Cannabis continues to be the most widely  
cultivated, produced, trafficked and consumed 
drug worldwide 
Cannabis plant cultivation — either through direct indi-
cators (cultivation or eradication of cannabis plants) or 
indirect indicators (seizures of cannabis plants, domestic 
cannabis production being indicated as the source of sei-
zures, etc.) — was reported on the territory of 129 coun-
tries over the period 2009-2014. Given the absence of 
systematic measurements, however, the extent and trends 
in cannabis cultivation and production are difficult to 
assess. Most indirect indicators come from law enforce-
ment authorities and, to a certain extent, reflect their pri-
orities and activities173 and not simply the existence of 
cannabis cultivation and production. Since 1998, the total 
area of eradicated cannabis plants (in hectares), though it 
has fluctuated, has actually decreased, as have seizures of 
cannabis plants. These trends contrast with seizures of 
cannabis herb and cannabis resin, which, after a twofold 
increase over the period 1998-2004, have remained largely 
stable. 
Reports from Member States on source countries for can-
nabis resin during the period 2009-2014 suggest that the 
world’s largest producer of cannabis resin continues to be 
Morocco, followed by Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, 
Lebanon, India and Pakistan. Using as a basis cannabis 
seizures (which reflect law enforcement activity, as well as 
cannabis production), the size of local cannabis markets 
(derived from the number of users) and information on 
the sources of the cannabis consumed, it can be assumed 
that most of the world’s production of cannabis herb takes 
place in North America. In North America, cannabis herb 
is mainly produced in Mexico and the United States, for 
consumption in the subregion, while hydroponic cultiva-
173 For a discussion, see World Drug Report 2015, box entitled  
“Interpreting drug seizures”, p. 37.
tion of cannabis plants seems to be concentrated in Canada 
and the United States. Reports by Member States over the 
period 2009-2014 indicate that Albania, Colombia, 
Jamaica, the Netherlands and Paraguay are important 
source countries of the cannabis herb sold in international 
markets. 
The Americas, followed by Africa, remain the 
main markets for cannabis herb
In 2014, the Americas accounted for about three quarters 
of all the cannabis herb seized worldwide, Africa accounted 
for 14 per cent and Europe accounted for 6 per cent. At 
the subregional level, the largest amount of cannabis herb 
was seized in North America (accounting for 37 per cent 
of global seizures of cannabis herb in 2014), South Amer-
ica (24 per cent) and the Caribbean (13 per cent). Despite 
an increase in cannabis use, the quantity of cannabis herb 
intercepted in North America, after reaching a peak in 
2010, has been declining, reflecting the fact that a decrease 
5%
Global  se izures
47%
Global  number of  users
change from previous year
-11%
cannabis herb
1,433
tons
cannabis resin
5,834
tons
2%
herb resin
4%
182.5 million
20142014
FIG. 52 Quantities of cannabis herb seized, by 
region, 1998-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire and  
government reports.
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in cannabis production has been reported in Mexico and 
that cannabis interdiction may have become less of a pri-
ority in the United States since the decriminalization and 
legalization of recreational use of cannabis in some of the 
states in that country. Nonetheless, the quantity of can-
nabis herb seized in other parts of the world, particularly 
in South America, the Caribbean and Africa, is actually 
on the increase. 
Europe, North Africa and the Near and Middle 
East remain the main markets for cannabis resin
The subregion in which the largest amount of cannabis 
resin was seized in 2014 was again Western and Central 
Europe, accounting for 40 per cent of the global seizures 
of cannabis resin (Spain alone accounted for 26 per cent 
of the world total); 32 per cent of the world total was 
accounted for by countries in North Africa (mainly 
Morocco and Algeria) and 25 per cent was accounted for 
by countries in the Near and Middle East (mainly Paki-
stan, followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghani-
stan). The proportion of global quantities of seized 
cannabis resin accounted for by Europe declined from 77 
per cent of the world total in 1998 to 48 per cent in 2009 
and 43 per cent in 2014, which reflects the decrease in the 
share of cannabis resin in the European cannabis market, 
where cannabis herb from domestic production has gained 
in popularity. 
As in previous years, cannabis resin from Morocco was 
mainly smuggled to Europe and other countries in North 
Africa, while cannabis resin produced in Afghanistan con-
tinued to be smuggled to neighbouring countries, partic-
ularly Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the 
Near East, cannabis resin produced in Lebanon is used to 
supply other markets in the subregion. 
Despite major changes in some regions, global 
cannabis consumption has remained rather 
stable in recent years
About 3.8 per cent of the global population used cannabis 
in 2014. A proportion that has been somewhat stable since 
1998, this means that cannabis was used by an estimated 
183 million people (range: from 128 million to 234 mil-
lion people) in 2014. A figure about 27 per cent higher 
than in 1998, this reflects the growth in the global popu-
lation over the period 1998-2014. Given the large margin 
of error, caution needs to be applied when considering this 
figure; however, analysis of the perception of changes in 
use, as reported by Member States, shows a similar pat-
tern, indicating that the use of cannabis increased until 
2009, only to grow less rapidly thereafter. 
Oceania is the only region in which a marked decline in 
cannabis use, from comparatively high levels, has been 
noted since 1998, which is mainly a reflection of a reduc-
tion in cannabis consumption in Australia. In Europe, 
following a twofold increase from the early 1990s onwards, 
a temporary decline in cannabis use was seen after 2009, 
until cannabis use increased again in 2013 and 2014, 
returning to the level reported in 2009.174 
Since 2009, cannabis consumption has been rising in the 
Americas. Although the United States continues to be the 
largest market for cannabis in the Americas, cannabis use 
174 The Eurobarometer survey also shows a slight increase in the use of 
cannabis between 2011 and 2014 among young people in the Euro-
pean Union (past-month use increased from 6.2 to 7.0 per cent 
over that period (Gallup Organization, Youth Attitudes on Drugs: 
Analytical Report, Flash Eurobarometer series No. 330 (European 
Commission, July 2011); and European Commission, Young People 
and Drugs, Flash Eurobarometer series No. 401 (August 2014)). 
FIG. 53 Quantities of cannabis resin seized, by 
region,1998-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire and on  
government reports.
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FIG. 54 Global trends in the number of past-year 
users of cannabis and the cannabis use 
perception index, 1998-2014
Source: World Drug Report, 2000-2016; UNODC, Global Illicit 
Drug Trends, 2001-2003; and responses to the annual report 
questionnaire. 
Note: The uncertainty intervals were calculated by UNODC for the 
period 2007-2014; for data prior to 2007, the three-year average of the 
uncertainty intervals found over the period 2007-2009 was used as a 
proxy. For more details of perception indices, see the online methodol-
ogy section of the present report..
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is still significantly less prevalent in that country now than 
in the late 1970s. Increased cannabis use has also been 
reported in Africa, but those reports are based on limited 
information and caution should thus be applied when 
considering them. 
Developments in the countries where 
cannabis legalization has occurred 
In the past four years, four jurisdictions in the United States 
and Uruguay have passed laws to allow the production, 
distribution and sale of cannabis for non-medical purposes 
(i.e. for recreational use), which is contrary to the spirit of 
the international drug control conventions.
United States
In the United States, cannabis is federally prohibited as a 
substance in schedule I of the Controlled Substances 
Act.175 The states of Colorado and Washington, after pass-
ing ballot initiatives in November 2012, became the first 
jurisdictions in the country to legalize large-scale com-
mercial production of cannabis for recreational use by 
adults (persons aged 21 and older); Colorado also permit-
ted home cultivation of cannabis. In November 2014, 
similar initiatives were approved by voters in the states of 
Alaska and Oregon. Washington, D.C., took a narrower 
approach by legalizing only the possession and home cul-
tivation of cannabis. 
While each of the jurisdictions legalizing cannabis had 
previously approved medical cannabis laws, only Colo-
rado, Oregon and Washington, D.C., regulated commer-
175 Rosalie L. Pacula and others, “Assessing the effects of medical mari-
juana laws on marijuana use: the devil is in the details”, Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 34, No. 1 (2015), pp. 7-31.
cial medical cannabis businesses.176 Colorado restricted 
initial applications for recreational cannabis licences to 
businesses already licensed to sell medical cannabis, and 
the first recreational stores opened on 1 January 2014. 
Oregon temporarily allowed the sale of recreational can-
nabis through existing medical dispensaries beginning in 
October 2015, though licensed recreational stores are not 
expected to open until late 2016. The state of Washington 
had an extensive medical cannabis industry, including 
many brick-and-mortar dispensaries that operated openly, 
but without regulation. Alaska will not have recreational 
cannabis sales until licensed stores open, which is expected 
by late 2016. In order to develop and enforce regulations 
for the legal cannabis industry, each state has appointed a 
regulatory agency. The resulting regulatory details vary 
depending on the jurisdiction, including limits on the 
quantities that can be possessed or purchased, and market 
structure (for the regulatory details in each jurisdiction, 
see table on page xxv in the annex of the present report).177, 
178
Uruguay
Uruguay announced in mid-2012 that it would permit 
the production and distribution of cannabis for recre-
ational use by adult residents (persons aged 18 and older). 
Law 19.172 was enacted in December 2013, and regula-
tions for the new industry were issued in May 2014.179 
The law and its supporting regulations permit the sale 
through pharmacies and non-medical use of up to 40 
grams of cannabis per month for individuals registered 
with the Institute for the Regulation and Control of Can-
nabis (IRCCA).
The circumstances of legalization in Uruguay were quite 
different from the developments in the United States in 
that the legislature itself initiated the law, although with 
limited popular support (only a third of Uruguayans).180, 
181 There was no prior regulation for the use of cannabis 
for medical purposes (although the possession of cannabis 
was not a criminal offence), nor was there significant illicit 
cannabis production in Uruguay.182
176 Ibid.
177 Bryce Pardo, “Cannabis policy reforms in the Americas: a compara-
tive analysis of Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay”, International 
Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 25, No. 4 (2014), pp. 727-735.
178 Becky Bohrer, “Alaska regulators are 1st to OK marijuana use at pot 
shops”, Big Story (Juneau, Alaska), 20 November 2015.
179 Pardo, “Cannabis policy reforms in the Americas” (see footnote 
177).
180 Maria F. Boidi and others, “Marijuana legalization in Uruguay and 
beyond” (Miami, United States, Florida International University, 
Latin American and Caribbean Centre, Latin American Marijuana 
Research Initiative, 2015).
181 John Walsh and Geoff Ramsey, “Uruguay’s drug policy: major inno-
vations, major challenges” (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute, 
2015).
182 Uruguay, Junta Nacional de Drogas, “Regulación controlada del 
mercado de marihuana: una alternativa al control penal y a la crimi-
nalización de los usuarios”. Available at www.infodrogas.gub.uy.
FIG. 55 Prevalence of past-year cannabis use  
in Australia, the United States and the 
European Union, 1979-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire and data 
from EMCDDA.
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Uruguay has created three legal channels for obtaining 
cannabis: home cultivation; access to social clubs; and 
retail pharmacies. Individuals are allowed to access only 
one mode of supply, which they must declare upon regis-
tering with the cannabis registry. 
Nearly two years after the enactment of the law, critical 
parts of the distribution system have yet to be put in place. 
In October 2015, only two private firms were issued 
licences to cultivate cannabis, and to date no cannabis has 
been sold in pharmacies. Officials estimate that cannabis 
from the first harvest will not be ready for sale until mid-
2016. By February 2016, about 4,300 people had regis-
tered to grow cannabis at home, and 21 cannabis clubs 
had been licensed. Recent surveys reveal that 40 per cent 
of the cannabis users in the country are hesitant to register 
with the system to obtain cannabis,183 while the rest have 
indicated that they intend to register and obtain the drug 
through pharmacies.184
Outcomes
Although three and a half years have elapsed since the first 
regulations on legal cannabis went into effect in Colorado 
and Washington, the outcomes of the legalization of 
cannabis in those jurisdictions are still not fully understood 
and may not be for some time. Some may play out in the 
longer term, especially as the regulations evolve and the 
markets mature. In the United States, it will be particularly 
difficult to assess the impact of cannabis legalization, as 
many states have made incremental changes to their 
cannabis laws over the past few years that may have 
affected outcome trends prior to the legalization of 
recreational cannabis. Currently, the best data on the 
outcomes of cannabis legalization come from Colorado 
and Washington, the states that adopted cannabis 
legislation early. That cannot be said of the other 
jurisdictions in the United States (Alaska, Oregon and 
Washington, D.C.) or of Uruguay, which have yet to fully 
establish their retail systems. 
Cannabis use
In the United States, the National Survey on Drug Use 
and Health indicated that the prevalence of past-month 
cannabis use among those aged 12 and older increased 
from around 6 per cent in the mid-2000s to 8 per cent in 
the period 2013-2014. However, in the jurisdictions that 
legalized recreational cannabis, where the prevalence of 
past-month cannabis use has historically been higher, past-
month prevalence increased more rapidly than past-month 
prevalence at the national level during this period. Avail-
183 Maria F. Boidi, Rosario Queirolo and José M. Cruz, “Marijuana 
consumption patterns among frequent consumers in Montevi-
deo”, paper presented at the ninth Conference of the International 
Society for the Study of Drug Policy, Ghent, Belgium, 19-22 May 
2015.
184 Daniela Kreher, “Uruguay: a dos años de la aprobación de la ley que 
regula el cannabis” (Montevideo, IEPES, 2016). Available at http://
esiglesia.org/.
FIG. 56 Prevalence of past-month cannabis use 
among the general population in the 
United States, including selected areas, 
and Uruguay, 2000-2014
Source: United States, Department of Health and Human Services, 
SAMHSA, National Survey on Drug Use and Health; and Uruguay, 
Junta Nacional de Drogas, Observatorio Uruguayo de Drogas, 
Encuesta Nacional sobre Consumo de Drogas en Hogares.
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FIG. 57 Prevalence of past-month cannabis use 
among young adults in the United States, 
including selected areas, 2000-2014
Source: United States, Department of Health and Human Services, 
SAMHSA, National Survey on Drug Use and Health.
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able data suggest that the increase in the prevalence of 
past-month cannabis use is driven by increased use among 
young adults (persons aged 18-25), which is more pro-
nounced in Colorado, where the prevalence of past-month 
cannabis use increased from around 27 per cent in 2011 
to 31 per cent in 2014. In Uruguay, the prevalence of can-
nabis use is much lower, but household surveys suggest 
that there was an increasing trend even before the legal-
ization of cannabis use. Trends in cannabis use may change 
as the demand curve evolves in response to changes in 
price, availability and social norms. 
Medical cannabis markets after legalization in 
the United States
It is unclear whether the legalization of cannabis for rec-
reational use will have any discernible effect on the size of 
the medical cannabis market. The original purpose of med-
ical cannabis laws was to provide access to cannabis for 
those with a qualifying medical need. Since the legalization 
of recreational cannabis use, individuals can now obtain 
cannabis without having a medical recommendation and 
without submitting their personal data to be entered into 
a state-run database. However, the recreational cannabis 
markets in most jurisdictions are currently higher priced 
(after taxes) and often have fewer retail outlets than the 
existing medical cannabis market. For registered or qual-
ifying patients, the introduction of regulated recreational 
cannabis markets may not present an additional incentive 
to forego the benefits of their medical status.185
After the legalization of the non-medical use of cannabis, 
the number of patients in Colorado’s mandatory medical 
185 Clinton W. Saloga, “The effect of legalized retail marijuana on the 
demand for medical marijuana in Colorado”, paper prepared for the 
ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Drug 
Policy, Ghent, Belgium, 19-22 May 2015.
cannabis patient registry remained fairly stable, although 
the number decreased in the last quarter of 2015. Further-
more, monthly medical cannabis sales have not exhibited 
a downward trend in the two years since legalization. 
Given the evolving markets and one-year duration of med-
ical cannabis identification cards, the impact of legalization 
on the medical cannabis market may take much longer to 
become apparent in jurisdictions with both medical and 
recreational cannabis markets. 
In Colorado, and currently in Oregon, cannabis stores 
have been allowed to operate simultaneously as recre-
ational and medical cannabis stores, but in the long run 
it is unclear whether those systems will be separate or inter-
twined or whether one system will fold into the other, as 
in the State of Washington. 
Products and potency
Cannabis potency in the United States has been increasing 
over the past three decades, particularly in jurisdictions 
that have allowed medical dispensaries.186 Compared with 
the national average of 11 per cent (based on data from 
the period 2002-2008),187 the average THC content of 
recreational cannabis herb sold in the states of Washington 
and Colorado is nearly 17 per cent, with some samples 
reaching up to 30 per cent. Data on cannabis potency are 
scarce in Uruguay, as authorities in that country only 
recently began to analyse seized cannabis,188 but the Gov-
ernment has discussed limiting to 15 per cent the THC 
content of cannabis products sold in pharmacies. Accord-
ing to the authorities, this limit has been set with a view 
to reducing health risks caused by cannabis use. 
Innovation in the commercial markets has led to the 
increased availability of a wide range of cannabis products, 
especially concentrated cannabis extract and cannabis-in-
fused edibles, which pose additional public health con-
cerns. In 2014, such products accounted for an estimated 
35 per cent of retail sales of recreational cannabis in Col-
orado.189 The high potency of extract-based concentrates 
such as oil, “wax” or “shatter” can have a THC content of 
up to 80-90 per cent; “dabbing” or vaporizing these prod-
ucts involves a rapid intake of large amounts of THC, 
making it difficult for even experienced users to determine 
an appropriate dosage, potentially leading to over-intoxi-
186 Eric L. Sevigny, Rosalie L. Pacula and Paul Heaton, “The effects of 
medical marijuana laws on potency”, International Journal of Drug 
Policy, vol. 25, No. 2 (2014), pp. 308-319.
187 Zlatko Mehmedic and others, “Potency trends of Δ9-THC and 
other cannabinoids in confiscated cannabis preparations from 1993 
to 2008”, Journal of Forensic Sciences, vol. 55, No. 5 (2010), pp. 
1209-1217.
188 Inés Acosta and Emilio Godoy, Marihuana, de las sombras a los 
laboratorios”, Inter Press Service, 24 September 2013.
189 Adam Orens and others, “Marijuana equivalency in portion and 
dosage: an assessment of physical and pharmacokinetic relationships 
in marijuana production and consumption in Colorado” (Boulder, 
Colorado, Marijuana Policy Group, University of Colorado Boul-
der, Leeds School of Business, 2015).
FIG. 58 Medical cannabis market in the State of 
Colorado, United States, 2014-2015
Source: Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment 
and Colorado Department of Revenue.
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cation. With edible products, the slower onset and longer 
duration of intoxication could increase the risk of over-in-
toxication, especially for new or inexperienced users.190 
A common approach to regulating such products has been 
to implement stringent packaging and labelling require-
ments. The four states in the United States require canna-
bis-infused edibles to be packaged into demarcated 
individual servings according to the quantity of THC: 
Washington and Colorado set the serving size at 10 mg of 
THC; and in Alaska and Oregon, draft regulations pro-
posed a maximum of 5 mg.191 In addition, Washington 
requires all cannabis-infused products to undergo, prior 
to approval, a process to determine if they are appealing 
to children,192 and Oregon is considering a similar rule.193
Health consequences
The proliferation of concentrated cannabis extract and 
cannabis-infused edibles in licit markets has generated 
concerns of accidental ingestion or over-intoxication, espe-
cially among children and inexperienced users, as those 
products may often resemble familiar sweets.194 Since the 
legalization of recreational cannabis in the states of Colo-
rado and Washington, incidents of accidental cannabis 
ingestion among young children have been increasing. In 
Colorado, the number of cases involving exposure to 
THC-infused edibles in young children increased nearly 
fivefold, from 19 cases in 2013 to 95 cases in 2014, and 
the number of cannabis exposure calls to the Washington 
Poison Center involving persons under 20 years old has 
doubled since the period 2010-2011.195 It is unclear to 
what degree the legalization of recreational cannabis has 
had an effect on such cases, as cannabis-infused edibles 
and concentrated cannabis extract existed to some extent 
in loosely regulated medical cannabis markets for years 
prior to the legalization of recreational cannabis.
Legalization of the use of recreational cannabis may have 
also increased the number of accidents or injuries 
associated with cannabis use or intoxication. In 2014, 
190 Mark A. R. Kleiman, “Legal commercial cannabis sales in Colorado 
and Washington: what can we learn?” (Washington, D.C., Brook-
ings Institute, 2015).
191 United States, Oregon, Office of the Secretary of State, Oregon 
Administrative Rules (Salem, Oregon Health Authority, Public 
Health Division, 2015), chap. 333, division 7.
192 United States, Government Accountability Office, State Marijuana 
Legalization: DOJ Should Document Its Approach to Monitoring the 
Effects of Legalization, GAO report GAO-16-1 (Washington, D.C., 
December 2015).
193 Oregon Liquor Control Commission, Recreational marijuana, 
Packaging and labeling pre-approval. Available at www.oregon.gov/
olcc/. www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/Pages/PackagingLabelingPre-
Approval.aspx.
194 Robert J. MacCoun and Michelle M. Mello, “Half-baked: the retail 
promotion of marijuana edibles”, New England Journal of Medicine, 
vol. 372, No. 11 (2015), pp. 989-991.
195 United States, Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Area, Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado: The Impact, vol. 3 
(September 2015).
within one year of the legalization of recreational cannabis 
use, there was a 29 per cent increase in the number of 
cannabis-related emergency room visits in Colorado and 
a 38 per cent increase in the number of cannabis-related 
hospitalizations.196 
Data on treatment of cannabis use disorders are mixed: in 
Colorado the number of admissions for such treatment 
remained stable from 2011 to 2014, while in Washington 
and in the country as a whole, that number has been 
decreasing since 2009. The decline in the number of 
admissions for treatment of cannabis use in the United 
States, however, may be linked to changes in the referral 
process used by the criminal justice system (see the dis-
cussion in this chapter on the treatment of cannabis use 
in the section entitled “Extent of drug use”). There are 
currently no data available on admissions for treatment of 
cannabis use disorders in Uruguay.
Public safety
The increased availability of cannabis for recreational use 
is likely to increase the number of users driving while 
under the influence of cannabis. Studies suggest that can-
nabis is less hazardous than alcohol in terms of driving 
impairment, but much more dangerous when used in 
combination.197, 198, 199 Data from the states of Colorado 
196 Ibid.
197 Richard P. Compton and Amy Berning, “Drug and alcohol crash 
risk”, report No. DOT HS 812117 (Washington, D.C., United 
States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, Office of Behavioral Safety Research,  
February 2015).
198 Rebecca L. Hartman and others, “Cannabis effects on driving 
lateral control with and without alcohol”, Drug and Alcohol Depend-
ence, vol. 154 (2015), pp. 25-37.
199 Johannes G. Ramaekers, Hindrik W. J. Robbe and James F. 
O’Hanlon, “Marijuana, alcohol and actual driving performance”, 
Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimental, vol. 15, No. 
7 (2000), pp. 551-558.
FIG. 59 Cannabis exposure calls to the  
Washington Poison Center in the State of 
Washington, United States, 1998-2014
Source: Washington Poison Center.
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and Washington show a substantial increase in the number 
of cases in which drivers involved in traffic accidents or 
arrested for driving-under-the-influence violations have 
tested positive for cannabis. However, this may have 
resulted from increased law enforcement scrutiny. 
Cannabis markets 
Despite the legalization of recreational cannabis use, the 
illicit cannabis market has not been entirely displaced in 
the states of Colorado and Washington. In Washington, 
the medical, recreational and illicit cannabis markets each 
accounts for approximately one third of the state’s canna-
bis sales,200 while in Colorado the illicit cannabis market 
still supplied an estimated 40 per cent of the state’s total 
demand for cannabis in 2014. 
In the short term, cannabis prices are likely to remain 
higher on the recreational cannabis market than on the 
medical and illicit cannabis markets, due in part to limited 
supply, higher taxation and regulatory burden. Even 
though commercialization had already occurred to some 
degree in the medical cannabis markets, the maturation 
200 Mark A. R. Kleiman and others, “Estimating the size of the medi-
cal cannabis market in Washington State” (Los Angeles, California, 
BOTEC Analysis Corporation, 2015).
of licit cannabis markets has already driven down retail 
prices substantially as competition increases and businesses 
achieve economies of scale.201 Prices have fallen in 
Washington since 2014,202 and in Colorado the average 
price of an eighth of an ounce of cannabis (3.5 grams, the 
most commonly purchased quantity) fell dramatically 
from nearly $60 in mid-2014 to $25-40 in November 
2015.203 Uruguayan policy has not yet set a price but it 
is projected to be set at between $1.20 and $1.30 per gram 
of cannabis.204
Each jurisdiction that has legalized cannabis use has devel-
oped a unique tax scheme for legal cannabis (see table on 
page xxv in the annex of the present report). The recrea-
tional cannabis markets in Colorado and Washington have 
grown considerably since such schemes were put in place. 
In Colorado, recreational cannabis market profits reached 
nearly $600 million in 2015, compared with $313 million 
in 2014. The state collected $56 million in recreational 
cannabis tax revenues in 2014 and over $114 million in 
2015. While these figures are large, they represent only a 
very small portion of the state’s total revenues, which 
totalled nearly $11 billion in the fiscal year 2014.205 In 
Colorado, the first $40 million of excise tax revenues are 
201 Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Estimated cost of production for legalized 
cannabis”,Working Paper No. WR-764-RC (Santa Monica, Califor-
nia, RAND Corportation, 2010).
202 B. Smith, Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, “Data on 
LCB prices”, e-mail correspondence, 2016.
203 Jessica Rabe, “Marijuana store survey and industry outlook Q4 
2015”,18 December 2015. Available at www.convergex.com/.
204 “Cannabis llega a farmacias en 8 meses; tres porros, US$ 1,20”, El 
País (Montevideo), 2 October 2015. Available at http://www.elpais.
com.uy/informacion/cannabis-llega-farmacias-meses-tres.html.
205 United States, Colorado Department of Revenue, 2014 Annual 
Report, (2015). 
FIG. 60 Cannabis-related traffic accidents and 
fatalities out of all traffic accidents and 
fatalities in the United States, including 
selected states, 2006-2015
Source: Monitoring the Future; National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System; Colorado 
Department of Transportation; and Washington State Toxicology 
Laboratory.
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FIG. 61 Recreational cannabis market prices after 
tax in the State of Washington, United 
States, December 2014-December 2015
Source: Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board.
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earmarked for public schools, as required by law. Addi-
tional revenues are distributed primarily to the Marijuana 
Enforcement Division and to public health programmes 
such as substance abuse intervention and prevention pro-
grammes and educational campaigns.206 
In Washington, in the fiscal year 2015 (July 2014-June 
2015), sales of legal cannabis totalled $256 million. Just 
eight months into the fiscal year 2016, sales have already 
more than doubled, reaching nearly $580 million. Wash-
ington collected $65 million in tax receipts in the fiscal 
year 2015 (accounting for 0.3 per cent of the state’s total 
revenues) and over $100 million during the first eight 
months of the fiscal year 2016.207, 208 All revenues col-
lected from the production and sale of recreational can-
nabis go into Washington’s general fund, with the 
exception of allocations for certain programmes: $5 mil-
lion to the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board 
to regulate the industry; $500,000 to the Washington State 
Healthy Youth Survey; $200,000 to fund cost-benefit anal-
yses of the effects of cannabis legalization on the economy, 
public health and public safety; and $20,000 to the Uni-
versity of Washington Alcohol and Drug Abuse Initiative 
to publish medically and scientifically accurate informa-
tion on cannabis. 
206 Larson Silbuagh, “Distribution of marijuana tax revenue”, Issue 
Brief No. 15-10 (Denver, Colorado Legislative Council Staff, 
2015). 
207 Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, “Weekly marijuana 
report”, 6 April 2016. Available at www.lcb.wa.gov/.
208 Washington State Department of Revenue, Research and Fiscal 
Analysis Division, “Tax statistics 2015”, December 2015. Available 
at www.dor.wa.gov/.
In Oregon, data on initial sales or tax revenues are not yet 
available, although the Oregon Liquor Control Commis-
sion has indicated that recreational cannabis sales tax rev-
enue after regulatory costs will be distributed as follows: 
40 per cent to the common school fund; 20 per cent to 
mental health, alcoholism and drug use treatment services; 
15 per cent to state police departments; and 5 per cent to 
the Oregon Health Authority for alcohol and drug use 
prevention. 
In Uruguay, taxation on cannabis sale has been deferred, 
although IRCAA may impose a tax in future. While Colo-
rado and Washington illustrate that tax revenues from 
cannabis legalization can be substantial, it is still not clear 
how the total costs of designing, implementing and regu-
lating a legal cannabis market will measure against the 
current costs of cannabis prohibition. One important con-
sideration for legalization is whether the costs of enforcing 
prohibition exceed the budgetary costs of regulation. In a 
recent study, it was estimated that for 2014 the State of 
Vermont spent approximately $1 million enforcing crimi-
nal laws against cannabis compared with an estimate of 
“low to middle single-digit millions” of dollars to establish 
and maintain a regulatory system.209 However, those costs 
need to be weighed against revenues, which cover the 
ongoing costs of regulations and additional externalities, 
such as increased treatment and prevention costs, which 
are often not included in the budgets of regulatory 
agencies. 
209 Jonathan P. Caulkins and others, Considering Marijuana Legaliza-
tion: Insights for Vermont and other Jurisdictions (Santa Monica, Cali-
fornia, RAND Corporation, 2015), p. 150.
FIG. 62 Retail cannabis: monthly revenue from 
sales tax, excise tax and fees for licences 
and applications in the State of Colorado, 
United States, 2014-2015
Source: Colorado Department of Revenue.
FIG. 63 Monthly revenue from the sale of  
recreational cannabis in the State of 
Washington, United States,  
July 2014-October 2015
Source: Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board; and  
Washington State Department of Revenue
a The excise tax was changed to 37 per cent on 1 July 2015.
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Criminal justice
The number of arrests and court cases associated with 
cannabis-related offences have declined substantially in 
the states that have legalized cannabis. It should be pointed 
out, however, that this trend reflects the number of 
offences recorded in the criminal justice system, and that 
prior to legalization cannabis-related offences may not 
necessarily have led to prosecution or sentencing. Data on 
other cannabis-related police interactions, such as citations 
or verbal warnings for public consumption, are not readily 
available. Uruguay does not disaggregate its criminal jus-
tice figures by drug-related offences, although overall 
annual drug-related detentions have remained more or less 
stable in the past decade.210 It is yet to be seen whether 
or how legalization affects other types of crime or arrests.
Licitly and illicitly produced cannabis in jurisdictions that 
have legalized recreational cannabis use can be used to 
supply the illicit cannabis markets of neighbouring juris-
dictions, although the extent to which smuggling has 
increased as a result of cannabis legalization is difficult to 
evaluate. However, in December 2014, the states of 
Nebraska and Oklahoma requested that the United States 
Supreme Court reverse Colorado’s decision to legalize can-
nabis, complaining that the new law in Colorado had gen-
erated an increase in cannabis trafficking in neighbouring 
jurisdictions.211 Likewise, officials in Argentina and Brazil 
voiced concern following the legalization of cannabis use 
in Uruguay.212 Interdiction of cannabis originating in 
Colorado increased from 2011 to 2014,213 although this 
may have been a result of increased law enforcement 
searches. Early statements from police officials in Uruguay 
indicate that cannabis trafficking has remained unchanged 
and that organized criminal groups may have benefited in 
the initial period before establishment of the retail phar-
macy system.214
210 Uruguay, Junta Nacional de Drogas, Observatorio Uruguayo de 
Drogas, “Indicadores de control de la oferta” (May 2012).
211 Caulkins and others, Considering Marijuana Legalization, p. 4 (see 
footnote 209).
212 “Preocupa a la región el proyecto de legalización de la marihuana”, 
El País (Montevideo), 9 December 2013.
213 Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado (see footnote 195).
214 “Policía: a pesar de regular, no varía comercio clandestino de  
marihuana”, El Pais (Montevideo), 28 January 2016.
FIG. 64 Cannabis-related arrests, charges and 
offences in the United States, including 
selected areas, 2009-2015
Source: Colorado Judicial Branch; Washington State, Administra-
tive Office of the Courts; Metropolitan Police Department of the 
District of Columbia; and Oregon Annual Uniform Crime Reports.
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SYNTHETIC DRUGS: AMPHETAMINE-TYPE STIMULANTS AND NEW PSYCHOACTIVE 
SUBSTANCES
Key figures
Amphetamine-type stimulants: market 
developments
Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are synthetic drugs 
that, in principle, can be manufactured anywhere. Unlike 
heroin and cocaine, they do not depend on the extraction 
of active constituents from plants that have to be cultivated 
and require certain conditions to grow. Small-scale ATS 
manufacture using simple “recipes” in so-called “kitchen 
labs”, to be sold and consumed locally, exists, but large-
scale ATS manufacture in clandestine laboratories with 
sophisticated manufacturing equipment that makes use 
of a range of precursor chemicals and synthesis routes also 
plays an important role. Any analysis of the ATS market 
is complicated by the fact that information on ATS man-
ufacture is limited and this does not allow for estimates 
of the volume of global ATS manufacture. Data on ATS 
use in some of the main markets, such as East and South-
East Asia, are also very limited, and the situation is further 
complicated by the appearance of NPS, which are some-
times sold under the names of traditional ATS.
Global seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants 
reach a new peak
Global ATS seizures almost doubled from 72 tons in 2009 
to 144 tons in 2011. After three years of relative stability, 
ATS seizures reached a new peak of 173 tons in 2014. For 
the past few years, methamphetamine seizures have 
accounted for the largest share of global ATS seizures. 
Since 2009, global amphetamine seizures have fluctuated 
annually between about 20 and 46 tons. “Ecstasy” seizures 
more than doubled in 2014, reaching 9 tons, compared 
with 4-5 tons per year in the period 2009-2013. 
Methamphetamine continues to dominate the 
markets for amphetamine-type stimulants in 
North America, East and South-East Asia and 
Oceania
Although methamphetamine is a feature of ATS markets 
worldwide, methamphetamine is particularly dominant 
in East and South-East Asia and North America. Since 
2009, North America and East and South-East Asia 
together have accounted for most of the methamphet-
amine seized worldwide. North America has consistently 
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reported the largest amount of methamphetamine seized 
each year. Between 2009 and 2014, quantities of meth-
amphetamine seized in East and South-East Asia almost 
quadrupled.
In ATS markets in East and South-East Asia, metham-
phetamine is available in the form of both crystalline 
methamphetamine and methamphetamine tablets. Meth-
amphetamine tablets, commonly known in the subregion 
as “yaba”, are small tablets, typically of low purity and 
available in various shapes and colours. Methamphetamine 
tablets are mainly manufactured in the Mekong area in 
East and South-East Asia, and seizure reports indicate that 
such tablets are mostly intended for markets in that sub-
region. Crystalline methamphetamine continues to be 
manufactured on a large scale in East and South-East Asia 
and is also trafficked from other subregions.215
In East and South-East Asia, there is a large and growing 
market for both methamphetamine tablets and crystalline 
methamphetamine. In 2014, crystalline methamphet-
amine was the primary drug of concern in Brunei Darus-
salam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and 
the Republic of Korea, while methamphetamine tablets 
were the main drug of concern in the Lao People’s Dem-
ocratic Republic and Thailand. Moreover, in that same 
year, experts perceived an increase in the use of crystalline 
methamphetamine in Cambodia, China, Japan, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Viet Nam and increased use of meth-
amphetamine tablets in Cambodia, China, Malaysia, 
Myanmar and Viet Nam. Data on treatment for drug use 
in East and South-East Asia show that methamphetamine 
use has become a growing concern. In 2014, people receiv-
ing treatment for methamphetamine use accounted for 
215 UNODC, The Challenge of Synthetic Drugs in East and South-East 
Asia: Trends and Patterns of Amphetamine-type Stimulants and New 
Psychoactive Substances (Vienna, 2015).
the largest share of people treated for drug use in Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.216 
Although these data indicate the importance of both forms 
of methamphetamine, treatment data are not representa-
tive of the overall prevalence of methamphetamine use 
and demand for treatment for methamphetamine use in 
East and South-East Asia. 
In Oceania, both Australia and New Zealand have recorded 
sharp increases in methamphetamine seizures since 2012. 
In Australia, methamphetamine is illicitly manufactured. 
In addition, Australia saw the arrival of large-scale ship-
ments of crystalline methamphetamine in sea cargo. A 
government report has highlighted the growing number 
of methamphetamine users in Australia, increased fre-
quency of use of the drug among certain user groups, an 
increase in methamphetamine purity and a decline in puri-
ty-adjusted prices, all of which could aggravate the nega-
tive impact of methamphetamine use on the health of 
individuals and on society.217 
While demand for ATS has for many years been mostly 
met by manufacture in the same subregion, there have 
been recent reports of new trafficking flows connecting 
previously independent subregions, particularly with 
regard to methamphetamine.218 Between 2011 and 2014, 
methamphetamine was mostly reported to have been 
smuggled from West Africa, North America, West Asia 
and East and South-East Asia. Whereas South-East Asia 
and Oceania are predominantly recipients of the meth-
216 According to responses to the annual report questionnaire sent by 
the Philippines for 2014 and expert perceptions of the use of main 
drugs of concern reflected in the Drug Abuse Information Network 
for Asia and the Pacific.
217 Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Final 
Report of the National Ice Taskforce 2015 (Canberra, 2015). 
218 UNODC, Global SMART Update 2014, vol. 12 (September 2014). 
FIG. 65 Quantities of amphetamine-type  
stimulants seized worldwide, 2009-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
Note: The data presented in the figure do not include seizures of pre-
scription stimulants and substances placed under international control 
after 2014.
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FIG. 66 Quantities of methamphetamine seized 
worldwide, 2009-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
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MAp 2 Interregional trafficking flows of methamphetamine, 2011-2014
Source: UNODC elaboration based on responses to annual report questionnaire, 2011-2013.
Note: The arrows do not imply the involvement of any specific country in the regions mentioned nor do they represent the level of importance of any 
methamphetamine trafficking flow. The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon 
by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir  has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan 
and South Sudan has not yet been determined.
amphetamine trafficked worldwide, the Middle East and 
large parts of Europe primarily function as transit areas 
for methamphetamine trafficking. All regions with illicit 
methamphetamine markets also have illicit methamphet-
amine manufacture. 
Amphetamine: an intraregional mechanism of 
supply
Seizure reports worldwide indicate that amphetamine, 
unlike methamphetamine, is largely trafficked and sup-
plied on an intraregional basis and that there are only rare 
linkages between regional amphetamine markets. This is 
especially evidenced in Europe and the Middle East, where 
countries continue to report large amounts of seized 
amphetamine.
Amphetamine seizures reported in the Middle East in 
recent years point to trafficking dynamics that are mainly 
contained within the region. In 2013 and 2014, most of 
the amphetamine seized in the Middle East was considered 
to have originated in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic. Over the same period, authorities of some countries 
in the Middle East reporting the seizure of amphetamine 
consignments found that the consignments had been des-
tined for other countries within the region, such as Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and 
the Syrian Arab Republic were perceived to be the main 
transit countries for amphetamine consignments seized in 
the Middle East in 2013 and 2014.
In particular, large amounts of amphetamine tablets 
labelled with the brand name “Captagon”219 were reported 
to have been seized in the Middle East between March 
2014 and November 2015. While mostly intraregional 
trafficking in “Captagon” tablets has been reported in the 
Middle East, large amounts have also been reportedly traf-
ficked from Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to 
countries outside the region, such as the Sudan and Turkey.
Although Lebanon was the only country in the Middle 
East that reported the discovery of clandestine ampheta-
mine laboratories between 2009 and 2014, the availability 
of precursor chemicals and the existence of certain areas 
of limited government control in some countries in the 
subregion are risk factors for potential amphetamine 
manufacture.
Variations in “ecstasy” purity and composition
In recent years, there have been indications of an 
increasingly diversified “ecstasy” market featuring three 
different product types: “ecstasy” tablets containing little 
or no 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA); 
“ecstasy” tablets with an unusually high dose of MDMA; 
and “ecstasy” sold in powder form containing MDMA of 
high purity. These compositions of “ecstasy” tablets have 
219 Captagon was originally the trade name for a pharmaceutical 
preparation containing fenetylline, a synthetic stimulant. In the past 
few years, most tablets seized as “Captagon” essentially contained 
amphetamine, typically in combination with caffeine and some-
times with other adulterants (World Drug Report 2010, p. 114).
0 2.0001.000 km
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire, 2011-2013.
Note: The origins of the flow arrows do not necessarily indicate the source/manufacture of methamphetamine. These arrows represent the flows as perceived by recipient countries. Flow arrows represent the direction of methamphetamine trafficking and are not an indication of the quantity trafficked. 
The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir 
has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined.
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been observed in the illicit markets for synthetic drugs in 
Europe, in particular, and in East and South-East Asia and 
Oceania, where there is generally a large presence of 
“ecstasy”. 
The presence of different “ecstasy” products in the market 
is the result of different circumstances. When controls over 
the main precursor chemical used in the manufacture of 
MDMA were heightened, other substances were often 
used as substitutes for MDMA. In 2013, seizures of 
“ecstasy” tablets containing little or no MDMA and con-
sisting mainly of a blend of non-controlled substances that, 
in some cases, included NPS were reported in East and 
South-East Asia (in Brunei Darussalam; Hong Kong, 
China (including NPS); Indonesia (including NPS); 
Macao, China; Malaysia; Republic of Korea; Singapore 
(including NPS); and Thailand) and in Oceania (in New 
Zealand (including NPS)). In Europe, several countries 
issued health risk alert warnings in 2014 when reports of 
fatalities were linked to the use of tablets sold as “ecstasy” 
that contained para-methoxymethamphetamine (PMMA), 
sometimes in combination with MDMA.220
220 UNODC early warning advisory on new psychoactive substances.        
In recent years, the availability of “ecstasy” tablets contain-
ing a high dose of MDMA appears to have increased, par-
ticularly in Europe. While fatalities caused by “ecstasy” are 
generally low, consumption of high doses can lead to death 
as a result of direct toxicity or following hyperthermia and 
dehydration.221 According to EMCDDA, there are indi-
cations that illicit MDMA manufacture is concentrated 
in Belgium and the Netherlands, where clandestine labo-
ratories used for the large-scale manufacture of MDMA 
have been dismantled.222 “Ecstasy” tablets with a high 
MDMA content are being sold across Europe; they have 
distinctive shapes and logos to differentiate them from 
other “ecstasy” tablets.223 
In addition to the growing availability of “ecstasy” tablets 
with a high MDMA content, a market niche appears to 
have emerged for powder or crystalline MDMA. In Aus-
“February 2015 – United Kingdom: high dose PMMA sold as 
“ecstasy” possibly still available” Available at www.unodc.org/. 
221 Terminology and Information on Drugs (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.16.XI.8). 
222 EMCDDA, European Drug Report: Trends and Developments 2015 
(Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015).
223 Ibid.
MAp 3 Major Captagon seizure cases in the Middle East reported in the media,  
March 2014-November 2015
Source: Based on seizures reported in media reports available in December 2015. 
Note: Arrows may not represent actual routes. Destination countries reported may not be the intended final destination of the shipment. 
The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined 
boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status 
of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been 
determined. Destination country may not be final destination of seized shipment. Arrows represent individual case, not routes or flows. 
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tralia, the Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System224 
found that in 2014 around half of the “ecstasy” users in 
the country had used “ecstasy” in the form of capsules 
containing powder or crystalline MDMA (53 per cent of 
users) or in the form of MDMA “crystal/rock” (49 per 
cent, an increase of 10 per cent over the 2013 level), while 
tablets remained the form used by the vast majority of 
“ecstasy” users (92 per cent). It was found that among 
“ecstasy” users in Australia the main route used for admin-
istering MDMA “crystal/rock” was swallowing (87 per 
cent), followed by snorting (13 per cent). Overall “ecstasy” 
use in Australia decreased from 3 per cent (annual preva-
lence) in 2013 to 2.5 per cent in 2014. 
East and South-East Asia driving the increase in 
global ketamine seizures
Over the years, global ketamine seizures have fluctuated 
greatly. The significant increase in global ketamine seizures 
reported since 2012 is largely attributable to East and 
South-East Asia, where ketamine seizures more than dou-
bled, from 6 tons to more than 12 tons, in 2014. Accord-
ing to expert perceptions, there are also indications of 
increasing non-medical use of ketamine in East and South-
East Asia. In recent years, dismantled ketamine laborato-
ries have been reported in East and South-East Asia. In 
China, for example, the number of dismantled ketamine 
laboratories increased from 81 in 2012 to 122 in 2013; 
and in Hong Kong, China, a dismantled ketamine labora-
tory was reported in 2012. 
According to WHO, among recreational users of keta-
mine, there is growing evidence of symptoms of ketamine 
dependence, as well as adverse physical effects, particularly 
urinary and biliary tract problems, after prolonged use or 
224 Multiple responses were possible (Natasha Sindicich and Lucy 
Burns, An Overview of the 2014 Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting 
System (Sydney, University of New South Wales, National Drug and 
Alcohol Research Centre, October 2015)).
high doses of ketamine.225 Increased rates of high-risk 
injecting behaviour in association with ketamine use have 
been reported by specific user groups.226
New psychoactive substances: market 
developments
The global market for new psychoactive substances (NPS) 
continues to expand. The emergence and persistence pat-
terns of these substances show significant differences 
between countries and regions. Marketed in many differ-
ent ways and forms, NPS can be observed among many 
different user groups. The effects of NPS use on the human 
body are not yet fully understood — safety data regarding 
toxicity are often not available and long-term side effects 
are not known. The range of drugs available on the market 
has probably never been wider. This situation poses addi-
tional challenges to prevention, treatment, control and 
identification efforts.
Wider range of new psychoactive substances  
reported
Between 2008 and 2015, a total of 644 NPS had been 
reported by 102 countries and territories to the UNODC 
early warning advisory on NPS. The emergence of NPS 
was reported for the first time in 2015 in Kyrgyzstan and 
Mauritius. In 2015, the early warning advisory also regis-
tered the emergence of NPS in previous years in Belarus, 
Serbia, South Africa and Tajikistan. The majority of coun-
tries and territories that reported the emergence of NPS 
up to December 2015 were from Europe (41), followed 
by Asia (30), Africa (16), the Americas (13) and Oceania 
(2).
The NPS market continues to be characterized by a large 
number of new substances being reported. Although data 
collection for 2015 is still in progress, 75 new substances 
have been reported to UNODC for the first time, com-
pared with a total of only 66 in 2014. Between 2012 and 
2014, most substances reported for the first time belonged 
to the group of synthetic cannabinoids. The data reported 
for 2015 so far show a different pattern: first, 20 synthetic 
cathinones (a group of substances with stimulant effects 
similar to cocaine or methamphetamine) were reported 
for the first time — almost as many as synthetic cannabi-
noids (21); and second, 21 “other substances” (substances 
not belonging to any of the major groups identified in 
previous years) were reported for the first time, including 
synthetic opioids (e.g. fentanyl derivatives) and sedatives 
(e.g. benzodiazepines).
225 “Ketamine (INN): update review report”, presented to the WHO 
Expert Committee on Drug Dependence at its thirty-seventh meet-
ing, Geneva, 16-20 November 2015.
226 Stephen E. Lankenau and Michael C. Clatts, “Ketamine injection 
among high risk youth: preliminary findings from New York”, Jour-
nal of Drug Issues, vol. 32, No. 3 (2000), pp. 893-905; and Stephen 
E. Lankenau and others, “The first injection event: differences 
among heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and ketamine initiates”, 
Journal of Drug Issues, vol. 40, No. 2 (2010), pp. 241-261.
FIG. 67 Quantities of ketamine seized worldwide, 
2009-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
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New psychoactive substances: stability and 
change
A growing number of NPS are reported every year by a 
large number of countries and territories throughout the 
world. NPS that have an established presence in the 
market include ketamine (reported by 62 countries and 
territories), khat (reported by 56), JWH-018 (reported by 
50), mephedrone (reported by 49) and methylone 
(reported by 47).227 Other NPS are transient in nature 
and are only reported by a small number of countries and 
territories for a couple of years. 
Approximately 19 per cent of the countries and territories 
reporting NPS have identified more than 100 different 
substances since 2008. At the same time, more than a 
quarter of all countries and territories reporting the emer-
gence of NPS have reported only one substance, which 
may be attributable to limited technical capacity for iden-
tifying NPS. 
Some NPS seem to have a stable presence in the drug 
market. A large proportion of the 451 substances registered 
in the UNODC early warning advisory on NPS in 2014 
had already been reported in previous years. Twenty-three 
of those substances reported in 2014 had been reported 
for the first time in 2008 and had been reported every year 
since then; those substances include the phenethylamine 
227 JWH-018, mephedrone and methylone have been under interna-
tional control since 2015.
4-fluoroamphetamine, the synthetic cannabinoid JWH-
018 and the synthetic cathinone mephedrone. Many other 
NPS that appeared in subsequent years were also reported 
each year until 2014. Thus, there is an element of stability 
in the NPS market. Nevertheless, 66 new substances were 
reported to the UNODC early warning advisory for the 
first time in 2014. 
Several other NPS have been reported by a small number 
of countries for a period of just one or two years. Between 
2008 and 2014, a total of 569 NPS were reported to be 
MAp 4 Number of new psychoactive substances reported by country, 2008-2015
Source: UNODC early warning advisory on new psychoactive substances, 2008-2015.
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed 
upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the 
Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
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UNODC
Source: UNODC early warning advisory on new psychoactive  
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on the market; however, by 2012, 26 of those substances 
were no longer reported to be available on the market and 
by 2013, 69 substances were no longer reported to be 
available. For instance, N-benzyl-1-phenylethylamine was 
reported by six countries in Europe and Oceania between 
2009 and 2012, but since then no further reports on that 
substance have been submitted to UNODC, suggesting 
that the substance is no longer available. 
Many newly reported NPS are actually derivatives of pre-
viously reported substances whose molecular structure has 
been slightly modified. One such example is the series of 
2,5-dimethoxy ring-substituted phenethylamines (2C 
series). Modelled on 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethyl-
amine (2C-B), a substance controlled under the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, 20 NPS 
belonging to the 2C series were reported worldwide until 
2014. However, about half of them did not remain on the 
market and were only reported for a small number of years. 
These included 2C-T, which was reported only in 2011 
by Canada, and 2C-G and 2C-N, which were reported in 
2011 and 2012 by Canada and Poland. Other substances 
belonging to the 2C series seem to be more persistent, 
such as 2C-T-2 and 2C-T-7, which were reported from 
2009 to 2014 by 14 countries in the Americas, Europe 
and Oceania. 
Other substances, such as those belonging to the synthetic 
cannabinoid CP series, have shown large variations in 
market availability since 2008. For example, the 
CP-47,497-C8 homologue was first reported by one coun-
try in Asia (Japan) in 2008; after several fluctuations, the 
reporting of that synthetic cannabinoid reached its peak 
in 2013, with 13 countries in the Americas, Asia and 
Europe having reported its presence. 
There are elements that influence the NPS market, such 
as user preference, legal responses and law enforcement 
efforts to seize substances before a significant user base 
becomes established. UNODC monitoring of NPS since 
2008 has shown a rather dynamic supply situation, char-
acterized by persistence (substances that emerge, spread 
and stay for several years) and change (substances that 
appear for a short time or only locally). 
Significant seizures of new psychoactive  
substances 
Significant quantities of synthetic NPS228 have been seized 
over the past few years, reaching 34 tons in 2014. The 
global market for NPS continues to be dominated by syn-
thetic cannabinoids, with North America, in particular 
the United States, accounting for the largest quantities 
seized worldwide. Of the 32 tons of synthetic cannabi-
noids seized worldwide in 2014,229 26.5 tons were seized 
in the United States alone. Europe also recorded significant 
seizures of synthetic cannabinoids: 5.4 tons of synthetic 
cannabinoids were seized in 2014 (mainly in Cyprus and 
Turkey), compared with 1.2 tons in 2013. Of all the drug 
groups, synthetic cannabinoids accounted for the largest 
seizures in Cyprus in 2012 (8.3 tons) and 2014 (4.4 tons); 
in most cases, the seized synthetic cannabinoid was 
AM-2201.230 
Global seizures of synthetic cathinones have been steadily 
increasing since they were first reported in 2010. Those 
seizures tripled between 2013 and 2014, reaching 1.3 tons. 
Most synthetic cathinones were seized in Eastern Europe 
(692 kg were seized in the Russian Federation), in Western 
and Central Europe (312 kg were seized in England and 
Wales) and in East and South-East Asia (226 kg were 
seized in Hong Kong, China). In 2014, the Russian Fed-
eration also reported significant seizures of aminoindanes 
(438 kg).
228 Seizures of synthetic NPS refer to synthetic NPS and do not 
include seizures of plant-based substances and ketamine.
229 Seizures are usually associated with control measures; therefore, an 
increase in seizures of NPS may reflect the fact that a larger number 
of substances were placed under national control.
230 AM-2201 has been placed under international control since 2015. 
FIG. 69 Number of countries reporting the 
CP-47,497-C8 homologue, a synthetic 
cannabinoid, by year and region,  
2008-2014
Source: UNODC early warning advisory on new psychoactive sub-
stances.
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FIG. 70 Quantities of synthetic cathinones seized,  
by region, 2010-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
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The risk of mixtures of new psychoactive  
substances sold in various compositions 
Seizure reports indicate that NPS are frequently sold in 
various compositions in a combination of different com-
pounds, including internationally controlled drugs, phar-
maceutical products and adulterants. Over the past few 
years, various countries in Europe and South-East Asia 
have reported seizures of “ecstasy” tablets containing 
mainly a blend of non-controlled substances, including 
NPS, and little or no MDMA. However, recent seizure 
reports show that packaged NPS products contained mix-
tures of a variety of NPS compounds. Mixtures can arise 
intentionally (for example, if the producer believes that 
some blends will have greater effects for the user than any 
of the substances in isolation) or unintentionally (for 
example, if the producer lacks the skill or the facilities to 
produce a consistently pure product). 
In 2013, European countries reported more than 110 NPS 
products containing a combination of up to seven differ-
ent NPS compounds sold as one product. Synthetic can-
nabinoids were found to be present in more than 55 per 
cent of those NPS products, and synthetic cathinones were 
present in more than 25 per cent.231 
In addition to NPS mixtures containing substances 
belonging to the same NPS group, in 2013, four European 
countries reported 10 different NPS products that included 
231  UNODC survey on new psychoactive substances, 2014.
combinations of substances from different chemical NPS 
groups. The most frequently identified combination of 
NPS groups found in such products included phenethyl-
amines combined with synthetic cathinones. Generally, 
synthetic cathinones were most frequently identified in 
NPS products combining different NPS groups and were 
usually observed in combination with ketamine and other 
phencyclidine-type substances, phenethylamines and 
tryptamines.232 
It should be noted that polydrug use is not limited to NPS 
use. People who use drugs often choose to take multiple 
substances concurrently, including mixing street drugs 
with alcohol and/or prescription drugs. But the sheer 
number of potential combinations of NPS and, most 
importantly, the fact that NPS users are often unaware of 
what they are actually consuming can complicate the situ-
ation with NPS. The use of NPS products containing a 
variety of psychoactive substances that may or may not be 
known to the user potentially exposes the user to addi-
tional serious health risks, as little or no scientific infor-
mation is available to determine the psychoactive effects 
that these combinations may have. 
Understanding the use of new psychoactive 
substances
In the past few years, a growing number of NPS have been 
sold on illicit drug markets. Available NPS may or may 
232  Ibid.
FIG. 71 Examples of seized products of new psychoactive substances containing combinations of  
substances
Source: UNODC survey on new psychoactive substances, 2014.
Note: The main substance found in each product is listed first. 
a Substance under international control at the time the product was seized.
b Different chemical NPS group.
c Pharmaceutical product. 
d Adulterant.
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not have effects and profiles similar to those of the sub-
stances under international control that they are designed 
to mimic.233 A large number of NPS are designed to 
mimic the effects of controlled drugs such as cannabis, 
cocaine, heroin, LSD, MDMA (“ecstasy”) or metham-
phetamine. Analysis of the pharmacological effects of NPS 
reported up to December 2015234 revealed that the major-
ity of those substances were synthetic cannabinoid receptor 
agonists, stimulants and classic hallucinogens. 
Data on the prevalence of NPS use indicate diverse trends. 
Among the reasons for this are the limited data available 
for comparing the prevalence of NPS use over time, lim-
ited survey tools for capturing NPS use and limited knowl-
edge of NPS users about the substances they use. In the 
United States, there are indications of an increase in NPS 
use among certain user groups between 2009 and 2013; 
the prevalence of lifetime use of a “novel psychoactive 
substance” among the population aged 12-34 was 1.2 per 
cent in 2013.235 There are signs of declining use of syn-
thetic cannabinoids among secondary school students in 
the United States. The prevalence of past-year use of syn-
thetic cannabinoids among twelfth-grade students 
decreased from 11.4 per cent in 2011 to 5.2 per cent in 
2015.236 This is associated with an increase, over the same 
period, in the perceived risk of taking synthetic cannabi-
noids among the same group. The use of NPS with stim-
ulant effects (reported as “bath salts“) among twelfth 
graders remained stable at 1 per cent in 2015. The prev-
alence of the use of synthetic cannabinoids among eighth, 
tenth and twelfth graders has declined to the lowest levels 
since the collection of such data began. However, the large 
amount of synthetic cannabinoids seized between 2012 
and 2014 (more than 93 tons) and the large number of 
calls to poison centres for problems related to the use of 
synthetic cannabinoids (3,682 in 2014 and 7,779 in 
2015)237 indicate the continued presence and use of this 
NPS group in the United States. 
233 For more information, see UNODC, The Challenge of New Psycho-
active Substances (Vienna, March 2013).
234 The analysis covered the pharmacological effects of 621 synthetic 
NPS registered in the early warning advisory up to December 2015. 
Plant-based substances were excluded from the analysis, as they 
usually contain a large number of different substances, some of 
which may not even be known or may have effects and interactions 
that are not fully understood. The pharmacological effects of the 
remaining substances could not be determined with certainty on 
the basis of the available scientific data.
235 Some authors have reported an increase in NPS use among persons 
aged 12-34 years in the United States between 2009 and 2013 
but also highlighted the risk of underreporting NPS use (see, for 
example, Joseph J. Palamar and others, “Self-reported use of novel 
psychoactive substances in a US nationally representative survey: 
prevalence, correlates, and a call for new survey methods to prevent 
underreporting”, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 156, pp. 112-
119). 
236 Lloyd D. Johnston, and others, Monitoring the Future National 
Survey Results on Drug Use: 1975-2015 − Overview, Key Findings on 
Adolescent Drug Use (Ann Arbor, Institute for Social Research, Uni-
versity of Michigan, 2016).
237 American Association of Poison Control Centers, “Synthetic  
cannabinoid data”, updated 31 March 2016.
According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales,238 
over the period 2014-2015, 279,000 adults (0.9 per cent 
of the population aged 16-59) reported the use of NPS. 
Among young adults (ages 16-24), the prevalence of NPS 
use was much higher (2.8 per cent), the majority of the 
users being young men. Herbal smoking mixtures were 
the most commonly used form of NPS, with 61 per cent 
of the population aged 16-59 reporting their use. Accord-
ing to Public Health England,239 the number of individ-
uals “presenting to treatment” for a “club drug” or NPS 
more than doubled, from 2,727 to 5,532, between the 
financial years 2009-2010 and 2014-2015. The largest 
increase was recorded for mephedrone — from 953 in the 
period 2010-2011 to 2,024 in the period 2014-2015. 
Compared with the previous period, the prevalence of 
past-year use of mephedrone in England and Wales in the 
financial years 2014-2015 remained stable at 1.9 per cent 
for young adults and 0.5 per cent for adults, which is sim-
ilar to the prevalence of past-year use of amphetamines 
(0.6 per cent) and higher than that of LSD (0.4 per cent) 
or heroin (0.1 per cent). 240 
238 Deborah Lader, ed., Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2014/15 Crime 
Survey for England and Wales, 2nd ed., (London, Home Office, July 
2015).
239 Public Health England, Adult Substance Misuse Statistics from the 
National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS): 1 April 
2014 to 31 March 2015 (London, 2015). 
240 Deborah Lader, ed., Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2014/15 
Crime Survey for England and Wales, 2nd ed., (London, Home 
Office, July 2015).
FIG. 72 Proportion of new psychoactive substances 
by pharmacological effect, December 2015
Source: UNODC early warning advisory on new psychoactive 
substances, 2008-2015.
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In 2014, Chile reported for the first time data on the prev-
alence of past-year use of synthetic cannabinoids: 0.56 per 
cent241 among adults (ages 15-64), which is similar to the 
prevalence of the use of hallucinogens (0.55 per cent) and 
opioids (0.58 per cent). 
In several countries, the surge in NPS use in prisons has 
been reported with a corresponding rise in violence and 
hospital admissions. There are indications that synthetic 
cannabinoids, in particular, have emerged as a major prob-
lem. The substances abused by prisoners in England and 
Wales242 were reported to be primarily cannabis (13 per 
cent), synthetic cannabinoids (10 per cent), heroin (7 per 
cent) and other NPS (5 per cent). Although synthetic 
cannabinoids were identified as a concern in 37 per cent 
of the male prisons inspected in the financial year 2013-
2014,243 this proportion increased to 64 per cent in the 
financial year 2014-2015.244 According to reports, many 
prison staff and prisoners reported high levels of synthetic 
cannabinoid use, which was associated with mental and 
physical health problems, as well as altered behaviour of 
prisoners.245 In New Zealand, about 47 per cent of detain-
ees used synthetic cannabinoids in 2014.246 While the 
past-year prevalence of the use of synthetic cannabinoids 
in 2014 remained unchanged compared with 2013, the 
past-year frequency of the use of synthetic cannabinoids 
increased, from 67 days in 2013 to 110 days in 2014. 
Almost a third (30 per cent) of the detainees who had used 
synthetic cannabinoids in the past twelve months reported 
perceived dependence in 2014, up from 17 per cent in 
2013. Other NPS reported by detainees to be used 
included MDPV247 and ketamine. 
The injecting use of NPS, particularly synthetic cathi-
nones, continues to be reported among specific high-risk 
user groups and was associated with an elevated or even 
increasing rate of HIV infection. These include young 
people, subgroups of MSM, people who have previously 
injected other drugs and people who have switched from 
241 Chile, Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, “Décimo Primer 
Estudio Nacional de Drogas en Población General: Resultados Prin-
cipales” (Santiago de Chile, Observatorio Chileno de Drogas, July 
2014).
242 United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, Changing 
Patterns of Substance Misuse in Adult Prisons and Service Responses 
(London, 2015). 
243 United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for Eng-
land and Wales: Annual Report 2013-14 (London, The Stationery 
Office, 2014).
244 United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for Eng-
land and Wales: Annual Report 2014-15 (London, The Stationery 
Office, 2015).
245 United Kingdom, Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England 
and Wales, “Learning lessons bulletin: fatal incidents investigations 
issue No. 9 − new psychoactive substances” (London, July 2015). 
246 Chris Wilkins and others, New Zealand Arrestee Drug Use Monitor-
ing 2010-2014 (Auckland, SHORE and Whariki Research Centre, 
Massey University, 2015).
247  MDPV has been under international control since 2015.
snorting to injecting. In a study conducted in Hungary,248 
92 of 167 PWID tested HIV-positive, the most common 
drug injected being pentedrone (48 per cent). In Ireland, 
an unexpected increase in cases of acute HIV infection 
among PWID in 2015 was associated with the injecting 
use of the synthetic cathinone alpha-pyrrolidinopentio-
phenone (alpha-PVP) among so-called “chaotic” PWID.249 
Injecting was reported to occur multiple times a day, with 
users often reusing syringes and sharing filters. According 
to Public Health England, within five years of the first 
appearance of mephedrone250 around 1 in 10 PWID 
reported the injection of mephedrone. Increased 
mephedrone use was also reported by subgroups of MSM 
who injected the substance for use in a sexual context 
(“chemsex”), often sharing injecting equipment and engag-
ing in unprotected sex.251 These findings indicate an 
increase in the number of people who inject synthetic 
cathinones in Europe, an increase in high-risk behaviour 
and a higher risk of acquiring blood-borne viruses such as 
HIV and hepatitis C.
248 József Rácz, V. Anna Gyarmathy and Róbert Csák, “New cases of 
HIV among people who injects drugs in Hungary: false alarm or 
early warning?”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 27, pp. 
13-16.
249 Coralie Giese and others, “Injection of new psychoactive substance 
snow blow associated with recently acquired HIV infections among 
homeless people who inject drugs in Dublin, Ireland, 2015”, Euro 
Surveillance, vol. 20, No. 40 (2015). 
250 United Kingdom, Public Health England, Shooting Up Infections 
among People who Inject Drugs in the UK, 2014 (London, 2015). 
251  Adam Bourne and others, The Chemsex Study: Drug Use in Sexual 
Settings Among Gay and Bisexual Men in Lambeth, Southwark and 
Lewisham (London, Sigma Research, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, 2014); Victoria L. Gilbart and others, 
“High-risk drug practices in men who have sex with men”, The 
Lancet, vol. 381, No. 9875 (2013), pp. 1358-1359; and David 
Stuart, “Sexualised drug use by MSM: background, current status 
and response”, HIV Nursing, vol. 13, No. 1 (2013), pp. 6-10.
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INTRODUCTION
From illicit cultivation and production to trafficking and 
use, the world drug problem, with all its ramifications, is 
intertwined with a vast array of social, economic and envi-
ronmental issues. This exerts great pressure on develop-
ment efforts, which in turn have an influence on the drug 
problem. Interventions made in response to the drug prob-
lem themselves generate further interplay with the broader 
development and social context and introduce additional, 
sometimes unforeseen, complexity to this dynamic. The 
importance of this interaction is increasingly being recog-
nized by the international community, as reflected in the 
discussions on the Sustainable Development Goals and 
the special session of the General Assembly on the world 
drug problem held in 2016. 
The concept of development, together with the engage-
ment by the international community in this area, is 
reflected in the Millennium Development Goals, followed 
by the recently formulated 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development.1 The 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
and their targets are integrated and indivisible and balance 
the three dimensions of development: economic, social 
and environmental. The new development agenda also 
recognizes that sustainable development cannot be realized 
without peace and security, and that peace and security 
will be at risk without sustainable development. Factors 
that give rise to violence, insecurity and injustice, such as 
inequality, corruption, poor governance and illicit finan-
cial and arms flows, are addressed in the development 
agenda.
1 See General Assembly resolution 70/1.
The present chapter uses the framework of the Sustainable 
Development Goals to examine the interplay between the 
drug problem and the broader development context. It 
clusters the discussion around five topics — social devel-
opment; economic development; environmental sustain-
ability; peaceful, just and inclusive societies; and 
partnership — in the light of the world drug problem and 
the global response thereto. Specifically, the present chap-
ter seeks to elucidate the interplay between each of these 
aspects of sustainable development on the one hand, and 
the issue of drugs on the other, while distinguishing 
between the drug problem as a phenomenon (illicit drug 
use, production and trafficking) and the response to the 
drug problem. 
In analysing the interaction between social development 
and the world drug problem, the first section in this chap-
ter summarizes the evidence of the social costs of illicit 
drug use, the most important being its effects on the health 
of people who use drugs. The section also investigates the 
health impact of drug use across levels of development. 
Other aspects addressed include the impact on the families 
of people who use drugs and their communities, and the 
marginalization and stigmatization of people who use 
drugs and the repercussions of that, particularly on their 
employment opportunities. The section also addresses the 
impact of the response to the drug problem on social devel-
opment, with reference to, for example, alternative devel-
opment, as well as the availability of drugs for medical and 
scientific purposes. 
The second section, on economic development, addresses 
the question of how the level of economic development 
relates to drug use and the formation of illicit drug mar-
kets, by examining indicators at the national level. The 
analysis attempts to identify patterns describing the evolu-
tion of the drug problem and the role of development. It 
also discusses socioeconomic factors at the subnational 
level, focusing on marginalization and poverty. The eco-
nomic cost of drug use resulting from loss of productivity 
is also taken into account, as are the costs associated with 
efforts by state institutions to help drug users. 
The third section, on environmental sustainability, pre-
sents evidence on the environmental impact of illicit drug 
cultivation, production and trafficking, as well as drug 
supply reduction interventions, including deforestation 
and biodiversity loss.
The fourth section, on peaceful, just and inclusive socie-
ties, addresses topics that have been recently introduced 
into the international development agenda through the 
Sustainable Development Goals. It examines different 
forms of violence in connection with drugs, including 
links to terrorism and insurgency, and it discusses the long-
term and short-term outcomes of the response to the drug 
FIG. 1 Dimensions of sustainable development
GLOBAL PARTNERS
HIP
 
 
ACCOUNTABLE AND INCLUSIVE IN
STIT
UT
IO
NS
 
 
JUSTICE
PEACEFUL SOCIET
IES
EC
ON
OM
IC
DE
VE
LO
PM
EN
T
ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY 
SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT
bearable equitable
sustainable
viable
64
problem. In addition, the section investigates the extent 
to which drug trafficking is intrinsically associated with 
violence, describes how the drug problem can be an ena-
bler or an outcome of violence, and highlights the role of 
the underlying rule of law in shaping this relationship. It 
also explores how the criminal justice system influences, 
and is influenced by, the drug problem, looking in par-
ticular at how drug trafficking can undermine the system, 
as well as the role of law enforcement in influencing drug 
prices and markets. Moreover, the discussion covers the 
impact of criminal justice on people who use drugs, the 
extent of the resource drain on the system arising from the 
incarceration of drug users, and alternatives to imprison-
ment. In addition, the section describes the mutually rein-
forcing relationship between the drug problem and 
corruption and addresses the scale and the impact of illicit 
financial flows arising from drug trafficking and 
production. 
Last but not least, the section on partnership looks at 
development assistance data provided by countries and 
highlights divergent trends between overall development 
assistance on the one hand and the assistance provided for 
the drug-related sectors on the other, underlining the need 
to redress this imbalance in the context of the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development. 
Figure 2 schematizes the interactions discussed in this 
chapter, which serve as a template for most of the subsec-
tions in the chapter.
A. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Impact of drug use on social development
Public health impact
There are numerous ways in which illicit drug use, pro-
duction and trafficking can have an impact on sustainable 
development. Principal among them are the negative con-
sequences for public health, which, as its absence precludes 
human development in every other dimension, lies at the 
heart of sustainable development.
 Sustainable Development Goal 3. 
Ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all at all ages 
 
The impact of illicit drug use on the health of people who 
use drugs and, more generally, on public health is notori-
ous and well documented. Target 3.5 of the Sustainable 
Development Goals is to strengthen “the prevention and 
treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug 
abuse”. Prevention, treatment, care, recovery, rehabilita-
tion and social reintegration measures and programmes 
all play a role in addressing the problem of drug use and 
reducing the negative health impact on society. 
In addition to medical conditions resulting directly from 
the psychoactive and physiological effects of drugs, certain 
forms of drug use and modes of administration are impor-
tant risk factors for contracting other diseases; this not 
only affects people who use drugs but also the people with 
whom they come into contact. As discussed in the previ-
GOOD HEALTH
AND WELL-BEING
FIG. 2 Analytical framework of the thematic chapter
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ous chapter, there are many potential health risks and out-
comes for people who use drugs, including overdose, 
suicide, trauma, mental health problems, disability and 
premature death. 
People who develop dependence and become affected by 
drug use disorders are those who account for the vast 
majority of negative health consequences among people 
who use drugs. UNODC estimates that, as of 2014, out 
of a quarter of a billion past-year drug users, more than 
29 million had a drug use disorder (see page 1). Sporadic 
or regular drug use that has not progressed to drug depend-
ence can still carry some health risks, particularly if it has 
the potential to change the user’s behaviour when he or 
she is under the influence of drugs; even a single episode, 
or small number of episodes, can have damaging effects. 
Since products sold in the illegal drug market under a cer-
tain name may contain a wide variety of substances, and 
people who use drugs do not have information about the 
contents of what they consume, there are also additional 
risks. Moreover, episodic drug use itself carries the risk of 
evolving into drug-dependent use.
Certain people who use drugs may manage to lead socially 
integrated lives in parallel with regular drug use and thus 
do not conform to the stereotypical image of a problem 
drug user, but that does not prevent the development of 
drug dependence, and the harm caused by drug use may 
only be felt in the long term. In general, the consequences 
of drug use may develop independently in two different 
aspects of an individual’s life: health and social. In some 
cases, there may be health conditions with a limited impact 
on an individual’s social life; in other cases, the social 
impact of drug use may be more serious than the health 
aspects. Broadly speaking, the social consequences of drug 
use may emerge only at later stages of the development of 
drug use disorders.
Globally, roughly 200,000 people lose their lives each year 
to causes attributed to drug use. People who regularly use 
drugs tend to live with disability and die early. The Global 
Burden of Disease Study quantifies the adverse health 
impact of hundreds of diseases, injuries and risk factors. 
It indicates that opioids, cocaine, amphetamines and can-
nabis together accounted for almost 12 million years of 
life lost2 because of premature death or disability in 2013, 
of which more than 8 million were linked to the use of 
opioids.3 Based on data from the study, developed coun-
tries appear to be disproportionately affected by the overall 
health impact of drug use (see figure 3). 
2 The figure for all drugs, including the category “Other drug use 
disorders”, was 18 million years of life lost.
3 Christopher J. L. Murray and others, “Global, regional, and 
national disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for 306 diseases and 
injuries and healthy life expectancy (HALE) for 188 countries, 
1990-2013: quantifying the epidemiological transition”, The Lancet, 
vol. 386, No. 10009 (2015), pp. 2145-2191. 
Target 3.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals  
By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat 
hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communi-
cable diseases
Epidemics and communicable diseases have a negative 
impact on the health of millions of people and constitute 
a major challenge to sustainable development, which are 
among the reasons why target 3.3 of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals is aimed at ending, by 2030, the epidemics 
of AIDS and tuberculosis and combating hepatitis, water-
borne diseases and other communicable diseases. To 
improve prevention and treatment of these diseases, better 
understanding of their risk factors is needed. One of the 
biggest risk factors associated with the use of drugs stems 
from their mode of administration, particularly injecting 
drug use. Smoking, swallowing, snorting or inhaling a drug 
can lead to a variety of health problems, but injecting a 
drug carries a much greater risk of overdose, vein damage, 
abscesses and infection, in particular the transmission of 
blood-borne viruses such as HIV and hepatitis C.
It is currently estimated that some 11.7 million people 
worldwide inject drugs, of whom around 1.6 million (14.0 
per cent) are living with HIV. People who inject drugs 
(PWID) are estimated to make up appromately 5-10 per 
cent of all people living with HIV,4 and injecting drug use 
4 UNAIDS, “AIDS by the numbers” (Geneva, 2013).
FIG. 3 Burden of drug use disordersa  
per 100,000 population, by level of  
development, 2013
Source: Human development index from the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP); data on burden of disease  
(disability-adjusted life years) from the Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation, University of Washington, GBD Compare, 2015. 
Available from http://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare. 
Note: The designations “low”, “medium” etc. based on the human 
development index are those used by UNDP.
a The sum of the burden attributed to opioids, cocaine, cannabis and 
amphetamines, excluding “Other drugs”.
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accounts for around 30 per cent of new 
HIV infections outside sub-Saharan Africa.5, 6 Scientific 
estimates of the probability of HIV transmission ensuing 
from exposure to an infected source indicate that needle-
sharing drug use carries one of the higher risks of trans-
mission per exposure (albeit much lower than transmission 
by blood transfusion or mother-to-child transmission 
without antiretroviral therapy).7, 8
HIV transmission is not the only health consequence asso-
ciated with drug use. According to data on the global 
burden of disease, drug use as a risk factor accounted for 
32 per cent of deaths caused by cirrhosis resulting from 
hepatitis C and 14 per cent of deaths caused by liver 
cancer.9 
Drug use can also have an impact on public health by 
increasing the risk of road traffic accidents (driving while 
under the influence of drugs) and accidents in the work-
place, which not only cause serious harm to people who 
use drugs but also to the people around them.
Sexual behaviour and the health impact  
of drug use 
Although indirect, one mechanism whereby drug use may 
have repercussions on the health of society in general is 
linked to the sexual behaviour of people who use drugs. 
This is of particular concern in the case of at-risk groups 
such as PWID, for whom an increased risk of transmis-
sion caused by drug use itself can be the very cause (or a 
major driver) of a high prevalence of certain sexually trans-
mitted infections.When non-injecting drug use increases 
the likelihood of risk-taking behaviour among other at-risk 
groups, such as men who have sex with men (MSM) and 
transgender individuals, that can also have an impact.
Research confirms that there are links between drug use 
patterns and sexual behaviour. It is difficult to disentangle 
causalities between drug use and sexual behaviour, but the 
following patterns have been documented: transmission 
of sexually transmitted infections from people who use 
drugs to spouses and partners; people who use drugs 
engaging in sex work as a way to fund drug use; and people 
who use drugs engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour 
while under the influence of certain drugs, especially stim-
ulants and “party drugs”. Local reports from India, Myan-
mar and Ukraine have documented HIV epidemics 
associated with injecting drug use that have spread to the 
general population chiefly through heterosexual contact.10 
5 UNAIDS, The Gap Report: People Who Inject Drugs (Geneva, 2014).
6 World Drug Report 2015 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.15.XI.6), p. 6.
7 Pragna Patel and others, “Estimating per-act HIV transmission risk: 
a systematic review”, AIDS, vol. 28, No. 10 (2014), pp. 1509-1519.
8 Rebecca F. Baggaley and others, “Risk of HIV-1 transmission for 
parenteral exposure and blood transfusion: a systematic review and 
meta-analysis”, AIDS, vol. 20, No. 6 (2006).
9 Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, GBD Compare. Avail-
able at www.healthdata.org/.
10 Steffanie A. Strathdee and Susan G. Sherman, “The role of sexual 
A report by the Commission on AIDS in Asia11 described 
one example in Indonesia in which HIV did not spread 
in the sex industry until a few years after it had reached a 
very high level among PWID.
It has been hypothesized that the use of certain drugs 
increases or decreases sexual desire and levels of sexual 
activity and has a disinhibiting effect, making users less 
likely to engage in safer sex, thus exacerbating the negative 
health impact of drug use. Stimulants such as cocaine and 
ATS are the most commonly cited drugs linking drug use 
with high-risk sexual behaviour and HIV transmission. It 
has also been argued that many people use the disinhibit-
ing effects of amphetamines to facilitate sex, including 
high-risk sex, and that the impulsivity produced by 
amphetamines makes users potentially more likely to 
engage in unprotected sex. For example, a study in the 
United States found methamphetamine use to be related 
to increased, unprotected sexual activity and the risk of 
contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, 
irrespective of gender, age, race, ethnicity or sexual 
orientation.12 
Impact of drug use on gender equality and 
the empowerment of women
 Sustainable Development Goal 5. 
Achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls 
 
Women affected by drug use disorders are more vulnerable 
and more stigmatized than men. They suffer from co-
occurring mental health disorders to a greater extent than 
men and they are more likely to have been victims of vio-
lence and abuse. However, they are far less likely to enter 
drug treatment programmes than men, which can reduce 
their opportunities to reintegrate into society and exacer-
bate their sense of stigmatization as people who use 
drugs.13 Drug use may thus have a direct negative impact 
on gender equality and the empowerment of women.
There are many aspects of the drug problem that have an 
impact on gender equality and therefore on social devel-
opment. Given that there are many more men than women 
who use drugs, research, guidelines and training pro-
grammes concerning people who use drugs remain largely 
transmission of HIV infection among injection and non-injection 
drug users”, Journal of Urban Health, vol. 80, No. 4, Suppl. 3 
(2003),pp. iii7-iii14. 
11 Redefining AIDS in Asia: Crafting an Effective Response – Report of 
the Commission on AIDS in Asia (New Delhi, Oxford University 
Press, 2008).
12 F. Molitor and others, “Association of methamphetamine use during 
sex with risky sexual behaviors and HIV infection among non-in-
jection drug users”, Western Journal of Medicine, vol. 168, 1998, pp. 
93-97.
13 World Drug Report 2015, p. 17.
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male-focused and fail to address the specificities of female 
drug use patterns. The impact of drug use is also greater 
on women than on men because women tend to lack access 
to the continuum of care for drug use disorders. 
Women who use drugs face several issues and problems 
that enhance their vulnerability to HIV (as well as other 
major health issues) such as sex work, sexually transmitted 
infections, viral hepatitis, mental health problems, repro-
ductive health issues, childcare, stigma and violence, in 
addition to a lack of gender-sensitive health services.14 
Women who inject drugs, in particular, are an often hard-
to-reach and highly vulnerable group, to the extent that 
even data relating to them are more limited than data 
relating to their male counterparts. 
An indirect consequence of drug use on the health of 
women is that HIV is not only transmitted between PWID 
through the sharing of injecting equipment but also from 
(predominantly male) PWID to their spouses and other 
sexual partners owing to inadequate use of protection such 
as condoms. Although they also have their own set of risk 
factors, generally there is a risk incurred by the female sex 
partners of men who inject drugs, who share injecting 
equipment, have multiple sex partners, practice limited 
condom use, engage in sexual violence and have low risk 
perception and disclosure of HIV status and drug use, as 
well as low uptake for HIV testing.15 In a study of over 
4,000 female sex partners of men who inject drugs in 
India, young age, early marriage (more than half had been 
married before the age of 18), unsupportive partners, diag-
nosable mental health problems (mainly depression), poor 
decision-making powers and economic dependence char-
acterized many of the women, who also reported high rates 
of exposure to domestic violence but low rates of seeking 
help in such situations.16
Drug use and intimate partner or family-related 
violence 
Drug use has been identified as a major risk factor for 
family-related violence. As this type of violence particularly 
affects women and girls, drug use can effectively be seen 
to be a factor contributing to violence against women and 
girls, which, according to target 5.2 of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, needs to be eliminated in all its 
forms, in the public and private spheres. 
Target 5.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Eliminate all forms of violence against all women 
and girls in the public and private spheres, includ-
ing trafficking and sexual and other types of 
exploitation
14 Tasnim Azim, Irene Bontell and Steffanie A. Strathdee, “Women, 
drugs and HIV”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 26, 
Suppl. 1 (2015), pp. S16-S21.
15 Ibid.
16 UNODC Regional Office for South Asia, Women and Substance Use 
in India: Women, Substance Use and Vulnerability, Pratima Murthy, 
ed. (New Delhi, 2008).
A study in Afghanistan found that drug use led to domes-
tic violence, with over half of family members interviewed 
reporting that they had been hit by or had hit out at a 
drug-using relative during a confrontation regarding the 
latter’s drug use.17 In India, physical violence by family 
members was reported by 43 per cent of a sample of 179 
women with a male family member currently using drugs, 
and verbal aggression was reported by 50 per cent.18 
Research indicates that the pathways leading to drug use 
are different for men and women, with the initial period 
of a woman’s drug-using career significantly related to their 
relationship with men.19 A study in the United States of 
416 women in opioid substitution treatment (using meth-
adone) found that frequent use of “crack” by women who 
use drugs increased the likelihood of subsequent violence 
from intimate partners.20 
Women who inject drugs may also experience violence, 
perpetrated by intimate partners or law enforcement per-
sonnel (or clients if the women are sex workers). Research 
also shows that women who experience intimate partner 
violence are less likely to use condoms and more likely to 
share injecting equipment, to have multiple sexual partners 
and to trade sex.21
Impact of problem drug use on the family,  
children and youth
“People are at the centre of sustainable development … and 
the commitment was made … to benefit all, in particular 
the children of the world, youth and future generations of the 
world.” 22
Another way in which drug use can have a negative impact 
on social development is by undermining the functioning 
of society’s basic cell — the family — and the welfare of 
children and youth, upon whom its future hinges. 
Family
Different patterns of drug use have different types and 
degrees of impact. In some situations, drug use may make 
little or limited difference to the family; in other cases, it 
may have distinct effects on family structures and on mari-
17 UNODC, Impacts of Drug Use on Users and Their Families in 
Afghanistan (Vienna, 2014).
18 P. Murthy, Women and Drug Abuse: The Problem in India (India, 
Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment and United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme, Regional Office for South 
Asia, 2002).
19 Tammy L. Anderson, “Drug use and gender”, in Self-destructive 
Behavior and Disvalued Identity, vol. 4, Encyclopedia of Criminology 
and Deviant Behavior, Charles E. Faupel and Paul M. Roman, eds. 
(Philadelphia, Brunner-Routledge, 2001), pp. 285-289.
20 Nabila El-Bassel and others, “Relationship between drug abuse 
and intimate partner violence: a longitudinal study among women 
receiving methadone”, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 95, 
No. 3 (2005), pp. 465-470.
21 Azim, Bontell and Strathdee, “Women, drugs and HIV” (see foot-
note 14).
22 Wording proposed by the Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals
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tal relationships, family violence and child abuse and 
neglect and on the family economy. Drug use is often 
associated with child abuse and domestic violence and is 
also a leading contributor to marital dissatisfaction, family 
breakups and rejection of family members.23 
A UNODC study on people who use drugs in Afghanistan 
found that nearly 70 per cent of family members of people 
who use drugs had experienced financial problems as a 
result of a family member’s drug use, which led to a reduc-
tion in overall family income caused by a decrease in the 
financial contribution by the person using drugs. Family 
members interviewed reported that 60 per cent of drug-
using relatives who had been employed prior to using 
drugs had subsequently lost their jobs. Almost half of the 
family members interviewed also said they had been forced 
to borrow money as a result of drug use in the family; 
almost 70 per cent reported that they had faced financial 
difficulties as a result of that drug use; and a third of all 
family members indicated that they had gone without food 
or other basic necessities as a result.24 
While drug-using parents may have a negative impact on 
their children’s development, drug use by children, teen-
agers and young adults can also have a profound impact 
on a family, affecting the dynamics and relationships with 
parents, siblings and other members of the extended 
family, often eliciting feelings of anger, sadness, anxiety, 
shame and loss. Parents of drug-using children have linked 
deterioration of their own physical and psychological 
health to the stress and conflictual nature of living with 
their child’s drug problem. Siblings of drug-using children 
may experience the loss of a close relationship with their 
drug-using brother or sister and may themselves be 
exposed or deliberately introduced to drug use that leads 
to more problematic use.25 
Children
 Sustainable Development Goal 4. 
Ensure inclusive and equitable 
quality education and promote 
lifelong learning opportunities for  
all
Target 16.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of 
violence against and torture of children
Children appear as a group of special concern in several 
of the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Goal 
1 (target 1.2 of which covers children living in poverty), 
23 Kenneth J. Gruber and Melissa F. Taylor, “A family perspective for 
substance abuse: implications from the literature”, Journal of Social 
Work Practice in the Addictions, vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2 (2006), pp.1-
29.
24 Impacts of Drug Use on Users and Their families in Afghanistan.
25 Marina Barnard, Drug Addiction and Families (London, Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 2006).
Goal 2 (which covers malnutrition), Goal 3 (which covers 
mortality among newborns and children), Goal 4 (which 
covers education) and Goal 16 (target 16.2 of which covers 
violence against children). The development of children 
is, however, directly in the hands of their parents, whose 
parenting skills have a profound effect on their offspring. 
Unstable and inconsistent family and living environment 
factors, such as transient living conditions, inconsistent 
caretaking and violence resulting from drug-using parents, 
have been linked to psychological and emotional develop-
ment problems among children. Moreover, parents who 
use drugs may be absent because they are incapacitated by 
drug use or spending time procuring drugs, in treatment 
or in prison.26
A study undertaken in Ireland suggested that opiate 
dependence has a specific impact on parenting processes, 
particularly on the physical and emotional availability of 
parents and on the capacity of parents to provide an emo-
tionally consistent environment. The factors involved 
relate to the parents’ focus on the supply and acquisition 
of drugs, the impact of intoxication and withdrawal from 
opioids, preoccupation with drugs and instability of 
moods. Drug-using parents reported that they were aware 
of their limitations as parents and were dissatisfied with 
their levels of availability, emotional responsiveness and 
stability regarding their children.27 
Youth
Target 4.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth 
and adults who have relevant skills, including 
technical and vocational skills, for employment, 
decent jobs and entrepreneurship
Drug use often affects people during their most produc-
tive years, and the entrapment of youth in both drug use 
and the illicit drug trade itself, as opposed to engagement 
in legitimate employment and educational opportunities, 
poses distinct barriers to the development of individuals 
and communities. Depending on a wide range of factors 
associated with the culture and context of that use, such 
as the type of drugs and the availability of particular drugs, 
young people may be vulnerable and at risk of drug use. 
There is not a straight cause-and-effect relationship 
between development and the involvement of youth in 
illicit drug use and drug trafficking, as these factors are all 
associated with each other. A key feature in understanding 
risk factors for youth is their interconnectedness, especially 
relating to the onset of drug use disorders.28
26 Marija G. Dunn and others, “Origins and consequences of child 
neglect in substance abuse families”, Clinical Psychology Review, vol. 
22, No. 7 (2002), pp.1063-1090.
27 Diane M. Hogan, “The impact of opiate dependence on parenting 
processes: contextual, physiological and psychological factors”, 
Addiction Research and Theory, vol. 15, No. 6 (2007), pp. 617-635.
28 Charlie Lloyd, “Risk factors for problem drug use: identifying vul-
QUALITY
EDUCATION
WORLD DRUG REPORT 2016
CHAPTER 2
Social development
69
Impact of social development on the drug 
problem
An entire area of development interventions, namely 
alternative development, exists for the express purpose of 
reducing illicit drug crop cultivation, among other things. 
There is ample evidence that it is only when interventions 
have succeeded in improving the development status of 
communities that they turn away from illicit cultivation.29
More broadly, just as drug use has serious ramifications 
for development, certain socioeconomic factors, such as 
poverty, poor education and lack of health-care services, 
can have a negative impact on drug use. Inequality, social 
deprivation and lack of alternative livelihoods, to name 
but a few, can all be viewed as deficiencies in development 
that feed one or another aspect of the drug problem. Pov-
erty, unemployment, poor education, domestic violence 
and social disadvantage are vulnerabilities linked to social 
development that can be conducive to drug use. Moreover, 
people with drug use disorders whose lives are character-
ized by low levels of literacy and education may have lim-
ited understanding of the potentially harmful effects of 
drugs, particularly relating to the risk of drug dependence, 
because of a general lack of accurate, practical and realistic 
information about drugs and their effects.30
Countries with well-developed and articulated healthcare 
delivery systems, well trained staff and efficient procedures 
for the issuance and processing of both import and export 
authorizations tend to fare better in ensuring the 
availability of opioids for medical purposes. According to 
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the 
consumption of narcotic drugs for pain relief is 
concentrated primarily in countries in North America, 
Western Europe and Oceania,31 some of which are also 
regions with a high level of documented misuse of 
prescription opioids. Based on data by the National Center 
for Health Statistics,32 every year since 2002 more than 
40 per cent of the total number of overdose deaths in the 
United States have been related to prescription opioids. 
Street gang members have capitalized on the problem of 
misuse of prescription opioids in the United States by 
trafficking prescription drugs, specifically hydrocodone 
and oxycodone.33
nerable groups”, Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, vol. 5, No. 
3 (1998), pp. 217-232.
29 See World Drug Report 2015, chap. II.
30 UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan, “Community drug 
profile No.5: an assessment of problem drug use in Kabul city”, 
(Kabul, 2003), p. 25.
31 INCB, “Availability of narcotic drugs for medical use”. Available at 
www.incb.org.
32 https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-
death-rates.
33 United States, DEA, 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Sum-
mary (October 2015).
Social norms and drug use
Another indirect way that social development can have an 
influence on the drug problem is by supporting or under-
mining existing structures of society that can increase (or 
decrease) vulnerability to drug use. One aspect of this is 
related to changing social norms, whereby an individual’s 
inclination to engage in drug use, particularly the initia-
tion of drug use or of a new type of drug-using behaviour, 
is influenced by the level of acceptability that individuals 
perceive to be associated with that particular behaviour 
within their immediate acquaintances, family, community, 
peer group and society in general. 
As society and social norms change, the inclination to 
engage in drug use may therefore also undergo change. 
For example, in families where drugs are used or attitudes 
towards their use are positive, the incidence of drug use 
among children is higher than in families where drug use 
is low and where attitudes towards drug use are not as 
permissive. One study showed that children of people with 
drug use disorders are seven times more likely than their 
peers to grow up with drug and alcohol problems.34 
The results of school surveys in the United States provide 
an indicator of the acceptability of using cannabis, as meas-
ured by the percentage of pupils who did not disapprove 
of people (over 18 or older) who try cannabis once or 
twice; the trend in this indicator over the period 1975-
2015 mirrors the trend in prevalence of cannabis use. 
Indeed, this disapproval indicator is a slightly better pre-
34 Neil P. McKeganey and others, “Preteen children and illegal drugs”, 
Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, vol. 11, No. 4 (2004), pp. 
315-327.
FIG. 4 Use of cannabis compared with attitudes 
towards cannabis use among twelfth 
graders in the United States, 1975-2015
Source: Monitoring the Future study: United States, Department 
of Health and Human Services (1975-1994), and Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan (1995-2015).
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dictor of the trend in cannabis use than the perceived ease 
of availability of cannabis. Although this pattern is observ-
able over the long term, in recent years the trends have 
begun to diverge, which may be linked to developments 
in the policy on cannabis in some states of the United 
States.
A similar pattern emerges from the results of a recent study 
of drug use among the school population in Chile (cover-
ing pupils between the eighth year of primary school and 
the fourth year of secondary school). In 2013, past-year 
prevalence of cannabis use rose sharply (reaching 30.6 per 
cent, up from 19.5 per cent in 2011); at the same time, 
several perception indicators (including parental disap-
proval) showed significant shifts towards greater accept-
ability of cannabis use and a decrease in the perception of 
risk.35
One study of already socially excluded young people who 
were living in impoverished areas in the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, where there were 
changing illicit drug markets and few opportunities in the 
local economy, found that young people experienced an 
erosion of normative cultural barriers between recreational 
and problematic drug use and had an increased risk of 
transitioning from cannabis to heroin use.36 This is likely 
to be true for similarly impoverished groups in the rapidly 
changing drug markets of developing countries. 
A review of over 50 articles on school-based education 
programmes to prevent the use of drugs and other sub-
stances identified various cultural components used to 
adapt the programmes to different schools and settings 
and evaluated whether the inclusion of such components 
enhanced outcomes. The study found that among the 
components that enhanced the outcomes for participants 
in the school-based drug use prevention programmes was 
the incorporation of positive values of the participants’ 
cultural and ethnic identities, such as religiosity.37 
Migration and drug use
Target 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible 
migration and mobility of people, including 
through the implementation of planned and 
well-managed migration policies
One of the numerous perils of migration is that it can 
affect drug use patterns not only because it may expose 
35 Chile, Servicio Nacional para la Prevención y Rehabilitación del 
Consumo de Drogas y Alcohol, Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad 
Pública, “Décimo estudio nacional de drogas en población escolar: 
principales resultados nacionales” (Santiago de Chile, Observatorio 
Chileno de Drogas, 2014).
36 Robert MacDonald and Jane Marsh, “Crossing the Rubicon: youth 
transitions, poverty, drugs and social exclusion”, International Jour-
nal of Drug Policy, vol.13, No. 1 (2002), pp. 27-38.
37 Anne M. Gewin and Bobby Hoffman, “Introducing the cultural 
variables in school-based substance abuse prevention”, Drugs: Edu-
cation, Prevention and Policy, vol. 23, No. 1 (2016), pp. 1-14.
migrants to new drugs, but also because migrants often 
find themselves living in new and challenging circum-
stances away from the support of their families and other 
networks. A UNODC study in Afghanistan, in which 
interviews were conducted with more than 3,000 people 
who had been using drugs (opium, cannabis, heroin and 
tranquillizers) for more than six months on a regular basis, 
found that 26 per cent of the people interviewed had 
started using drugs in the Islamic Republic of Iran and 8 
per cent had started using drugs in Pakistan.38 Participants 
in focus-group discussions in all provinces mentioned that 
the problems faced by migrants could drive them to use 
drugs. An earlier study in Afghanistan yielded similar 
results; of the opium users, 40 per cent (all men) had ini-
tiated their opiate use in the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
4 per cent had initiated their opiate use in Pakistan.39 
While migration itself can directly affect drug use patterns, 
the absence of safe and accessible channels for migration 
contributes (together with various root causes such as envi-
ronmental disasters, conflict and political and social 
upheaval) to the displacement of populations, the forma-
tion of communities of internally displaced persons and 
refugees and the deterioration of many aspects of life, exac-
erbating poverty and creating unemployment. This leads 
to conditions conducive to the emergence of illicit drug 
use, which may arise, for example, as an escape from social 
stress and post-conflict conditions. 
Studies on the mental health of populations displaced by 
conflict have brought out the links with post-traumatic 
stress disorder and depression, both potential triggers for 
initiating or escalating drug use.40 Research conducted in 
six settings of protracted displacement for refugees and 
internally displaced people — in Iran (Islamic Republic 
of ), Kenya, Liberia, Pakistan, Thailand and northern 
Uganda — found that a range of narcotic drugs, psycho-
active substances and other substances, such as opiates, 
khat, benzodiazepines and alcohol, contributed to wide-
reaching health, social and protection problems. The study 
also found that displacement experiences, including dis-
possession, livelihood restriction, hopelessness and an 
uncertain future may make communities particularly vul-
nerable to drug use and its effects, and changing social 
norms and networks (including the population in the sur-
rounding area) may result in changed and potentially more 
harmful patterns of use and resultant social costs.41 
38 Impacts of Drug Use on Users and Their Families in Afghanistan (see 
footnote 17).
39 UNODC, “Drug use in Afghanistan: 2009 survey – executive sum-
mary” (2009).
40 Zachary Steel and others, “Association of torture and other poten-
tially traumatic events with mental health outcomes among pop-
ulations exposed to mass conflict and displacement: a systematic 
review and meta analysis”, Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion, vol. 302, No. 5 (2009), pp. 537-549.
41 Nadine Ezard and others, “Six rapid assessments of alcohol and 
other substance use in populations displaced by conflict”, Conflict 
and Health, vol. 5, No. 1 (2011).
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Migrants can develop problems related to the use of drugs 
and other substances while in their country of origin, in 
transit, in temporary refuge or in resettlement, and a vari-
ety of risk factors for developing drug dependence in those 
settings have been reported, including male gender, expo-
sure to war trauma, displacement and coexisting mental 
health problems.42 
Links between social exclusion, stigma  
and drug use
Target 10.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
By 2030, empower and promote the social,  
economic and political inclusion of all
Target 10.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of 
outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory 
laws, policies and practices and promoting appro-
priate legislation, policies and action in this regard
Clearly, not all people who use drugs are marginalized and 
not all marginalized people are people who use drugs. 
Nevertheless, marginalization can be viewed as contribut-
ing to drug use, just as drug use can be viewed as contrib-
uting to the marginalization of some users: drug use can 
cause a deterioration in living conditions, while processes 
of social marginalization can be a reason for initiating drug 
use.43
Since marginalization is not easy to measure directly, it 
does not lend itself to quantitative research. However, sev-
eral categorical risk factors for marginalization have been 
shown to be linked to drug use, including unemployment, 
homelessness, incarceration, sex work and vulnerable 
youth (such as young victims of family abuse and 
violence).44 For example, a cohort study among homeless 
people in the four largest cities of the Netherlands (Amster-
dam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) found that can-
nabis had been used in the past month by 43 per cent of 
adult homeless people and by 63 per cent of young home-
less people.45 A study carried out in Ireland found 67 per 
cent of homeless ex-prisoners to be drug-dependent.46 
High-risk behaviours, such as injecting drug use and shar-
ing injecting equipment, are also reported to be high 
among homeless people.47 Research conducted in 2015 
by Homeless Link, a charitable company in the United 
42 Kamaldeep Bhui and Nasir Warfa, “Drug consumption in conflict 
zones in Somalia”, PLoS Medicine, vol. 4, No. 12 (2007).
43 EMCDDA, Annual Report 2003: The State of the Drugs Problem in 
the European Union and Norway (Lisbon, 2003).
44 Ibid.
45 Margriet van Laar and others, Report to the EMCDDA by the Reitox 
National Focal Point: The Netherlands Drug Situation 2014 (Lisbon, 
2015).
46 Claire Hickey, Crime and Homelessness 2002 (Dublin, Focus Ireland 
and PACE, 2002).
47 Annual Report 2003:The State of the Drugs Problem in the European 
Union and Norway.
Kingdom, found that 34 per cent of people “sleeping 
rough” (sleeping in uncomfortable conditions, typically 
outdoors) had used heroin in the previous month and 37 
per cent had used “crack” or cocaine.48 Elsewhere, a study 
focusing on the profile of regular49 users of “crack” or 
similar smokeable forms of cocaine (thus excluding cocaine 
salt) in Brazil50 found that more than a third of those users 
spent a significant time on the streets and that less than a 
quarter of them had been to secondary school, although 
more than 95 per cent had been in school at some point 
in their lives. The study also found that more than 70 per 
cent of the users shared their drug using equipment, a pat-
tern which raises concerns about the transmission of infec-
tions, especially viral hepatitis. Moreover, prevalence of 
HIV among these users was eight times higher than the 
prevalence rate in the general population of Brazil (5.0 per 
cent versus 0.6 per cent).
Drug use itself can also contribute to marginalization. In 
some societies, the stigma of being drug users and dis-
crimination drive people who use drugs to the margins of 
society. People with drug use disorders are frequently dis-
tanced from their communities and families. The margin-
alization and stigmatization of people who regularly use 
drugs also have a negative impact on their employment 
opportunities and social relationships. Stigma and social 
exclusion can lead to a loss of human capital, as people 
who use drugs are unable to contribute to or participate 
48 Stephen Holland, “Homeless health data finds heroin and cocaine 
dependency more prevalent amongst women than men”, 5 August 
2015. Available at www.homeless.org.uk/.
49 A “regular user” was defined as a person who had used the sub-
stances on 25 days or more in the previous six months.
50 Brazil, National Drug Policy Secretariat, “Perfil dos usuários de 
crack e/ou similares no Brasil” (Rio de Janeiro, 2013).
FIG. 5 Living situation of regular “crack” users 
in Brazil
Source: A Profile of Users of Crack and/or Similar Drugs in Brazil 
(Brazil, National Drug Policy Secretariat, 2013).
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in a range of community activities such as civic duties, 
voluntary work, sports clubs, religious gatherings and cul-
tural events. Stigma also contributes to poor mental and 
physical health, non-completion of drug treatment and 
increased involvement in high-risk behaviour such as shar-
ing injecting equipment.51 
Drug dependence and unemployment:  
a vicious cycle
There is a clear positive association between drug depend-
ence and social disadvantage, including unemployment 
and poverty. The relationship between drug use and 
employment status is complex and characterized by recip-
rocal causality: drug use exacerbates the risk of unemploy-
ment, while unemployment increases the risk of drug use.
Drug use can hamper a person’s employment prospects by 
reducing productivity and the chance of finding work. 
Conversely, unemployment can cause stress and anxiety, 
financial difficulties, dissatisfaction and disaffection, which 
are all risk factors for initiation, perpetuation, intensifica-
tion or resumption of drug use. In the United States, for 
example, the prevalence of past-month use of any drug 
among the population aged 18 years or older averaged 18 
per cent among the unemployed, 10 per cent among part-
time workers, 8 per cent among full-time workers and less 
than 6 per cent among those in the “other” category, such 
as retirees.52 Data from EMCDDA for 30 European coun-
tries53 suggest that, as of 2013, among all persons access-
ing treatment for drug use disorders who were in the 
labour force, at least half were unemployed.54 A UNODC 
study on drug use in Afghanistan also found distinct links 
between drug use and employment status.55 
A detailed breakdown of employment status among past-
month users of drugs in the United States brings out dif-
ferent levels of association between drug use and 
unemployment across the various drug types. Heroin, 
methamphetamine and “crack” cocaine were the drugs 
most closely associated with unemployment, both in terms 
of the unemployment rate among past-month users and 
51 James D. Livingston and others, “The effectiveness of interventions 
for reducing stigma related to substance use disorders: a systematic 
review”, Addiction, vol. 107, No. 1 (2012), pp. 39-50.
52 Alejandro Badel and Brian Greaney, “Exploring the link between 
drug use and job status in the U.S.”, Regional Economist, July 2013. 
Available at www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/
july-2013/exploring-the-link-between-drug-use-and-job-status-in-
the-us.
53 These data refer to the 28 member States of the European Union, 
Norway and Turkey.
54 Fifty per cent corresponds to the proportion of entrants classified as 
“unemployed/discouraged”, among the total of number of entrants 
with known employment status, excluding students. This total 
includes persons whose status was classified as “other” as well as 
“receiving social benefits/pensioners/house-makers/disabled”. It is 
likely that these categories include people who are not in the labour 
force; if this were taken into account, the proportion of unem-
ployed people would be higher.
55 Impacts of Drug Use on Users and Their Families in Afghanistan.
in terms of the increased likelihood of being a past-month 
user among the unemployed (compared with employed 
people). The unemployment rate among past-month 
heroin users was 38 per cent, while unemployed people 
were almost 10 times more likely to be heroin users than 
people in full-time employment (prevalence rates of 0.59 
per cent and 0.060 per cent, respectively). The association 
was much stronger in the case of “crack” cocaine than 
cocaine in general (see figures 6 and 7).
There are several mechanisms whereby problem drug use 
can affect an individual’s chances of finding and keeping 
a job. First, people with drug use disorders can suffer from 
a range of serious personal, health, lifestyle and other prob-
lems that need to be addressed before they are in a position 
either to complete welfare-to-work programmes success-
fully or to take up and retain paid employment.56 Second, 
drug use may be associated with other factors, such as lack 
of qualifications, low levels of literacy and poor employ-
ment histories, which themselves reduce the competiveness 
56 Peter A. Kemp and Joanne Neale, “Employability and problem drug 
users”, Critical Social Policy, vol. 25, No. 1 (2015), pp. 28-46.
FIG. 6 Unemploymenta among past-month drug 
users in the United States, by drug type, 
2013
Source: United States, National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA), Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2013; data extracted 
from the National Addiction and HIV Data Archive Program, 
hosted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research at the University of Michigan (http://doi.org/10.3886/
ICPSR35509.v3).
a For details, including an explanation of the methodological differences 
in the unemployment rate based on data from the National Survey on 
Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
see the online methodology section of the present report.
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of people who use drugs on the job market.57 Third, addi-
tional barriers may arise from social circumstances, such 
as the exclusion of people from job opportunities because 
of a criminal record and the stigmatization of people who 
use drugs, with the resultant discriminatory practices by 
employers and providers of social services (such as child-
care). Fourth, many people with drug use disorders may 
be acutely aware that limited skills, poor or no qualifica-
tions, gaps in their work history, particularly related to 
imprisonment, and a criminal record can make looking 
for a job extremely challenging, to the extent that it may 
seem a pointless venture.58
Drug use can limit the opportunities of a person entering 
or remaining in the workforce, whereas frustration caused 
by the failure to find adequate employment can increase 
drug consumption, creating a vicious cycle, particularly 
in the case of drug-dependent persons. 
57 Harry Sumnall and Angelina Brotherhood, Social Reintegration and 
Employment: Evidence and Interventions for Drug Users in Treatment, 
EMCDDA Insights No. 13 (Luxembourg, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2012).
58 J. Spencer and others, Getting Problem Drug Users (Back) into 
Employment (London, United Kingdom Drug Policy Commission, 
2008).
How stigma can affect the effectiveness  
of drug responses 
Just as a good level of social development enhances the 
efficacy of government efforts to counter the drug prob-
lem, deficiencies in the social milieu may hamper efforts 
to reduce illicit drug supply and demand. In particular, 
the stigmatizing attitudes towards people who use drugs 
that may extend to staff in health-care services can get in 
the way of their ability to deliver effective treatment to 
drug users. 
Several studies have identified stigma as a significant bar-
rier to accessing health-care and treatment services for drug 
users, with some health-care providers holding negative 
beliefs about people with drug use disorders, including 
overuse of system resources, non-investment in their own 
health, abuse of the system through drug-seeking and 
diversion, and failure to adhere to recommended treatment 
and care.59, 60 Surveys of health professionals have indi-
cated that they may hold negative or stereotypical views 
of people with drug dependence, which are likely to com-
promise the provision of high-quality care, while studies 
of nurses found that negative and punitive attitudes 
towards people who use drugs are relatively common. 
Judgmental, unsympathetic or hostile attitudes and views 
held by health professionals are likely to discourage indi-
viduals with drug-related problems from accessing health-
care services.61
Generally, PWID may be perceived as a threat to health-
care staff, as well as the community, because they are a 
potential cause of fear and vigilance, partly as a result of 
the perceived threat of needle-related injuries and of trans-
mission of blood-borne viruses. A study to examine the 
extent of discrimination and stigma related to hepatitis C 
infection experienced by 274 PWID in Sydney, Australia, 
found that over half (52 per cent) reported discrimination 
in health-care settings as a result of having tested positive 
for hepatitis C, and 65 per cent reported that such dis-
crimination was a result of being a drug user, with females 
more likely than males to experience discrimination 
because of their status with regard to hepatitis C.62 Accord-
ing to UNAIDS, health-care services may even exclude 
PWID or treat them badly when they ask for help.63
59 Livingston and others, “The effectiveness of interventions for reduc-
ing stigma related to substance use disorders”.
60 T. M. Ronzani, J. Higgings-Biddle and E. F. Furtado, “Stigmati-
zation of alcohol and other drug users by primary care providers 
in Southeast Brazil”, Social Science and Medicine, vol. 69, No. 7 
(2009), pp. 1080-1084. 
61 Natalie Skinner and others, “Stigma and discrimination in health-
care provision to drug users: the role of values, affect, and deserv-
ingness judgments”, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, vol. 37, 
No. 1 (2007), pp. 163-186.
62 Shah E. Habib and Lester V. Adorjany, “Hepatitis C and injecting 
drug use: the realities of stigmatization and discrimination”, Health 
Education Journal, vol. 62, No. 3 (2003), pp. 256-265.
63 The Gap Report (see footnote 5).
FIG. 7 Increased likelihood of being a past-month 
drug user among the unemployed popu-
lation, compared with the population in 
full-time employment in the United States, 
by drug type, 2013
Source: United States, National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 
SAMHSA, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2013; data extracted 
from the National Addiction and HIV Data Archive Program, 
hosted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research at the University of Michigan (http://doi.org/10.3886/
ICPSR35509.v3).
a See the online methodology section of the present report.
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The punitive approaches of law enforcement authorities 
with regard to people who use drugs can contribute to 
their marginalization, particularly when those approaches 
lead to high levels of incarceration (for a more detailed 
discussion, see the subsection entitled “Criminal 
justice”).
Drug responses and social development
Target 3.5 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Strengthen the prevention and treatment of 
substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse 
 and harmful use of alcohol
Drug demand reduction efforts and the entire continuum 
of care for people who use drugs, when successful, reduce 
drug use and therefore its impact on public health. The 
benefits affect both the people who use drugs and society 
in general, and such efforts have proved effective in 
preventing the transmission of, for example, HIV and viral 
hepatitis. Drug use prevention programmes have also been 
shown to lead to a decrease in a range of other risky 
behaviours, such as aggressiveness and truancy.
Effective strategies for countering the drug problem exist, 
but it takes a well-developed framework to implement 
them effectively. Even at the level of monitoring the extent 
of drug use, developed countries are typically better placed 
than developing countries to assess the extent of the prob-
lem. For example, heroin use in Europe has undergone a 
significant decline in recent years, and this improvement 
has been attributed in part to increased effectiveness in 
drug demand reduction efforts, specifically a dramatic 
increase in treatment availability, which removed a signif-
icant proportion of the demand from the market.64 
Experience has provided an abundance of evidence on how 
drug demand reduction programmes can have a positive 
impact.65, 66 Programmes are more effective when they 
recognize that drug use can be the result of multiple causes, 
and when they incorporate not only drug-specific 
components, but also skills that help individuals to deal 
effectively with the challenges of each phase of life, such 
as relationship skills for adolescents or parenting skills for 
parents. The results are also enhanced when the 
interventions employ and expand the use of evidence-
based tools systematically. Moreover, the entire continuum 
of care interventions can be even more effective when it 
incorporates evidence-based measures aimed at minimizing 
the adverse public health and social consequences of drug 
abuse, including appropriate medication-assisted therapy 
programmes, injecting equipment programmes as well as 
64 EMCDDA, Annual Report 2012: The State of the Drugs Problem in 
Europe (Lisbon, 2012).
65 “International standards for the treatment of drug use disorders: 
draft for field testing” (E/CN.7/2016/CRP.4).
66 See UNODC, International Standards On Drug Use Prevention 
(Vienna, March 2013).
antiretroviral therapy and other relevant interventions that 
prevent the transmission of HIV, viral hepatitis and other 
blood-borne diseases associated with drug use. The 
implementation of evidence-based programmes remains 
at very low levels of coverage in many parts of the world67 
and is still under-funded.68
Impact of alternative development on social 
development
When successful, alternative development programmes 
also lead to the broader development of the affected com-
munities. In Myanmar, for example, alternative develop-
ment projects in Wa Special Region 2 resulted in several 
benefits on the health front: vaccinations reduced infant 
mortality and eliminated leprosy among children; and 
electricity and potable water were brought to some town-
ships. In Thailand, alternative development resulted in 
increased access to education, health services and potable 
water, with a resulting decline in the incidence of malaria 
and smallpox. In Pakistan, alternative development efforts 
in Dir District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-
West Frontier Province), resulted in the provision of drink-
ing water infrastructure, an effective immunization 
programme and the improvement of roads, thereby 
enhancing accessibility to social services. Alternative devel-
opment programmes often create and strengthen social 
organizations and generally enhance the level of organiza-
tion of rural communities, enabling progress on various 
fronts, especially when such programmes encourage the 
direct participation of beneficiaries in the design, planning 
and implementation of projects. A discussion of the social 
component of alternative development, including detailed 
examples, can be found in chapter II of the World Drug 
Report 2015.
Availability of drugs for medical and scientific 
purposes
Target 3.b of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Support the research and development of vaccines 
and medicines […], provide access to affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines, […]
Target 3.b of the Sustainable Development Goals is closely 
linked to the objective of drug control, which is to ensure 
access to controlled drugs for medical and research pur-
poses while preventing diversion and abuse. In the pream-
ble to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 
as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the parties to the Con-
vention recognized that the medical use of narcotic drugs 
continues to be indispensable for the relief of pain and 
suffering and that adequate provision must be made to 
ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes. 
67 David P. Wilson and others, “The cost-effectiveness of harm reduc-
tion”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 26, Suppl. No. 1 
(2015), pp. S5-S11.
68 UNAIDS, Halving HIV transmission among people who inject 
drugs: Background note, document UNAIDS/PCB (35)/14.27.
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Notwithstanding the clear intentions of the control system, 
5.5 billion people, or three quarters of the world’s popula-
tion, have little or no access to medicines containing nar-
cotic drugs and have inadequate access to treatment for 
moderate to severe pain. WHO estimates that each year 
5.5 million terminal cancer patients and 1 million end-
stage HIV/AIDS patients, as well as many other people 
with chronic, non-malignant pain, suffer untreated or 
under-treated moderate to severe pain, including 800,000 
patients with lethal injuries caused by accidents and vio-
lence, patients with chronic illnesses, patients recovering 
from surgery, women in labour (110 million births per 
year) and paediatric patients.69 
While some controlled substances play an important role 
in the management of pain and other medical uses, in 
some countries the strategies in place to prevent the abuse, 
misuse and diversion of controlled substances may some-
times affect the availability of those substances. Human 
Rights Watch reviewed the national drug control strategies 
of 29 countries and found that 25 of them failed to iden-
tify the issue of ensuring availability of controlled sub-
stances for medical and scientific use as an objective or to 
outline specific measures on this issue.70 
Impact of other drug responses on social  
development
There are other ways in which the response to the drug 
problem, particularly efforts to counter the illicit supply 
of drugs, may impact health and social development. Erad-
ication of illicitly cultivated crops, if not adequately com-
plemented by initiatives to provide alternative livelihoods, 
may impact the livelihood of already poor farmers and 
their families. These aspects are discussed below, in the 
sections on economic development and environmental 
sustainability. 
Furthermore, when the response to illicit drug use neglects 
the health aspects of drug use and treats the problem exclu-
sively as a criminal offence, excessively focusing on pun-
ishment, consequences can ensue for the well-being of 
people who use drugs, of prison populations and of society 
in general. These aspects are discussed below, in the sub-
section on criminal justice. 
Finally, when the response to the drug problem fails to 
take into account the particular needs of women, it may 
contribute to undermining the objectives of gender parity 
and of the empowerment of women and girls. This applies 
not only to direct interventions against the drug problem 
but also to the monitoring of drug use, as women are likely 
to be under-represented in research identifying prevalence, 
needs, risks and outcomes of drug use, leading to a gap in 
69 WHO, Ensuring Balance in National Policies on Controlled Sub-
stances: Guidance for Availability and Accessibility of Controlled Medi-
cines (Geneva, 2011).
70 Human Rights Watch, “National drug control strategies and access 
to controlled medicines” (2015).
appropriate policy development and continuing to per-
petuate a lack of understanding of women’s specific needs 
and issues in that area.71 
B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Various Sustainable Development Goals and targets make 
reference to economic aspects, but Goal 8, dealing with 
economic growth, and Goal 1, dealing with poverty, are 
probably the two most relevant in analysing the links 
between economic development and the drug problem.
Poverty, economic disadvantage and unemployment are 
some of the enabling factors of illicit crop cultivation and 
drug production. Economic aspects can also have an 
impact on the evolution of illicit drug markets, as varia-
tions in income levels and purchasing power may influence 
drug consumption patterns. Just as economic development 
has an impact on illicit drug markets, the drug problem 
can also have economic ramifications. The economic cost 
of drug use that is incurred, for example, when drug-using 
segments of the workforce do not receive adequate treat-
ment, can impact on productivity. The costs associated 
with efforts by state institutions to help people who use 
drugs, such as efforts to provide treatment and rehabilita-
tion, as well as law enforcement efforts, can also have an 
impact on government budgets. 
Sustainable Development Goal 8. 
Promote sustained, inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth, full 
and productive employment and 
decent work for all
Impact of economic development on the 
drug problem
One way to look at how economic development affects 
the drug problem is to compare the latter across different 
countries on the basis of their economic development. 
Such an analysis provides a simplified view, as there are a 
multitude of factors that can play a role in shaping the 
drug problem of each country. Proximity to a drug-pro-
ducing area or to a major drug trafficking route, for exam-
ple, explains more than economic development the higher 
than global rates of opiate use in the Near and Middle East 
and South-West Asia or the higher rates of cocaine use 
(including “crack” cocaine) in South America and West 
Africa. Nevertheless, a global macrolevel analysis can still 
provide insights into how economic development may 
have a bearing on the drug problem, although the rela-
tionship between development and the drug problem 
needs to be viewed in dynamic terms. 
71 A. Roberts, B. Mathers and L. Degenhardt, Women Who Inject 
Drugs: A Review of Their Risks, Experiences and Needs (Sydney, 
National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, 2010). 
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Some patterns manifest themselves at the global level and 
can be seen in cross-country comparisons based on 
national indicators; other patterns are intrinsically tied to 
variations within countries and can be observed from 
socioeconomic indicators at the subnational level. Some 
patterns are evident when all drug types are considered 
together, some emerge when focusing on a single drug 
type and others can be observed in the interplay and the 
trade-offs between different drugs.
Economic development and drug use
The present section examines three overarching patterns 
whereby the level of economic well-being can influence 
drug use. First, the analysis uses cross-country comparisons 
to explore to what extent higher national income is con-
ducive to the formation of illicit drug markets. Second, it 
uses subnational data to examine poverty, together with 
other forms of economic and social disadvantage,72 as a 
risk factor for drug use. Third, it explores the relationship 
between socioeconomic status and different patterns of 
drug use.
The first pattern emerges from analysing indicators of drug 
use and economic development at the national level, as 
past-year use of drugs of all types is higher in “high-
72 In addition to the discussion of poverty in this section, see the 
discussion of social exclusion in the section entitled “Social develop-
ment”. 
FIG. 8 Prevalence of past-year use of drugs 
among persons aged 15-64, by drug  
category and national income, 2013
Source: World Bank (for income levels) and UNODC estimates 
based on responses to the annual report questionnaire and other 
official sources (for drug use data).
* Including prescription stimulants.
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FIG. 9 Prevalence of past-year use of opiates and 
cocaine versus per capita gross domestic 
product in countries with national data, 
2013 or the latest year for which data are 
available
Source: World Bank (for per capita gross domestic product (GDP)) 
and national data and estimates based on responses to the annual 
report questionnaire and other official sources (for drug use data).
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income” countries. As figures 8 and 9 show, cocaine is the 
drug most clearly associated with high income. The asso-
ciation between the problem of drug use and development 
can also be noted in terms of disability-adjusted life years 
(see figure 3, page 65).
Development and the evolution of drug use 
and consumer markets
Drugs that command a relatively high price, and ulti-
mately greater profits for traffickers, may find an easier 
foothold in countries with relatively higher levels of per 
capita income. Although historically there have been dif-
ferent dynamics (including licit use) that have triggered 
the onset of the use of certain drugs, it is likely that income 
levels play an important role in enabling drug use to take 
hold and consolidate. Estimates by United States authori-
ties show the magnitude of the amounts spent on drugs: 
in 2010, people in the United States who used a drug at 
least four times a month spent an average of $10,600 a 
year on cocaine, $17,500 on heroin and $7,860 on meth-
amphetamine.73 Total annual national expenditure related 
to the purchase of drugs amounted to $28 billion spent 
on cocaine, $27 billion on heroin and $13 billion on 
methamphetamine. 
High-income countries are likely to have above-average 
drug prices and to be more attractive to international drug 
traffickers. This is particularly the case for cocaine and 
heroin, which originate in confined and well-defined areas 
of production, creating a scenario in which consumers 
worldwide compete for a product with a concentrated 
supply and leading to a situation in which supply gravi-
tates to those places where the largest profits are to be 
made. In contrast, cannabis and, to a certain extent, some 
kinds of ATS can be sourced locally and on a very small 
scale, sometimes even by self-sufficient consumers. 
This may help to explain, for example, why relatively 
undeveloped countries in Africa, which is not located near 
cocaine and heroin production areas, have typically had 
relatively low rates of cocaine and heroin use (prior to 
some of them becoming cocaine or heroin transit areas), 
whereas the same cannot be said of the prevalence rates of 
cannabis use, which have tended to be even higher than 
the global average. The use of unprocessed drugs such as 
opium and coca leaf remains largely confined to the places 
in which they are cultivated, where they have been used 
for centuries, while their derivatives have not always found 
a large market in the countries of origin. Heroin use, for 
example, is quite low in Latin American countries, 
although opium is cultivated in the subregion and is also 
processed into heroin. 
Just as different drug categories display different patterns, 
different drug subcategories may also explain some of the 
complexities of illicit drug markets. For example, although 
73 B. Kilmer and others, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 
2000-2010 (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 2014).
the prevalence of past-year use of cocaine in South America 
is not very different from the figure for North America, 
the majority of cocaine users in the United States use 
cocaine in salt form, whereas in South America the use of 
other forms of cocaine (in base form) appears to be much 
more widespread. Moreover, some of the “products” con-
sumed in base form in South America are siphoned off 
from intermediate stages of the cocaine-processing chain, 
when they may still contain high levels of impurities and 
are thus usually considered to have less potential to fetch 
high prices. In contrast, even “crack” cocaine (used for 
smoking) in the United States is believed to be obtained 
from a reverse step that reverts to base form (in this case, 
“crack”) from salt form. Another possible illustration of 
this pattern is the case of the domestic heroin market in 
India. Reports by the Government of India indicate that 
heroin in the domestic retail market is considered to be of 
“low value” and that this reflects a distinct market from 
the heroin transiting India  from Afghanistan and headed 
for other destinations. 
Within the same country, different sub-types of a given 
drug category may have quite different patterns of associa-
tion with the socioeconomic status of users. Economic 
well-being is not necessarily homogenous within a country 
and different subgroups may use different drugs to differ-
ing degrees. Indeed, certain links between drug use and 
socioeconomic well-being, such as income levels and 
employment status, are only visible at the subnational or 
community level.
For example, in the United States, the association of drug 
use with unemployment status is quite different in the case 
of cocaine salt and “crack” cocaine (see figures 6 and 7 in 
the section entitled “Social development”). Although this 
is sometimes attributed to “crack” being cheaper than 
cocaine salt, it is not clear whether, or in which sense, price 
can be a determining factor; one study,74 based on data 
covering cities in the United States, determined that, in 
purity-adjusted terms, there were no consistent differences 
between prices of “crack” and cocaine salt. The study ten-
tatively suggests that, given typical transaction sizes in 
practice, the minimum cost for achieving intoxication was 
frequently lower. However, data from a later study75 indi-
cate that the median costs of “crack” and cocaine transac-
tions are comparable ($27 for cocaine salt versus $25 for 
“crack” cocaine). Because of their different modes of 
administration, the typical experience associated with 
“crack” use is shorter but reportedly more intense than 
that of cocaine salt, so it can be argued that users of cocaine 
salt would need to spend more to achieve the same level 
of intensity. The differences may also extend to the poten-
tial for users to develop tolerance and dependence.
74 Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Is crack cheaper than (powder) cocaine?”, 
Addiction, vol. 92, No. 11 (1997) , pp. 1437-1443.
75 Kilmer and others, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 
2000-2010.
78
Generally, even though wealthy societies appear to be more 
vulnerable to drug consumption, within those societies, 
economic and social disadvantage is a significant risk factor 
for drug consumption to translate into drug dependence 
and drug use disorders. Poverty is associated with drug use 
disorders, not because of any link with discretionary 
income but because poor people are more vulnerable and 
more likely to live on the margins of society. It is relative 
poverty and marginalization within one country that 
affects the development of drug use disorders, rather than 
absolute levels of income. Moreover, drug use can itself 
exacerbate poverty and marginalization, creating the 
potential for a vicious cycle. 
Higher socioeconomic groups may play a separate role in 
facilitating the onset of recreational use as a first step in 
the subsequent formation and consolidation of illicit drug 
markets. The mechanisms that drive this interaction merit 
further study, but they may be attributable to a higher 
propensity to experiment, higher income levels, higher 
association with an urban location of residence and dif-
ferent patterns of entertainment among people in the 
higher socioeconomic brackets. A study on cannabis use 
demonstrated this phenomenon by drawing on evidence 
from France, Germany and the United States. The study 
showed how, at the outset, it was mostly well-educated 
men in the countries examined who started to experiment 
with cannabis use. Gradually, this shifted to men with low 
levels of education. Women followed at lower rates and 
the change was not as marked; moreover, the people who 
transitioned to daily cannabis use were predominantly 
those in the lower socioeconomic bracket.76
76 Legleye and others, “Is there a cannabis epidemic model? Evidence 
from France, Germany and USA”. International Journal of Drug 
Policy, vol. 25, No. 6 (2014), pp. 1103-1112.
This pattern is also consistent with data on drug use in 
Colombia, which show very distinct patterns for past-year 
drug use and for drug use disorders in different socioeco-
nomic classes. In the case of cannabis and “ecstasy”, for 
example, there is a progressive increase in rates of occa-
sional (past-year) use with higher levels of socioeconomic 
status (see figure 10), but overall drug use disorders are 
associated with the lower socioeconomic classes.
Sustainable Development Goal 1. 
End poverty in all its forms 
everywhere
As mentioned earlier, poverty is a significant risk factor 
for drug use; conversely, drug use itself frequently places 
a significant strain on the finances of people with drug 
dependence and on their families’ finances. The extent of 
the financial strain brought about by drug use may be 
related not only to the price of a drug but also to the 
potential of the person using the drug to develop a toler-
ance to that particular drug, and hence to its pharmaco-
logical properties. In the case of heroin, for example, it is 
believed that experienced users may seek much higher 
doses than first-time users. People with fewer economic 
resources who use drugs may also be exposed to higher 
levels of harm as they resort to cheaper variants of drugs. 
Lower prices may be associated with lower purity levels, 
which imply higher health risks because of the presence 
of adulterants, by-products and other substances.
The financial difficulties experienced by people with drug 
dependence are often corroborated by the methods found 
to have been adopted to generate income. One study in 
NO 
POVERTY
FIG. 10 Prevalence of past-year drug use and of drug abuse or dependencea in Colombia,  
by socioeconomic class,b 2013 
Source: Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia, Estudio Nacional de Consumo de Sustancias Psicoactivas en Colombia — 2013, June 2014.
a “Dependence” is defined according to the ICD-10 criteria of the World Health Organization, and “abuse” is defined according to the DSM-IV criteria 
of the American Psychiatric Association.
b The socioeconomic classes were ranked so that class 1 was the least wealthy and class 6 the most wealthy.
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Brazil focused on the profile of regular77 users of “crack” 
or other similar smokeable forms of cocaine (thus exclud-
ing cocaine salt).78 The study estimated that 13 per cent 
of users had resorted to begging as a source of income 
during the preceding 30 days, 7.5 per cent were sex work-
ers or had exchanged sex for money, 6 per cent had resorted 
to illicit activities linked to the sale or distribution of drugs 
and 9 per cent had resorted to other illicit activities. 
Low income levels are relevant not only in themselves, but 
also in relation to the context and the society in which an 
individual lives, as income inequality within a society may 
contribute to the marginalization of the less wealthy. As 
discussed in the World Drug Report 2012, an analysis based 
on Gini coefficients indicated that countries with high 
levels of inequality (Gini coefficients exceeding 50) tended 
to face relatively higher levels of drug problems, mostly as 
transit or production countries. Societies characterized by 
high income inequality tend to be more prone to crime, 
and in some extremely unequal societies, members of mar-
ginalized groups may view involvement in criminal activi-
ties such as drug trafficking as the only feasible strategy for 
upward social mobility. Similarly, without realistic hopes 
of a better future, members of those groups may become 
disillusioned and more vulnerable to illicit drug use.79
Many drug-dependent persons are trapped in a vicious 
cycle of poverty and drug use because of a wide range of 
factors, such as family breakdown, lack of education and 
limited access to employment opportunities and health 
care. However, even though the causes of poverty and 
deprivation are to some extent social, they are experienced 
individually and those who experience them have their 
own set of reasons and motivations for responding to their 
circumstances in a particular manner.80 Not everyone 
living in a poor community will succumb to drug depend-
ence and it is important to recognize that not all people 
who are drug-dependent are to be found in the poorest 
socioeconomic groups. 
In sum, poverty, together with other forms of social 
disadvantage,81 is strongly associated with drug use disor-
ders, both as a risk factor leading to drug use and as a con-
sequence of drug use. Moreover, in some countries middle 
or upper socioeconomic classes are associated with  higher 
levels of “recreational” drug use, which may simply be a 
manifestation of purchasing power or may reflect more 
willingness, or opportunities, to experiment with drug use.
77 A “regular user” was defined as a person who had used the sub-
stance on 25 days or more in the previous six months.
78 “Perfil dos usuários de crack e/ou similares no Brasil” (see footnote 
50).
79 World Drug Report 2012 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.12.XI.1), p. 88.
80 R. Young, From War to Work: Drug Treatment, Social Inclusion and 
Enterprise (London, Foreign Policy Centre, 2002).
81 In addition to the discussion of poverty in this section, see the 
discussion of social exclusion in the section entitled “Social develop-
ment”.
Are developing countries following in the  
steps of developed countries when it comes to 
patterns of drug use?
The evolution of the global markets for some drug types 
has been led by the dynamics in developed countries. This 
is clear from the history of the illicit use of synthetic drugs 
and cocaine and, based on historical qualitative assess-
ments, it is also true to a large extent for heroin — all 
drugs that require a certain degree of processing or syn-
thesis. After emerging in developed countries, over time, 
consumption eventually tends to catch on in countries 
with lower levels of development. More broadly, the evo-
lution of consumer markets in developing countries seems 
to follow patterns seen in developed countries (see the 
discussion below). 
Figure 11 shows an overall shift in cocaine use from devel-
oped to developing countries between 2000 and 2013. 
Given the lack of data, the same analysis can only be done 
for opiates in general rather than specifically for heroin 
and only since the year 2000. 
Consumption of most synthetic drugs and new psychoac-
tive substances (NPS) first emerged in the more developed 
countries before expanding in less developed countries. 
Prime examples are the emergence of methamphetamine 
in Japan and North America near the middle of the twen-
tieth century, the subsequent emergence of “ecstasy” and 
FIG. 11 Share of past-year cocaine and opiate  
users among the global population,  
cumulative with per capita gross  
domestic product, 2000 and 2013
Source: World Bank (for per capita gross domestic product (GDP)) 
and UNODC estimates based on responses to the annual report 
questionnaire and other official sources (for drug use data).
a Gross domestic product.
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concentration of 
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other hallucinogens in North America and Europe and 
the ongoing proliferation of the consumption of NPS in 
Europe, Japan and North America. It is at a later stage 
when the use of these substances expanded in less devel-
oped countries; for example, the peak in methampheta-
mine use in the United States happened between 
1995-2002, while in China methamphetamine use is a 
more recent occurrence and the available indicators do not 
yet show signs of reaching a peak (see figure 12).
The drivers of the emergence of synthetic drug markets 
in developed countries may be a combination of supply-
side and demand-side factors. On the demand side, greater 
purchasing power, as well as potentially greater inclination 
and opportunities to experiment with substances for rec-
reational purposes, may play a role. In the case of ATS, 
however, it appears that the substances’ availability for 
other purposes, including their use in medicine, together 
with the associated potential for diversion, was crucial in 
triggering the onset of misuse. In addition, technological 
innovation and the presence of a variety of precursors and 
other chemicals in the licit markets facilitated the estab-
lishment of clandestine laboratories manufacturing syn-
thetic drugs in developed countries, often close to 
demand.82
82 United Nations International Drug Control Programme, World 
Drug Report 1997 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997).
FIG. 12 Selected indicators of the use of heroin and other substances in China and the United States, 
1990-2015
Source: Office of the National Narcotics Control Commission of China; and Monitoring the Future study, Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan.
a Data for the period 1990-2001, 2006 and 2015 were not available.
b The category “other substances” includes mainly synthetic substances such as methamphetamine and ketamine; a comprehensive breakdown for all 
years was not available.
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FIG. 13 Long-term trends in drug seizures in 
Western and Central Europe, 1980-2014 
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire and other 
official sources (for data on heroin, cannabis, cocaine and ATS); 
and EMCDDA (for data on NPS).
a Excluding “ecstasy” and prescription stimulants.
b Data for NPS refer to countries covered by the early warning system 
used by EMCDDA, namely the European Union member States, Norway 
and Turkey; data on NPS for 2014 were not available.
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Apart from data on drug use, availability indicators also 
illustrate some patterns in the evolution of the develop-
ment of illicit drug markets in developed countries and a 
certain replication of those patterns in the markets of less 
developed countries. The market in Europe offers a two-
fold illustration of these dynamics: first, an apparent situ-
ation in which the market in Western and Central Europe 
may be the first to have become saturated and to have 
stabilized with respect to most drugs, with an ongoing 
surge in NPS (see figure 13); and second, an apparent 
consistent time lag between the situation in Western and 
Central Europe and the subsequent expansion in Eastern 
Europe (see figure 14). As with many other social phe-
nomena, development may accelerate the diffusion and a 
certain homogenization of the drug problem. In effect, an 
analysis of reported expert perceptions of trends in illicit 
drug use made across drug types in 2012 also points in 
this direction: while there appears to have been an overall 
stabilization in countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 
2002, other countries tend to perceive the trend as 
increasing.83
How does economic development influence 
drug trafficking?
Does globalization affect drug trafficking? 
Facilitating trade and easing trade barriers are features of 
globalization that can potentially have an impact on drug 
trafficking. While the value of trade agreements in boost-
ing economic development is not under question, by fos-
tering the expansion of trade and global transportation 
networks, trade openness may also facilitate the coopera-
tion and the formation of alliances among criminal organi-
zations in different countries. Such cooperation expands 
the power and reach of cartels to distant markets and 
thereby strengthens their ability to evade detection by local 
law enforcement. Indeed, it has been argued that globali-
zation has driven an overall decline in the retail prices of 
drugs by increasing the efficiency of their distribution, by 
reducing the risk premium involved in dealing drugs and 
by increasing the degree of competition in illicit drug 
markets.84 
Strategies adopted to facilitate trade, such as free trade 
agreements and the establishment of free trade zones, 
export-processing zones, economic areas and customs 
unions, may reduce the opportunity for law enforcement 
authorities, specifically customs authorities, to monitor 
shipments from their origin to their destination. Such 
strategies shift the onus of monitoring trade from the 
country of destination to the point of entry into the 
broader economic area. This may potentially affect not 
only trafficking in illicitly produced drugs but also, 
83 World Drug Report 2012, p. 67. 
84 Cláudia C. Storti and Paul De Grauwe, “Globalization and the 
price decline of illicit drugs”, International Journal of Drug Policy, 
vol. 20, No. 1 (2009), pp. 48-61.
FIG. 14 Comparison of seizure trends in Western 
and Central Europe and in Eastern Europe, 
by drug type, 1999-2014
Source: Based on responses to the annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
a Excluding “ecstasy” and prescription stimulants.
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depending on the specific arrangements, the diversion of 
licitly produced substances, particularly precursor 
chemicals, as the prevention of diversion comes to rely on 
internal market regulations and safeguards rather than on 
cross-border protocols. In addition, some agreements may 
extend to the free movement of people, making the 
detection and monitoring of drug traffickers more 
challenging. 
The literature presents various hypotheses about the effects 
of trade openness on the ability of the authorities to reduce 
drug trafficking. One study that examines the various 
theories concludes that trade openness decreases the 
interdiction capabilities of authorities in drug-consuming 
countries while increasing those of authorities in drug-
producing countries. It also finds that greater openness to 
trade does not have a consistently significant effect on the 
interdiction capabilities of authorities in transit countries.85 
Economic development and illicit crop  
cultivation and drug production
In the relationship between economic development and 
drugs, nowhere is the link more pronounced than in the 
case of the illicit cultivation of drug crops. Socioeconomic 
factors such as poverty and lack of sustainable livelihoods 
drive farmers in rural areas to engage in illicit crop culti-
vation and are manifestations of poor levels of develop-
85 Horace A. Bartilow and K. Eom, “Free traders and drug smugglers: 
the effects of trade openness on States’ ability to combat drug traf-
ficking”, Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 51, No. 2 (2009), 
pp. 117-145.
ment, which, alongside issues of governance, constitute 
the enablers of large-scale illicit crop cultivation in rural 
areas.
Socioeconomic data collected through UNODC crop 
monitoring surveys confirm that poverty is one of the 
enabling factors of the illicit cultivation of coca bush and 
opium poppy. For example, the latest survey of illicit cul-
tivation in Myanmar86 found that the reasons for illicit 
opium poppy cultivation were predominantly income-
related, with village headmen indicating that, on average, 
the most important use of the income generated by illicit 
opium poppy cultivation in their villages was buying food, 
followed by paying debt and paying household property 
expenses. Most village headmen reported decreases in 
income among farmers who ceased cultivating opium 
poppy. Despite this, the average income in poppy-growing 
villages was still lower than in non-poppy-growing 
villages,87 corroborating the thesis that it is the struggle 
of villagers to make ends meet that leads to their decision 
to engage in illicit cultivation.
Not all poor farmers are engaged in illicit cultivation, and 
for certain households and communities the decision to 
engage in illicit cultivations is related to development 
issues that go beyond income levels. In Afghanistan, it has 
been shown that villages growing opium poppy are further 
86 UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015: Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic and Myanmar (Bangkok, 2015).
87 The income was $1,952 per household in non-poppy-growing 
villages compared with $1,548 per household in poppy-growing 
villages.
Example of development programmes that may have triggered  
illicit cultivation  
In the mid-twentieth century, the Andean 
nations of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru coordinated efforts to develop road 
infrastructure into their Amazonian low-
lands with the goal of interconnecting the 
Andean section of the Amazon basin, from 
Venezuela to Bolivia.a The Declaration of 
the Presidents of America, resulting from a 
meeting of the Presidents of the American 
States held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 
April 1967, crystallized the scope and ambi-
tion of this massive development plan and 
included the goals of laying the foundation 
for economic integration by completing the 
Carretera Marginal de la Selva and modern-
izing agricultural food production through 
development, agrarian reform and land 
settlement. In Peru, a badly conceived agri-
cultural reform that was applied from 1970 
onwards destroyed the agricultural compa-
nies, distributing the land and properties 
of the landowners (“gamonales”) among 
their workers, leading to the loss of the jobs 
of many workers, who migrated in search 
of land and other economic opportunities. 
There was an urgent need to expand the 
agricultural land base,b since agricultural 
modernization and demographic growth, 
coupled with vastly inequitable land dis-
tribution in the Andes, made hundreds 
of thousands of farmers redundant.c 
Colonization projects emerged to direct 
and sometimes follow migration flows of 
Andean farmers seeking land or a new start 
or fleeing violence.d, e, f, g, h
Map 1 shows the location of the devel-
opment projects in the Andean subregion 
during this period, as well as the main 
locations of coca bush cultivation in the 
1990s. Colombia opened projects in Meta 
along the Ariari, at El Retorno in Guaviare, 
near Florencia Caquetá and Puerto Asís, 
Putumayo;c, g, i but preparations for con-
struction of the road only started in 2012. 
Colonization projects in Colombia were 
quickly abandoned in favour of supporting 
spontaneous colonists, an approach viewed 
as efficient and effective.i, j Colonization 
projects east of the Andes in Ecuador (not 
shown on map 1) were small in comparison, 
directly associated with providing support 
for colonists along the single and late-start-
ing oil extraction road.c, j Bolivia opened 
projects in Santa Cruz, Chapare and Alto 
Beni.e In Peru, special development projects 
began in 1980, along the Carretera Mar-
ginal de la Selva; examples being the special 
projects of Huallaga Central, Alto Huallaga 
and Pichis-Palcazú. Aimed at triggering the 
development of the local population, these 
projects enabled the settlement, with better 
development prospects, of Andean and 
coastal migrants.
Designed to bring socioeconomic devel-
opment to the subregion, overall, these 
initiatives may have inadvertently set the 
stage for the subsequent increase in coca 
bush cultivation.
a-j  See the online methodology section of 
the present report.
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from market than non-poppy-growing villages and that 
there is a relation between opium poppy cultivation and 
the absence of basic development facilities such as access 
to power grids.88 Lack of security and governance has also 
proved to increase the likelihood of individuals and com-
munities engaging in illicit cultivation.89 
Economic development can reduce the vulnerability of 
farmers to engage in illicit crop cultivation and drug pro-
duction and can bring about a sustainable reduction in 
such cultivation. One of the clearest examples of success-
fully reduced illicit crop cultivation is the case of Thailand, 
where illicit cultivation of opium poppy was reduced from 
around 17,900 ha in the crop year 1965/1966 to 129 ha 
in 2003/2004. Although progress was achieved in the con-
88 UNODC and Ministry of Counter-Narcotics of Afghanistan, 
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Socio-economic Analysis (March 
2015).
89 See World Drug Report 2015, pp. 92-97.
text of a broad set of development objectives, the reduc-
tion of illicit opium poppy cultivation was also explicitly 
recognized as one of those objectives. Indeed, the case of 
Thailand illustrates how two streams of intervention — 
economic development and drug control — have worked 
well together to help the hill tribes to benefit from the 
overall progress made and provide them with alternative 
sources of income and have led to illicit opium poppy 
cultivation remaining relatively limited since 2004 (265 
ha in 2013, the latest year for which estimates are 
available).
If development interventions are not sensitive to the vul-
nerabilities of communities to specific drug issues, they 
may inadvertently trigger dynamics that increase illicit 
cultivation. One example is the impact of large develop-
ment programmes in the early 1960s and 1970s in the 
Andean subregion, where programmes to modernize agri-
culture and develop infrastructure were initiated to bring 
socioeconomic development to the subregion. At the same 
time, these dynamics may have also set the stage for later 
increases in coca bush cultivation (see map 1 and box on 
page 82). 
In countries with large-scale illicit crop cultivation in rural 
areas, the elimination of such cultivation can have an 
impact on the income and employment opportunities of 
labourers and farmers. Only when efforts to control illicit 
crop cultivation are accompanied by development meas-
ures to ensure alternative livelihoods can communities 
enjoy positive economic development.
Two contrasting examples can be seen in Afghanistan, 
where the illicit opiate economy has created a significant 
link between the labour market and opium poppy cultiva-
tion. The opium ban enforced in Taliban-controlled ter-
ritory in the growing season 2000/2001, which resulted 
in a very pronounced drop in opium poppy cultivation, 
had a negative effect on the rural economy. It led to a sig-
nificant rise in the level of opium-denominated debt and 
a dramatic increase in levels of rural unemployment. The 
economic downturn and problems repaying accumulated 
debts led to increased migration to Pakistan and the mort-
gaging of land.90 
The 2005 opium ban in Nangarhar Province, in southern 
Afghanistan, offers a contrasting example, as it was accom-
panied by significant development investments in physical 
and social infrastructure. After the ban, Nangarhar wit-
nessed significant economic growth between 2009 and 
2011, experiencing dramatic increases in job opportunities 
and wage rates. In the lower-lying districts of the province, 
along the Kabul river, the initial response to the ban was 
often to replace opium poppy with a combination of wheat 
90 David Mansfield, Alcis Ltd and Organization for Sustainable Devel-
opment and Research, Managing Concurrent and Repeated Risks: 
Explaining the Reductions in Opium Production in Central Helmand 
between 2008 and 2011 (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evalua-
tion Unit, 2011).
MAp 5 Agricultural development projects in the 
Andean countries in the 1960s and 1970s 
and coca bush cultivation in the early 
1990s 
Source: L. M. Dávalos, K.M. Sanchez and D. Armenteras,  
“Deforestation and Coca Cultivation Rooted in 20th-Century  
Development Projects” (forthcoming).
Notes: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on 
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations.
BRAZIL
COLOMBIA
PERU
BOLIVIA
VENEZUELA
ECUADOR
CHILE
Caribbean Sea
Pacific 
Ocean
0 250 500125 km
Geographic coordinates WGS84
South America
Coca bush cultivation, 1990/1992
Development projects prior to 1979
International boundaries
84
and another cash crop (such as onions in the district of 
Surkhrud and green beans in the district of Kama), but 
many farmers adapted to the growing demand from the 
rapidly expanding urban centres of Jalalabad and Kabul, 
cultivating a wide range of annual and perennial horticul-
tural crops. Many households experienced a pronounced 
increase in income-earning opportunities; the economic 
growth is reflected in the expanding footprint of the mar-
kets in the district centres of Kama and Surkhrud, as well 
as in the district of Jani Khel.91 Although the improvement 
in Nangarhar could be observed over a number of years, 
other more recent developments related to governance 
issues now threaten to undo the progress achieved in that 
province.92
The region of San Martín in Peru is another example of 
positive economic development occurring in parallel with 
efforts to reduce illicit drug supply in rural communities 
affected by illicit cultivation. Over the period 1996-2000, 
an average of 3,700 ha of illicit coca bush cultivation were 
eradicated each year, while agricultural cooperatives were 
set up and significant international funds were invested. 
The subsequent years saw significant economic growth in 
the region, together with sustained eradication of coca 
bush, even as coca bush cultivation in the rest of Peru rose. 
In the period 2001-2009, the regional gross domestic 
product (GDP) rose by 73 per cent.
Impact of the drug problem on economic 
development
The economic impact of the drug problem is multifaceted 
and ranges from creating an economy based on illicit activ-
ities in the rural areas of developing countries affected by 
large-scale illicit crop cultivation to discouraging business 
by fuelling violence, corruption, extortion and protection 
rackets, notably in transit countries, and to creating costs 
associated with consumption for individual consumers 
and for society in general.
Economic profits are generated across the entire chain of 
illicit drug production and distribution, but it is at the 
retail stage that profits are typically highest. UNODC, for 
example, estimated that, in 2009, the average wholesale 
price of cocaine in Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Colom-
bia and Peru was only 1 per cent of the retail price in the 
United States (after taking purity levels into account), 
while the corresponding percentage in Mexico was 7 per 
cent.93, 94 As a result, in absolute terms, only a small com-
91 David Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW on Opium 
Production. Nangarhar – A Case Study (2015).
92 David Mansfield, “The devil is in the details: Nangarhar’s contin-
ued decline into insurgency, violence and widespread drug produc-
tion”, Brief Series (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit, 2016).
93 World Drug Report 2011 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.11.XI.10).
94 A discussion of the theories explaining price markup at different 
stages of the supply chain can be found in Jonathan P. Caulkins and 
ponent of the immediate economic footprint of the global 
illicit trade in heroin and cocaine is to be found in coun-
tries where illicit cultivation of coca bush and opium 
poppy is concentrated. A recent UNODC report on the 
illicit flow of trafficked opiates from Afghanistan along 
the Balkan route found that, in the period 2009-2012, the 
total gross profit averaged $357 million per year in Afghan-
istan, compared with $28 billion along the rest of the 
Balkan route. 
However, the size of the illicit economy associated with 
drugs, relative to the licit economy, tends to be higher in 
drug-producing countries than in the consumer markets. 
This is partly because the licit economy in some drug-
producing countries is relatively small and partly because 
supply is concentrated in those few countries. For example, 
UNODC estimated the total value of the illicit opiate 
economy in Afghanistan to be $2.8 billion in 2014. This 
figure, equivalent to 13 per cent of the country’s GDP, 
considerably exceeded the value of the export of licit goods 
and services in 2014.95 Based on UNODC estimates96 of 
total gross profits related to cocaine trafficking, profits in 
Colombia were equivalent to 4.1 per cent of that country’s 
GDP in 2009, compared with 0.2 per cent in the case of 
the United States and 0.36 per cent in the case of the 
United Kingdom. 
In Afghanistan, the illicit economy provides access to 
labour for a large number of farmers and a source of 
income for other people involved in the trade and has 
therefore become embedded in the licit economy.
The macroeconomic impact of the opium economy 
depends, in particular, on how much of its proceeds actu-
ally enter the Afghan economy and how this is allocated 
between consumption, investment and savings, as well as, 
more generally, how it translates into demand for domestic 
and imported goods and services. A joint study by the 
World Bank and UNODC argues that, whereas farmers 
and wage labourers can be expected to spend rather than 
save the bulk of their earnings from the opium economy, 
mostly on domestic goods and services, opium traffickers 
and processors are likely to save a substantial proportion 
of their revenue and spend more on imports. While the 
opium economy results in a significant net inflow of 
money into Afghanistan’s balance of payments, this is 
reduced by drug-related outflows of funds (including capi-
tal flight, as well as spending on imports).97, 98
Peter Reuter, “How drug enforcement affects drug prices”, in Crime 
and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 39, No. 1, Michael Tonry, ed. 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 213-272.
95 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014.
96 UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug 
Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes (Vienna, 
2011).
97 Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, eds., Afghanistan’s Drug 
Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for 
Counter-Narcotics Policy (UNODC and World Bank, 2006).
98 World Drug Report 2012, pp. 115-116.
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The cost of the drug problem and drug 
control policy: the economic perspective
In general, economic studies can be used to quantify the 
cost borne by society attributable to the drug problem. A 
review of the literature reveals 22 such studies worldwide 
(see table 1) that attempt to assess, at the national level, 
the overall cost attributable to the various aspects of the 
drug problem (or at least drug use).99 The studies go 
beyond tallying the actual monetary disbursements that 
were made in connection with drugs. While they include 
the costs associated with the various forms of intervention 
in response to the drug problem, such as prevention, treat-
ment and law enforcement (the “direct costs”), they also 
assign a value to other costs, such as the loss of productivity 
in the workplace associated with drug use (“indirect costs”). 
A large number of factors, including absenteeism, acci-
dents and conflicts in the workplace, may lead to a decline 
in productivity as a consequence of drug use. 
A review of the literature shows large variations in the cost 
of illicit drugs in the 14 countries examined. First, the cost 
99 In many cases the studies focus on drug use.
in percentage of GDP ranged from 0.07 to 1.7 per cent. 
Second, the majority of the countries registered a high 
percentage of costs attributable to drug demand and 
supply reduction interventions (such as prevention, treat-
ment and law enforcement), incurred to address the drug 
problem, as opposed to productivity losses and any other 
indirect costs. Some countries, however, were confronted 
with considerable productivity losses (57-85 per cent of 
the total cost). The lost productivity was the result of high 
levels of morbidity and premature mortality caused by 
illicit drug use; together with the high number of incar-
cerations for drug-related crime. Third, the composition 
of the costs of the response differs from country to country. 
The studies found, in most countries, high costs for law 
enforcement compared with health costs. The only excep-
tions were studies in two European countries, which reg-
istered medical costs of 60-65 per cent of the total cost of 
the interventions in response to the drug problem.
The above-mentioned cost studies were conducted mainly 
in high-income countries. Most of the studies focused on 
the costs associated with drug consumption (rather than 
drug production), by using a hypothetical scenario in 
which there was no drug use. Indeed, it appears that the 
TAblE 3 Overview of economic evaluations of the costs of the drug problem
Sources: See the online methodology section of the present report.
Notes: The studies may use different methodologies and take into account different aspects of the drug problem; hence, the results are not directly 
comparable. Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not reported separately.
a Gross domestic product.
b The cost calculation was restricted to untreated opioid dependence in one city.
c The percentage refers to public expenditure only.
d The cost calculation in the table pertains exclusively to “illicit drug abuse”.
e These two studies focus specifically on the crime-related aspect of the drug problem.
Study Period covered by the data
Cost  
per capita
Cost as a  
percentage  
of GDPa
Gonçalves, Lourenço and da Silva (2015) 2010 25 euros (1999 prices) ..
Garcia-Altés and others (2002) 1997 .. 0.07
Mark and others (2001) 1996 .. ..
Wall and others (2000) 1996 Can$ 43-69b ..
Healey and others (1998) 1995 .. ..
Mills, Skodbo and Blyth (2013) 2013 .. ..
Lievens and others (2016) 2012 66 euros 0.19
Kopp (2015) 2010 36 euros 0.12c
Potapchik and Popovich (2014) 2008 .. ..
Vanags and Zasova (2010) 2008 .. 0.4
Observatorio Argentino de Drogas (2010) 2008 Arg$ 94 0.9
Observatorio Peruano de Drogas (2010) 2002-2010 US$ 6.8 n/a
Slack and others (2009) 2005/2006 .. 0.7
Collins and Lapsley (2002) 1998/1999 .. 0.85
Collins and Lapsley (2008) 2004/2005 .. 0.88d
Rehm and others (2006) 2002 Can$ 262 ..
Godfrey and others (2002) 2000 .. ..
Gordon and others (2006) 2003/2004 .. ..
United States Office of National Drug Control Policy (2004) 1992-2002 2002: US$ 650 2002: 1.7
United States Department of Justice (2011) 2007 .. ..
Miller and others (2006)e 1999 .. ..
Fernandez (2012)e 2006 .. ..
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established standard methodology and analytical frame-
work for such studies are well suited to dealing with drug 
use but are less well suited when it comes to dealing with 
illicit drug production and trafficking (for a standardized 
conceptual breakdown of the costs of drug use, see figure 
15).
One of the studies, an economic study in Chile,100 is 
rather atypical in that it focused on the impact of drug-re-
lated crime. The study covered infringements of the 
national drug law, as well as other types of crime, such as 
robbery, sex-related crime and homicide, that can be 
attributed to drug use or drug trafficking through any of 
the following three mechanisms: the psychopharmacolog-
ical link (drug users committing crime under the influence 
of drugs); the economic-compulsive link (drug users com-
mitting crime to fund their drug consumption); and the 
systemic link (crime related to drug trafficking that was 
not prosecuted under the drug law).101 The costs taken 
into account consisted of the costs of drug law enforce-
ment incurred by the various relevant institutions (mainly 
the police, the judicial system and the penitentiary system), 
as well as the cost of lost productivity resulting from incar-
ceration of perpetrators of the above-mentioned crimes. 
The study quantified these costs in 2006 at $268 million. 
A breakdown by type of crime shows that offences against 
the Chilean drug law per se only accounted for about one 
third (36 per cent) of the total costs, while the majority 
(60 per cent) of the costs could be attributed to robbery, 
including violent robbery. An independent breakdown by 
type of cost shows that the largest share of drug law 
enforcement costs was borne by the police (32 per cent of 
100 M. Fernandez, “The socioeconomic impact of drug-related crimes 
in Chile”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 23, No. 6 
(2012), pp. 465-472.
101 For a discussion of the different links between drugs and crime, see 
the subsection on violence.
the total), followed by the penitentiaries (25 per cent) and 
the judicial system (17 per cent). Productivity losses attrib-
utable to incarceration for drug-related crimes accounted 
for virtually all of the remaining costs. The costs were also 
broken down by drug type, cocaine base (“cocaine base 
paste”) being identified as the drug with the biggest 
impact, accounting for more than half of the cost, ahead 
of cocaine salt and cannabis.
Although the economic studies discussed above generally 
take into account a wide variety of costs that arise directly 
and indirectly from the drug problem, this is usually lim-
ited to costs that can be quantified in monetary terms. 
Non-tangible costs, such as loss of life or impaired quality 
of life, are frequently not quantified; and when they are 
quantified, it is usually done with reference to a non-mon-
etary unit of measure, such as “years of life lost” or “years 
lived with a disability”. While such studies can be very 
useful in assessing the economic toll that the drug problem 
has taken on society, other considerations also need to 
come into play when assessing the impact of the world 
drug problem and devising policy responses.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL  
SUSTAINABILITY
Environmental sustainability is embedded throughout the 
goals of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. Goal 
1, ending poverty, is closely linked to Goal 2, target 2.4 
of which is to ensure sustainable food production systems 
and implement resilient agricultural practices. Comple-
mentary to this are Goal 13 (combating climate change) 
and Goal 15 (sustainably managing forests and combating 
desertification, land degradation and biodiversity loss). 
Water availability and management are covered in Goal 
6, target 6.3 of which includes reducing pollution, elimi-
nating dumping and minimizing the release of hazardous 
chemicals and materials.
FIG. 15 Breakdown of the costs of drug use borne by society 
Source: Adapted from D. Collins and others, “Introduction; improving economic data to inform decisions in drug control”, Bulletin on 
Narcotics, vol. LII, Nos. 1 and 2 (2000), fig. II.
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The illicit cultivation and production of narcotic drug 
crops touch on all of these concepts. The present section 
describes how the illicit production of drugs and the drug 
control response can have adverse effects on ecosystems, 
for example, by resulting in the clearing of forests to illic-
itly cultivate drug crops. This section also reviews evidence 
on how efforts to reduce illicit drug supply may influence 
the expansion of illicit (and licit) farming activities to new, 
fragile or eco-sensitive areas; it also explains how well-
designed alternative development interventions can 
improve biodiversity conservation, thereby mitigating cli-
mate change. 
Illicit drug crop cultivation and drug  
production and trafficking: their impact  
on the environment
Deforestation 
Deforestation is the principal environmental concern 
resulting from illicit crop cultivation, in particular coca 
bush cultivation in South America, opium poppy cultiva-
tion in South-East Asia and, to some extent, cannabis 
cultivation. Deforestation can be a direct or indirect result 
of illicit crop cultivation: it is a direct result when a piece 
of woodland is cleared for opium poppy or coca bush cul-
tivation; and it is an indirect result when the various mech-
anisms associated with illicit crop cultivation, including 
licit agricultural activities, the formation of pastures and 
other forms of development and encroachment, have an 
influence on deforestation.
Target 15.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
By 2020, promote the implementation of sustain-
able management of all types of forests, halt  
deforestation, restore degraded forests and substan-
tially increase afforestation and reforestation 
globally
Direct deforestation 
Farmers may encroach upon forest to illicitly cultivate 
crops such as coca bush, opium poppy or cannabis plant 
in remote areas for two reasons: the poor socioeconomic 
conditions of farmers at the agricultural frontier may push 
them to look for cash crops; and the illicit nature of this 
activity and the necessity to keep it a clandestine activity 
may spur a move to relatively remote areas.
Quantifying the extent of direct deforestation due to illicit 
cultivation, and the measurement of deforestation in gen-
eral, is difficult. The net change in forest area over a given 
period may not reflect the complexity of the process, as 
losses in one place may be masked by gains in another, or 
the first transition from forest to non-forest may not be 
captured. Finally, illicit cultivation is not the only cause 
of deforestation and, as it often comes with other driving 
factors, the scale of direct deforestation resulting from such 
cultivation needs to be put in the context of the broader 
phenomenon.
According to UNODC estimates, over the period 2001-
2014, an annual average of 22,400 ha of coca bush culti-
vation replaced forest in Colombia.102 These estimates are 
done on a year-on-year basis and are therefore much less 
subject to the limitations associated with long gaps 
between snapshots in time. Although not directly compa-
rable, data from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations indicate that net forest conversion 
in Colombia from all causes averaged 116,000 ha/year 
over the period 2001-2012; at the same time, the total loss 
of land with detectable tree cover (over all tree cover 
classes) averaged 209,900 ha/year.103 However, specific 
studies in the Andes that focus more on the relative extent 
of forest conversion to illicit cultivation compared with 
other forms of land use suggest that the share of deforesta-
tion attributable to direct replacement by coca bush cul-
tivation may be lower than the simple comparison above 
would suggest. 
UNODC undertook a study of a risk area in Colombia 
of 12.4 million ha (defined as all locations within 1 kilo-
metre of a coca bush cultivation site identified in the 
period in question) that included an assessment of defor-
estation.104 The study found that a total of 2.6 million ha 
of forest had been lost in that area over the period 2001-
2006, of which 5.3 per cent could be directly attributed 
to coca bush cultivation. A follow-up study105 over a 
longer time period (2001-2012)  showed that 1.2 per cent 
of the lost forest area was occupied by coca at the end of 
the period. 
Another study, in the San Lucas mountain range of 
Colombia, reports land-use data for 2002, 2007 and 2010, 
based on satellite imagery, which suggest that the share of 
deforestation attributable to illicit coca bush cultivation 
was below 2 per cent  during the periods 2002-2007 and 
2007-2010. This does not, however, account for the pos-
sibility of conversion to licit use after deforestation for 
coca bush cultivation during those periods.106 Aside from 
capturing the exact transition from forest to non-forest, 
which is difficult to attribute to coca bush cultivation or 
other activity, it clearly emerges from such studies that in 
the long run, most of the deforested areas became pastures 
and licit crop cultivation areas, and relatively small parts 
were dedicated to coca bush cultivation. One long-term 
study in Peru that analysed imagery from 1986, 1993 and 
2007 covering a total area of 1.36 million ha in Pichis-
102 UNODC, Colombia: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2014 (Bogotá, 
2015).
103 Based on data from M. C. Hansen and others, “High-resolution 
global maps of 21st-century forest cover change”, Science, vol. 342, 
No. 6160 (November 2013), pp. 850-853.
104 UNODC, Análisis Multitemporal de Cultivos de Coca: Período 2001-
2006 (Bogotá, 2006).
105 UNODC, Análisis Multitemporal de Cultivos de Coca: Período 2001-
2012 (Bogotá, 2014).
106 Maria A. Chadid and others, “A Bayesian spatial model highlights 
distinct dynamics in deforestation from coca and pastures in an 
Andean biodiversity hotspot”, Forests, vol. 6, No. 11 (2015).
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Palcazú concluded that, by 2007, 269,000 ha had been 
deforested, of which 57 per cent consisted of pasture and 
the remainder consisted mainly of agriculture, with coca 
bush cultivation occupying only 0.39 per cent of the 
area.107 
Indirect deforestation 
The above-mentioned studies show that overall deforesta-
tion can only be directly attributed to coca bush cultiva-
tion to a small extent. Coca bush cultivation takes place 
in parallel with other human activities that cause defor-
estation, but this does not mean that there is necessarily a 
causal relationship between coca bush cultivation and 
deforestation in general. 
Various mechanisms can determine an indirect influence 
of illicit cultivation on deforestation rates. Farmers who 
are willing or inclined to engage in such cultivation would 
naturally penetrate deeper into forests in order to conceal 
their activity, and this could gradually attract further 
expansion, licit agriculture, the formation of pastures and 
other forms of development and encroachment. Profits 
made by higher-level organizers involved in large-scale 
consolidation of farm-gate products and the processing of 
crops into end products such as heroin and cocaine might 
generate the need for laundering proceeds through activi-
ties such as cattle ranching, pasturage and logging, which 
themselves contribute to deforestation. Moreover, certain 
107 UNODC and Ministerio del Medio Ambiente del Perú, “Análi-
sis económico de las actividades causantes de la deforestación en 
Pichis-Palcazú” (Lima, 2011).
characteristics of illicit cultivation areas, such as little (or 
no) security and weak rule of law, may drive other illegal 
activities that cause deforestation, such as illegal logging 
and illegal mining.
Several in-depth analyses have focused on the link between 
illicit cultivation and deforestation in Colombia (see box 
on page 89). Several variables were considered in order to 
investigate the potential effect of illicit crop cultivation 
systematically, but there is little empirical evidence to sup-
port the clear impact of such cultivation on overall defor-
estation, while outcomes vary from municipality to 
municipality. For example, in some particular cases in 
Colombia (i.e. Chocó, Nariño), high levels of coca bush 
cultivation were in fact directly related to high levels of 
deforestation. In general, deforestation and coca bush cul-
tivation take place in the same areas, but this does not 
mean that more coca bush cultivation leads to more defor-
estation. It seems that actions, conditions and policies to 
provide incentives for frontier development drive defor-
estation, and coca is a crop that thrives in those environ-
ments. Ultimately, with increased development, the area 
under coca bush cultivation decreases, but deforestation 
continues, unless specific countermeasures are taken.
A similar exercise was undertaken to examine the potential 
relationship between deforestation and opium poppy cul-
tivation in South-East Asia. In this case, maps were used 
to indicate areas with a high risk of opium poppy cultiva-
tion in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myan-
mar. The results of the modelling exercise did not show 
any evidence of a positive association between the risk of 
opium poppy cultivation and the probability of deforesta-
TAblE 4 Breakdown of deforestation into licit and illicit components: a summary of four studies  
comparing side-by-side licit and illicit cultivation, by study and region
Note: The “average annual deforestation rate” represents the average annual forest loss  
over the reference period, expressed as a percentage of the corresponding forest area at  
the beginning of that period.
a Maria A. Chadid and others, “A Bayesian spatial model highlights distinct dynamics in deforestation from coca and pastures in an Andean biodiver-
sity hotspot”, Forests, vol. 6, No. 11 (2015).
b UNODC and Ministerio del Medio Ambiente del Perú, “Análisis económico de las actividades causantes de la deforestación en Pichis-Palcazú” (Lima, 
2011).
c L. M. Dávalos and others, “Forests and drugs: coca-driven deforestation in tropical biodiversity hotspots”, Environmental Science and Technology,  
vol. 45, No. 4 (2011), pp. 1219-1227. 
d D. Armenteras, N. Rodriguez and J. Retana, “Landscape dynamics in northwestern Amazonia: an assessment of pastures, fire and illicit crops as  
drivers of tropical deforestation”, PLoS ONE, vol. 8, No. 1 (2013).
Location of study area, source and specifics Coca Licit uses
San Lucas Mountain Range,  
Colombia (Chadid and others, 2015)a
2007-2010
2002-2007
Pichis-Palcazú, Peru (UNODC 2011)b
1993-2007
1986-1993
Southern Colombia (Dávalos and 
others 2011),c 2002-2007
Secondary forest
Old-growth
Central Colombia (Dávalos and others, 
2011),c 2002-2007
Secondary forest
Old-growth
Northern Colombia  (Dávalos and 
others, 2011),c 2002-2007
Secondary forest
Old-growth
Northwestern Amazonia, Colombia, 
2001-2009 (Armenteras and others, 
2013)d
Secondary forest
Old-growth 0.026%
0.050%
0.005%
0.006%
0.024%
0.016%
0.013%
0.067%
0.112%
0.008%
0.004%
0.012%
0.29%
3.03%
0.91%
1.74%
0.39%
0.25%
0.56%
0.17%
0.70%
0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%
Average  annual deforestation rate  (percentage)
7.57%
6.98%
6.26%
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tion. This suggests that other factors, possibly socioeco-
nomic factors not included in the model, are the main 
drivers of deforestation, of which the displacement of forest 
by opium poppy cultivation is only one component.
Deforestation as a result of drug trafficking
Another aspect of the illicit supply of drugs that may have 
repercussions on the environment is cocaine trafficking. 
108 Iliana Monterroso and Deborah Barry, “Legitimacy of forest rights: 
the underpinnings of the forest tenure reform in the protected 
areas of Petén, Guatemala”, Conservation and Society, vol. 10, No. 2 
(2012), pp. 136-150.
Instances of deforestation stemming from such trafficking 
have been recorded in Petén, Guatemala,108 and in eastern 
Honduras.109 
The simplest way in which trafficking facilitates encroach-
ment is the clearing of strips of forest to enable the take-
off and landing of light aircraft. However, the phenomenon 
may extend beyond this, as it can trigger violent land grabs, 
generate conflict over land tenure, attract not only licit 
but also other illicit activity and, as mentioned earlier, 
generate a need to launder illicit proceeds, a need that can 
be addressed by converting forest for activities such as 
cattle ranching. One such example may have occurred in 
the Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala,110, 111 a vast 
protected area where drug traffickers may have been able 
to take over land and impose their territorial control 
through violence.112 Rapid increases in the local cattle 
inventory are thought to respond to the need to launder 
earnings from drug trafficking.113 Local smallholders may 
“sell” the community lands in the reserve under coercion 
from drug traffickers and then move on, generating more 
deforestation.114 
109 Kendra McSweeney and others, “Drug policy as conservation 
policy: narco-deforestation”, Science, vol. 343, No. 6170 (2014), pp. 
489 and 490.
110 Avrum J. Shriar, “Theory and context in analyzing livelihoods, land 
use, and land cover: lessons from Petén, Guatemala”, Geoforum, vol. 
55, 2014, pp. 152-163.
111 Iliana Monterroso and Deborah Barry, Tenencia de la Tierra, Bosques 
y Medios de Vida en la Reserva de la Biosfera Maya en Guatemala: 
Sistema de Concesiones Forestales Comunitarias (Guatemala City, 
Centro Internacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Facultad Latino-
americana de Ciencias Sociales, 2009).
112 Ibid.
113 Avrum J. Shriar, “Theory and context in analyzing livelihoods, land 
use, and land cover” (see footnote 110).
114 Liza Grandia, “Road mapping: megaprojects and land grabs in the 
Does coca bush cultivation drive deforestation? A case study in Colombia 
While some studies indicate that there is a 
relationship between illicit cultivation and 
deforestation, other in-depth analyses have 
not confirmed this link and there is little 
empirical evidence of the impact of illicit 
cultivation on deforestation. A comparison 
of deforestation rates in Colombian munici-
palities and the extent of illicit cultivation 
fails to bring out clear overarching patterns. 
After several potential covariates other than 
coca bush cultivation were included in the 
model, such as urban population density, 
road density, the initial forested fraction, 
the fraction of the population with unsatis-
fied basic needs and eradication by aerial 
spraying, the best-fit model indicated that 
coca bush cultivation was not a significant 
determinant of deforestation rates.
One studya concluded that illicit crop cul-
tivation is a driver of forest fragmentation 
through the perforation of forests. How-
ever, it is not clear if this results in a 
detectable impact in actual deforestation 
rates, and the study adds that some of the 
areas affected are later regenerated.
Another studyb set out to systematically 
isolate the potential effect of illicit crop 
cultivation as a catalyst of forest loss. The 
model measured the spatial proximity of 
coca bush cultivation in two ways — the 
distance to the nearest coca bush cultiva-
tion site and the area under such cultivation 
in the surrounding square kilometre — and 
examined how the probability of defor-
estation varied as a function of these two 
variables. Other variables usually associated 
with the probability of deforestation were 
also included in the model: the proportion 
of forest remaining,c distances to roads 
and rivers,d, e, f biophysical characteristics 
related to agriculture in general, such as 
climate, slope and aspectg and the pro-
tection status of the land.h The analysis 
did yield a certain link between coca bush 
cultivation and deforestation in southern 
Colombia only, where the probability of 
deforestation increased with the density 
of the coca bush cultivation and decreased 
with the distance from the nearest coca 
bush cultivation site. Once socioeconomic 
variables were included, the study did not 
support the thesis that coca is very different 
from other crops; instead it hypothesized 
that what sets municipalities growing coca 
bush apart is poor rural development, the 
underlying cause that enables a positive 
association between population growth 
and deforestation.
a-h  See the online methodology section of 
the present report.
MAp 6 Deforestation, 2000-2014, and the risk  
of illicit opium poppy cultivation in the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Myanmar
Source: UNODC opium poppy risk maps; and M. C. Hansen and 
others, “High-resolution global maps of 21st-century forest cover 
change”, Science, vol. 342, No. 6160 (November 2013).
Notes: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on 
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations.
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A quantitative link between drug trafficking and deforesta-
tion has been made in the case of Honduras. Forest loss 
in eastern Honduras over the period 2004-2012 appears 
to correlate with the number of registered air and maritime 
landings of cocaine shipments from South America to 
Honduras, as recorded in the Consolidated Counterdrug 
Database of the United States Office of National Drug 
Control Policy. Three interrelated mechanisms may explain 
this relationship: direct deforestation from landing strips 
and illegal roads; indirect deforestation from land grabs 
leading to greater pressure from displaced agriculturalists; 
and privatization of the public land to create “narco-
estates” and launder trafficking assets.115 The last variant 
often takes place at the expense of indigenous lands.116
Pollution and health hazards arising from  
chemicals and waste 
Target 6.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
By 2030, improve water quality by reducing 
pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing 
release of hazardous chemicals and materials, 
halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and 
substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse 
globally
Clandestine laboratories processing and manufacturing 
plant-based and synthetic drugs require significant quan-
tities of precursors and other chemicals, many of which 
northern Guatemalan lowlands”, Development and Change, vol. 44, 
No. 2 (2013), pp. 233-259.
115 McSweeney and others, “Drug policy as conservation policy” (see 
footnote 109).
116 K. McSweeney and Z. Pearson, “Prying native people from native 
lands: narco business in Honduras”, NACLA Report on the Americas, 
vol. 46, No. 4 (2013).
are hazardous to human health and potentially damaging 
to the environment. These chemicals include solvents; 
metals and salts; and acids and bases. Exposure to such 
chemicals can result in numerous health complications, 
ranging from eye, nose and throat irritation to liver and 
kidney impairments and bleeding and corrosion in the 
lungs. Some carry a risk of fire or explosion.117 Health 
hazards are of particular concern in the case of synthetic 
drugs manufactured in urban settings, with a high risk of 
exposure for large segments of the population, but they 
also affect individuals who, often because they have no 
viable alternatives, work in establishments manufacturing 
plant-based drugs, frequently in inhumane and exploita-
tive conditions.118 The by-products and unused chemicals 
are frequently disposed of in urban sewerage systems, other 
urban settings or, in in the case of processing of plant-
based drugs in non-urban areas, the natural environment, 
including rivers and forests. 
The consequences in urban settings not only pose health 
risks but may also have an impact on the urban and indus-
trial environment. According to the European Police 
Office (Europol), criminals engaged in the illicit manu-
facture of drugs may resort to simply dumping chemicals, 
burying them in the ground, leaving them in stolen trailers 
and draining liquids into sewerage systems, into or onto 
the ground or into surface water. Other techniques involve 
burning waste in stolen motor vehicles or mixing the 
chemicals with other chemical waste prior to releasing 
them into the open sea from maritime vessels.119 
The chemicals used in the illicit supply chain of cocaine 
and opiates also contribute to pollution and health hazards 
in rural environments. In late 2005 and early 2006, 
UNODC undertook a systematic study of the illicit cul-
tivation and processing of coca bush in Colombia, based 
on a nationwide sample of 1,300 coca bush growers, cat-
egorized by geographical region and by landscape.120 Most 
of the agrochemicals found in the study to be used by coca 
bush growers were legal. A comparison of the use levels of 
the most commonly used legal agrochemicals with the 
manufacturers’ recommendations indicated that, overall, 
coca bush growers in the study121 reported using quanti-
ties of herbicides and pesticides within the range used by 
other tropical agriculturalists. 
The study also investigated the use of reagents in the illicit 
processing of coca bush. The detailed data on reagents 
117 EMCDDA and Europol, Methamphetamine: A European Union 
Perspective in the Global Context (Luxembourg, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2009).
118 Merrill Singer, “Drugs and development: the global impact of drug 
use and trafficking on social and economic development”, Interna-
tional Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 19, No. 6 (2008), pp. 467-478.
119 Walter Ego and Aïssata Maïga, “Tallying the hidden environmental 
costs of drug production”, policy brief No. 149 (Stockholm, Insti-
tute for Security and Development, 2014).
120 UNODC, Características Agroculturales de los Cultivos de Coca en 
Colombia (Bogotá, 2007).
121 Ibid.
FIG. 16 Forest loss and number of primary  
cocaine trafficking movements in eastern 
Honduras, 2004-2012
Source: K. McSweeney and Z. Pearson, “Prying native people from 
native lands: narco business in Honduras”, NACLA Report on the 
Americas, vol. 46, No. 4 (2013).
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indicate: a distinct regional variation in the reliance on 
different organic solvents, whether gasoline, diesel or 
petroleum; complete dependence on sulphuric acid; and 
high levels of gasoline recycling, with variation related to 
fuel costs. There is potential for pollution by the use of 
the above-mentioned substances by the great number of 
laboratories, which are scattered throughout the Amazo-
nian forest; however, the combination of high rainfall and 
reuse probably reduces the environmental impact of these 
sources. Indeed, in the early 1990s, field observations in 
Chapare, Bolivia, found that rainfall quickly diluted chem-
ical spills.122
122 Ray Henkel, “Coca (Erythroxylum coca) cultivation, cocaine pro-
duction, and biodiversity in the Chapare region of Bolivia”, in Bio-
diversity and Conservation of Neotropical Montane Forests, Steven P. 
Churchill and others, eds. (New York, New York Botanical Garden, 
1995), pp. 551-560.
Water depletion and salinization
Target 15.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded 
land and soil, including land affected by desertifica-
tion, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a 
land degradation-neutral world
In Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation places an addi-
tional strain on the availability of water in areas already 
affected by water scarcity, and the irrigation methods used 
also contribute to salinization of desert areas.
According to one report,123 in the Province of Helmand, 
which continues to be affected by high levels of opium 
poppy cultivation (covering 27 per cent of arable land in 
123 John Weier, “From wetland to wasteland: the destruction of the 
Hamoun Oasis”, NASA Earth Observatory, Available at www.
earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/hamoun.
FIG. 17 Regional variation in reagents used to process one oil druma of fresh coca leaves into coca paste 
in Colombia 
Source: UNODC, Características Agroculturales de los Cultivos de Coca en Colombia (Bogotá, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de  
Cultivos Ilícitos, 2006).
a Approximately 87.5 kg of fresh coca leaves.
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2014), the combination of drought in the period 1999-
2001, unsustainable development and withdrawals for 
irrigation resulted in a reduction of 98 per cent of the 
water flow along the lower Helmand river and the com-
plete loss of the formerly rich downstream wetlands. In 
addition, drought appears to have intensified over time. 
The real-time record of global precipitation anomalies in 
the growing seasons (winter and spring) in Afghanistan 
from winter 2000-2001 until spring 2014 indicates that 
precipitation in that period was within 10 mm per 
month of the average in the reference period 1979-2000 
in 14 out of the 28 growing seasons, while it was below 
that range in 12 seasons and above that range in just 2 
seasons. At the same time, population growth has not 
abated, leading to intensification of cropping at the 
upstream end of canals.124 Opium poppy cultivation con-
tributes to water scarcity in two ways: by hoarding water 
from the irrigation system;125 and by rendering financially 
viable pumping from the aquifer through tubewells.126 At 
times, well-connected and locally powerful opium poppy 
growers were able to grow opium poppy by the roadside, 
as they did in Chahar Bolaq, to the extent that no water 
was available downstream.127 In contrast, the growers 
dependent on tube-well irrigation north of the Boghra 
canal are among the least powerful and most marginal 
farmers in central Helmand.128 Nevertheless, the returns 
on opium poppy enabled even those growers — at least 
for a while — to pay for the considerable costs of acquir-
ing (or renting) and fuelling pumps, lowering the water 
table and ultimately degrading the marginal lands.129 Sus-
tained opium poppy cultivation may have depleted the 
already low capacity of the soil, leading to decreasing 
opium yields (such as the exceptionally low yield in the 
south in 2015), while the process of degradation may have 
been exacerbated by poor water management.
Biodiversity and protected areas
Target 15.5 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Take urgent and significant action to reduce the 
degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of 
biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the 
extinction of threatened species
124 Adam Pain, “Water, management, livestock and the opium econ-
omy: the spread of opium poppy cultivation in Balkh”, Case Study 
Series (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007).
125 David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Opium poppy eradication: how 
to raise risk when there is nothing to lose?” Briefing Paper Series 
(Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2006).
126 David Mansfield, “Between a rock and a hard place: counter-nar-
cotics efforts and their effects in Nangarhar and Helmand in the 
2010-11 growing season”, Case Study Series (Kabul, Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011).
127 Mansfield and Pain, “Opium poppy eradication” (see footnote 
125).
128 Mansfield, “Between a rock and a hard place” (see footnote 126).
129 David Mansfield, “Helmand on the move: migration as a response 
to crop failure”, Brief Series (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Eval-
uation Unit, 2015).
One of the concerns associated with illicit cultivation is 
its possible effect on biodiversity. Rather than being evenly 
distributed throughout the world, biodiversity is concen-
trated in lowland moist tropical forests,130, 131 while mon-
tane tropical and subtropical forests are recognized as 
biodiversity hotspots, hosting a large number of species 
with a small known habitat.132 
The tropical Andes are the world’s most biologically 
diverse hotspot, accounting for 7 per cent of all plants and 
6 per cent of all vertebrates; the Choco lowland forests 
along the Pacific coast also host a disproportionately large 
amount of plants and vertebrates. Opium poppy cultiva-
tion in the Andes is of particular concern, as the altitude 
suitable for such cultivation also corresponds to the espe-
cially vulnerable Paramo and sub-Paramo ecosystems.133 
To the extent that opium poppy cultivation replaces these 
ecosystems, it represents one of several threats, along with 
licit agriculture and the fires associated with it, as well as 
mining, in the case of Colombia.134, 135 
The situation is similar in South-East Asia. The highlands 
of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar 
are part of the Indo-Burma biodiversity hotspot, which is 
estimated to harbour in excess of 13,500 plant species, 
7,000 of which are found nowhere else, but has less than 
5 per cent of natural land cover remaining.136
Cultivation of coca bush carries its own ramifications for 
biodiversity. Satellite-based data reveal clusters of persistent 
coca bush cultivation in protected areas (national parks) 
in all three coca-producing countries, where licit agricul-
ture may also pose a threat. In Colombia, the protected 
areas most affected are encircled by a moving front of 
agriculture including coca bush cultivation in Sierra de La 
Macarena, Tinigua and Los Picachos national parks (see 
the Orinoco line in figure 18). 
In Peru, the extent of coca bush cultivation in protected 
areas is limited. An analysis in 2004 of the location of coca 
cultivation according to potential land use in the three 
regions of Alto Huallaga, Apurimac-Ene and La Conven-
130 Clinton N. Jenkins, Stuart L. Pimm and Lucas N. Joppa, “Global 
patterns of terrestrial vertebrate diversity and conservation”, Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 110, No. 28 (2013).
131 Norman Myers and others, “Biodiversity hotspots for conservation 
priorities”, Nature, vol. 403, No. 6772 (2000), pp. 853-858.
132 Thomas Brooks and others, “Global biodiversity conservation  
priorities”, Science, vol. 313, No. 5783 (2006), pp. 58-61.
133 David M. Olson and others, “Terrestrial ecoregions of the world: a 
new map of life on Earth”, BioScience, vol. 51, No. 11 (2001), pp. 
933-938.
134 Natalia Ocampo-Peñuela and Stuart L. Pimm, “Elevational ranges 
of montane birds and deforestation in the western Andes of Colom-
bia”, PLoS ONE, vol. 10, No. 12 (2015).
135 Pasquale Borrelli and others, “The implications of fire management 
in the Andean Páramo: a preliminary assessment using satellite 
remote sensing”, Remote Sensing, vol. 7, No. 9 (2015), pp. 11061-
11082.
136 Myers and others, “Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities” 
(see footnote 131).
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ción-Lares revealed that 2 per cent of the land area was 
occupied by coca cultivation, most of which (90 per cent) 
was on land without agricultural potential. Slightly less 
than a quarter of the coca cultivation was in protected 
areas, while two thirds was on land designated for forest. 
In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the most affected 
parks are Isiboro Secure and Carrasco. The first overlaps 
with the Alto Beni deforestation front and the second 
overlaps with the Chapare-Santa Cruz deforestation front. 
Coca-related encroachment into the parks dates back at 
least to the 1980s.137 
Impact of drug control interventions on  
the environment
Alternative development 
Target 2.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
By 2030, ensure sustainable food production 
systems and implement resilient agricultural 
practices that increase productivity and production, 
that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen 
capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme 
weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and 
that progressively improve land and soil quality
Alternative development is an area of intervention in 
which efforts to reduce illicit drug supply contend with 
the socioeconomic conditions of farmers, as well as the 
environment in which the farmers live and earn their 
livelihood. Although short-sighted initiatives in the past 
may have had negative environmental consequences, 
alternative development has demonstrated that it can have 
a positive impact on the environment by promoting 
biodiversity and reforestation. The key elements, which 
are often critical to ensuring a holistic and sustainable 
success of alternative development programmes, include 
137 Henkel, “Coca (Erythroxylum coca) cultivation” (see footnote 122).
communal participation and the promotion of land 
ownership, community organization, good agricultural 
practices, including in post-harvest processes, agroforestry 
and forest management.138 
One successful instance of alternative development extend-
ing to positive environmental effects can be seen in the 
San Martín Region in Peru, where alternative development 
initiatives included the replacement of coca production 
with the production of oil palm, cocoa and coffee and with 
agroforestry, in addition to reforesting 7.5 per cent of 
former coca and other crop fields (or about 650 ha). This 
last activity involved 350 local families. An additional 687 
families were involved in 1,415 ha of agroforestry and 
coffee and cocoa cultivation for fair trade and organic 
markets. The success of the project rested on the provision 
of non-conditional support to beneficiaries, whether or 
not they eradicated coca bush, and on the inclusion of 
communities as a whole, whether or not they were directly 
involved in coca production.139 
Land ownership was emphasized in the context of the 
Colombian initiative Forest Warden Families Programme, 
which ran during the period 2003-2013, reaching more 
than 120,000 families.140 The project led to the purchase 
of more than 100,000 ha of land by approximately 30,000 
families. The premise of this strategy is that land owner-
ship discourages smallholders from joining or rejoining 
the coca economy and allows for the development of long-
term productive projects. Although deforestation rates 
were not assessed in the project, land ownership also has 
the potential to slow down the agricultural frontier.141 
138 See World Drug Report 2015, chap. II.
139 UNODC, San Martín: Análisis Económico del Impacto del Desarrollo 
Alternativo, en relación a la Deforestación y la Actividad Cocalera 
(Lima, 2014).
140 UNODC, Colombia: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013 (Bogotá, 
2014).
141 María D. Álvarez, “Forests in the time of violence: conservation 
FIG. 18 Coca bush cultivation in protected areas (national parks), Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia 
and Peru, 2003-2014
Note: Data from national parks were assigned to each of the ecological regions. *Data for Peru were only available from 2010 onwards.
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In the past, crop substitution programmes, aimed at 
replacing illicit crops with licit crops, may have had unde-
sired effects. In South-East Asia, for example, crop substi-
tution has been criticized for promoting the shifting away 
from swidden agriculture, which allows for fallow periods 
during which the land may regenerate, towards permanent 
agriculture.142 However, in terms of environmental 
impact, a study in northern Thailand showed how this 
does not necessarily translate into unsustainable deforesta-
tion. In the village of Pah Poo Chom, intensification of 
agriculture between the 1970s and 1990s took place in 
parallel with a decline in the overall use of land and the 
regrowth of forest on the steepest slopes, even as the popu-
lation increased. 
Eradication and displacement
The impact of illicit crop eradication on the environment 
may have different outcomes and different ramifications 
depending on the context. If eradication induces a dis-
placement of the location of drug crop cultivation, this 
may result in negative environmental effects when farmers 
react to eradication initiatives and seek new cultivation 
sites that are out of the reach of law enforcement authori-
ties. In Afghanistan, for example, the targeted “food zone” 
initiative in central Helmand, including eradication, may 
have played a role in the relocation of opium poppy grow-
ers north of the Boghra canal and the associated expansion 
of the agricultural frontier north of the canal, which almost 
doubled between 2008 and 2013.143 This, in turn, may 
have contributed to soil depletion and other environmen-
tal effects north of the canal.
In the Andean countries, the easiest way for farmers to 
evade law enforcement is to establish their coca bush cul-
tivation sites on relatively inaccessible mountain slopes. 
One study in the San Lucas mountain range in Colom-
bia144 obtained statistical confirmation that mountainous 
areas with some slope had a greater probability of being 
converted into coca bush cultivation areas, while the prob-
ability of converting forest into pasture decreased in very 
rugged terrain. 
The complexity of the potential impact of eradication on 
the spatial distribution of coca bush cultivation, and asso-
ciated environmental concerns, is also illustrated by other 
studies undertaken in Colombia. One study provided 
quantitative evidence to substantiate an overall shift in 
coca bush cultivation towards municipalities with a higher 
proportion of old-growth forest and lower road density 
implications of the Colombian war”, Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 
vol. 16, Nos. 3-4 (2003), pp. 47-68.
142 Chupinit Kesmanee, “The poisoning effect of a lovers triangle: 
highlanders, opium and extension crops, a policy overdue for 
review”, in Hill Tribes Today: Problems in Change, John McKinnon 
and Bernard Vienne, eds. (Bangkok, White Lotus, 1989), pp. 
61-102.
143 Mansfield, “Helmand on the move” (see footnote 129).
144 Chadid and others, “A Bayesian spatial model highlights distinct 
dynamics”.
over the period 2001-2008.145 Together, the results pro-
vide evidence of coca growers migrating out of areas tar-
geted for spraying and taking coca bush cultivation to new 
municipalities nearby. This explains the shifting of the 
Andean and Chocoan forest frontiers by coca bush 
growers.
Some studies, however, have shown that eradication may 
slow the advance of the agricultural frontier. Analyses of 
satellite imagery of eastern Bolivia146 implied that that 
was the case. Aggressive campaigns to counter drug traf-
ficking and to eradicate coca bush in the 1990s were iden-
tified as the main causes of the decline in forest clearing 
from the late 1980s to the 1990s. Although drug control 
policy was not identified as a driver of variation for farm-
ers in Santa Cruz and the forest product sector, similar 
trends in forest clearing were observed. This highlights the 
difficulties in separating deforestation associated with or 
caused by coca bush cultivation from land-use change 
caused by other activities along the forest frontier. 
Another study in Colombia suggested that eradication 
efforts may contribute to forest regrowth after coca bush 
cultivation has been abandoned.147 The study observed 
that coca production had taken place in 8 of the top 10 
municipalities gaining forest vegetation in 2001 and the 
total amount of coca produced had dropped markedly by 
2010 (to 30 per cent of the initial amount), probably as a 
result of eradication efforts.
The possible impact of aerial spraying on the environment 
has been a long-debated and controversial issue in Colom-
bia and elsewhere. In Colombia, since 1994, most coca 
bush eradication has been conducted by aerial spraying 
with the herbicide glyphosate.148 Many views and opin-
ions have enriched the discussion over the years and a 
considerable amount of research has been done, including 
on the substance glyphosate, spraying mixtures and the 
precision of spraying; however, the evidence is not con-
clusive, as some studies indicate that there is no negative 
impact on the environment while others indicate the 
contrary.149
145 Alexander Rincón-Ruiz, Unai Pascual and Suzette Flantua, “Exam-
ining spatially varying relationships between coca crops and associ-
ated factors in Colombia, using geographically weight regression”, 
Applied Geography, vol. 37 (2013), pp. 23-33. 
146 Timothy J. Killeen and others, “Total historical land-use change in 
eastern Bolivia: who, where, when, and how much?”, Ecology and 
Society, vol. 13, No. 1, art. 36 (2008).
147 Ana María Sánchez-Cuervo and others, “Land cover change in 
Colombia: surprising forest recovery trends between 2001 and 
2010”, PLOS ONE, vol. 7, No. 8 (2012).
148 Ricardo Vargas, “Fumigaciones y política de drogas en Colombia: 
¿fin del círculo vicioso o un fracaso estratégico?”, in Guerra, Socie-
dad y Medio Ambiente, Martha Cárdenas and Manuel Rodríguez, 
eds. (Bogotá, Foro Nacional Ambiental, 2004), pp. 353-395.
149 References to research undertaken on the environmental impact 
of spraying in Colombia can be found in the online methodol-
ogy section of the present report.
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D. PEACEFUL, JUST AND  
INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES
The new Sustainable Development Agenda recognizes the 
need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that 
provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect 
for human rights (including the right to development), 
on effective rule of law and good governance at all levels 
and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions. 
Among the targets associated with Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal 16, those related to the rule of law and access 
to justice and reducing violence, economic crime (corrup-
tion and bribery), organized crime and illicit financial 
flows all have significant links with the world drug prob-
lem and with the response to it. 
Violence
Defining drug-related violence
Target 16.1 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related 
death rates everywhere
Although the drug problem may threaten peace and secu-
rity in some countries, the connection between drugs and 
violence is not an automatic one. Moreover, as drug prob-
lems and violence can reinforce each other, it is challeng-
ing to assess to what extent drug problems impact on 
violence and vice versa. Indicators of drug-related violence 
may exist for certain locations and time periods, but data 
enabling comparison across countries and over time are 
difficult to come by. This is compounded by the multiple 
ways in which violence can be defined and the different 
forms it may take. Violence can be both lethal and non-
lethal; it can sometimes be highly visible, and it can some-
times be hidden by its perpetrators and thus difficult to 
identify.150
Different stages of the drug problem result in different 
manifestations of violence. One way used to conceptualize 
these differences is to distinguish between psychopharma-
cological violence (violence stemming from direct drug 
use or withdrawal from drug use), economic violence (vio-
lence stemming from users’ attempts to secure resources 
to buy drugs) and systemic violence (violence stemming 
from struggles for control between or within criminal 
groups over the illicit production and distribution of 
drugs).151, 152 The intensity and lethality of violence vary 
significantly across this broad categorization. Illicit drug 
150 A. Durán-Martínez, “To kill and tell? State power, criminal com-
petition, and drug violence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, 
No. 8 (2015), pp. 1377-1402.
151 Paul J. Goldstein, “The drugs/violence nexus: a tripartite concep-
tual framework”, Journal of Drug Issues, vol. 15, No. 4 (1985), pp. 
493-506.
152 Paul J. Goldstein, “The relationship between drugs and violence in the 
United States”, in United Nations International Drug Control Pro-
gramme, World Drug Report 1997, part 3.
production and drug trafficking are more clearly associ-
ated with lethal violence, while illicit drug use is more 
related to property crime and domestic violence. 
Globally, there is no clear correlation between homicide 
rates and prevalence of drug use, but there is an associa-
tion between relatively higher homicide rates and the drug 
transit status of a country, albeit with variations within 
each group of countries.
Homicide rates are higher in cocaine transit countries and 
in cocaine-producing countries than in other countries. 
However, countries affected by Afghan opiate trafficking 
flows appear to be associated with relatively lower homi-
cide rates,153 suggesting that while drug transit and pro-
duction can be associated with higher homicide rates, that 
is not always the case. There are differences across regions, 
countries and drug types.
Impact of drug use on violence
The relationship between drug use and violent crime is 
still under-researched and not properly understood, even 
though it is clear that some connection exists between the 
two phenomena. There is also enormous variation in the 
populations and in the sample sizes used in existing stud-
ies. There have been more analyses of the connection 
between drug use and crime in European countries and 
the United States than elsewhere. Meta-analyses of research 
studies suggest that certain drugs tend to drive the general 
association between drug use and crime and that the asso-
ciation tends to be stronger for property crime and drug 
law offences, including drug dealing. 
153 Bivariate correlations between homicide rates and each of these 
categories appear statistically significant in the categories “Country 
on the main Afghan opiate routes?”, “Country on the main cocaine 
routes?”, but not in the “Country with illicit crop cultivation?” cat-
egory (possibly because only 17 countries are in the latter category).
FIG. 19 Average homicide rates in relation to the 
location of countries on the illicit drug 
supply chain, 2009-2013
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2015). Available at www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html.
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A review of studies conducted in Australia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States found a greater likelihood 
of property crimes being committed among people who 
use drugs than among those who do not. The studies 
focused on people who use drugs (mostly amphetamines 
and opiates) who had sought treatment or reported drug 
dependence. A stronger relationship was found between 
drug use and shoplifting, general theft and drug dealing 
than between drug use and other crimes.154 The possibil-
ity that individuals engage in drug use to give them cour-
age to commit violent acts was mentioned and found in 
some of these studies, although not very consistently. Gen-
erally, the evidence for psychopharmacological violence 
was weaker.
The relatively few existing studies have found drug use to 
be a risk factor for different types of family-related violence, 
such as minor and severe intimate-partner violence and 
child maltreatment. Some studies have also found a con-
sistent link between witnessing or being a victim of vio-
lence early in life and engaging in drug use and crime later 
in life. Drug use is among the risk factors for both perpe-
trating and being a victim of family-related violence. Other 
risk factors include alcohol abuse, low socioeconomic status 
and a history of family-related violence. Drug use has been 
found to be a stronger predictor of committing an offence 
154 T. Bennett and K. Holloway, Understanding Drugs, Alcohol and 
Crime, Crime and Justice Series (Maidenhead, Berkshire, United 
Kingdom, Open University Press, 2005), pp. 96 and 105.
than having been victimized; for example, one study has 
found that women who use alcohol or drugs are more likely 
to be victims of battering and verbal abuse, but the effect 
seems less consistent when analysing severe abuse.155
Violence and illicit drug production  
and trafficking 
Violence within illicit drug markets can be used for several 
purposes: to solve territorial, contractual, disciplinary or 
successional issues within and between drug trafficking 
organizations; to retaliate against state law enforcement or 
to pressure state officials not to enforce the law; and to 
induce changes in legislation or policy that affect criminal 
activities. In this sense, drug-related violence often affects 
criminals and state officials, but it is not limited to them 
and it can also affect civilians perceived as enemies, caught 
in the crossfire or affected by repressive policies. Violence 
resulting from market disputes between and within drug 
trafficking organizations, and from confrontation with 
state forces, can be lethal because it is more likely to 
involve firearms. It is also likely to have medium- and 
long-term objectives such as market control, which are 
unlikely to be achieved quickly. 
Violence varies across countries affected by illicit drug 
production and trafficking, and it also varies over time 
within countries. Figure 20 illustrates the diverging trends 
in homicide rates in the main countries in which coca bush 
and opium poppy are cultivated. This divergence has not 
been systematically explained, although several factors 
related to those countries’ political and societal landscapes 
and to the organization of illicit drug markets may account 
for it. In Colombia, powerful drug trafficking groups and 
the combination of internal armed conflict and the illicit 
drug trade have contributed to high levels of violence. In 
addition, as seen in the example of the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, societal pressure, particularly from coca bush 
growers, has also shaped the operations of drug traffickers, 
possibly reducing the influence of large drug trafficking 
organizations.156 Thus, while violence is likely to be more 
prevalent in cocaine-producing countries, the different 
homicide levels demonstrate that socioeconomic and polit-
ical factors mediate this relationship.
Violence associated with illicit drug markets also varies 
across regions. For example, although countries in both 
Latin America and South-East Asia play key roles in the 
illicit production of cocaine and opium, the former has 
been associated with significantly higher levels of violence 
than the latter.157 Data collected for the Global Study on 
155 Larry W. Bennett, “Substance abuse and the domestic assault of 
women”, Social Work, vol. 40, No. 6 (1995), pp. 760-771.
156 Eduardo A. Gamarra, “Fighting drugs in Bolivia: United States and 
Bolivian perceptions at odds”, in Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian 
Reality, M. B. Léons and H. Sanabria, eds. (Albany, State University 
of New York Press, 1997), pp. 243-252.
157 V. Felbab-Brown and H. Trinkunas, “UNGASS 2016 in compar-
ative perspective: improving the prospects for success”, Foreign 
Policy Paper (Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution, 2015).
Violence and the “crack” epidemic 
in the United States
Between 1985 and 1991, homicide rates in the United States 
experienced an increase from 7.9 to 9.8 per 100,000 people, 
an upward trend mostly driven by increases in homicides 
among African-American males under 25 years of age (both 
as victims and perpetrators).a Similar increases occurred in 
robberies, which increased by 70 per cent between 1989 and 
1994, especially robberies perpetrated by children under 18 
years of age; among older perpetrators the uptick occurred 
earlier. Since the peak in crime in 1991, homicide rates have 
declined steadily. 
The above-mentioned rise in violent crime has been linked to 
the “crack” cocaine epidemic and the violence generated by 
the “crack” markets, although the association between the 
rise in “crack” use and violent criminality was not automatic. 
In New York, one of the epicentres of the public security crisis 
that accounted for 9 per cent of national homicides in 1991, 
the peak in the use of “crack” occurred in 1984, yet the peak 
in homicides occurred in 1988, while an earlier uptick occurred 
in 1980. The increase in homicides appeared to be clearly 
related to the violent disputes generated by control over the 
“crack” markets, while the connection to “crack” use itself 
was tenuous despite widespread perceptions to the contrary. 
“Crack” use was related to the increase in robberies and to 
the increase in drug dealing, as many “crack” users turned to 
those activities to sustain their habits.
a A. Blumstein and J. Wallman, eds., The Crime Drop in America 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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Homicide 2013 show that, among countries reporting the 
proportion of homicides related to gangs and organized 
crime, there is a clear difference between the Americas, 
where an average of 30 per cent of homicides can be related 
to gangs and/or organized crime, and Asia, where the pro-
portion is about 2 per cent.158 This does not indicate that 
organized criminal organizations may be less active in Asia 
than in the Americas, but it demonstrates that the modus 
operandi of such organizations is less violent in Asia than 
in the Americas. 
Characteristics of the illicit drug market and drug traffick-
ing organizations may explain why the cocaine trafficking 
route in the Americas appears to be associated with more 
violence than the opiate trafficking routes in Asia, and 
why East and South-East Asia seems generally less violent 
than Latin America, even though the drug problem sig-
nificantly affects both subregions. In East and South-East 
Asia, various individuals and groups engage in illicit opium 
and heroin production and trafficking, and trafficking 
networks can be characterized as being compartmentalized 
and decentralized. Drug couriers tend to come from ethnic 
groups that straddle borders and are often from families 
involved in trafficking for generations, yet relatively inde-
pendent of the traffickers and buyers that run the market. 
Although large organized criminal groups used to play a 
prominent role in drug trafficking, the organizations in 
control today seem less hierarchical and more decentral-
ized.159 In contrast, the cocaine supply chains in Latin 
America tend to be built around more cohesive, hierarchi-
cal organizations.
158 Global Study on Homicide 2013, p. 43.
159 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the 
Pacific: A Threat Assessment (Bangkok, 2013).
Drug-related violence associated with conflict, 
terrorism and insurgency
In a number of countries, resources generated by illicit 
activities such as drug trafficking have played a role in 
complicating and extending armed conflicts, often increas-
ing their overall lethality.160 The connection between the 
illicit drug trade and non-state armed groups has materi-
alized in high-profile examples such as Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Myanmar and Peru. In Afghanistan, an analysis 
of the impact of opium production on terrorist attacks 
and casualties between 1994 and 2008 estimated that a 
25 per cent increase in the number of hectares of cultivated 
opium poppy was associated with an average of 0.15 more 
terrorist attacks and 1.43 casualties per year. However, this 
association was modest relative to other variables.161
Colombia is another example where drug trafficking has 
been a crucial funding source for non-state armed groups 
since the mid-1990s. The illicit drug trade can thus 
become a funding source for insurgent and terrorist 
groups, and such a connection can in turn further weaken 
the rule of law, perpetuating both crime and insurgency 
and making conflicts more lethal. Despite the above-men-
tioned well-known examples, the connection between 
drugs, armed conflict and terrorism is not inevitable and 
varies significantly across armed groups and across coun-
tries affected by civil war. In fact, many armed groups and 
terrorist organizations operating in areas where they could 
profit by engaging in the illicit drug trade do not actually 
engage in it.
Collaboration between organized criminal and terrorist 
groups, if effectively realized, can, however, have grave 
implications for security. An analysis of terrorist and 
extremist organizations included in the Terrorism Knowl-
edge Base, covering the years 1998-2005,162 found that 
of the 395 organizations included in the data set, only 
about 9 per cent (35 organizations) were engaged in drug 
trafficking.163 The study found that organizations are 
more likely to engage in drug trafficking when they have 
the logistical capability and the necessary network. 
The profits associated with the illicit drug trade are a key 
motivation for non-state armed groups to engage in traf-
ficking. However, in addition to direct financial gain, 
engagement in the drug trade may provide other non-
monetary resources that are crucial for waging war, such 
160 Svante E. Cornell, “The interaction of narcotics and conflict”,  
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 42, No. 6 (2005), pp. 751-760.
161 James A. Piazza, “The opium trade and patterns of terrorism in 
the provinces of Afghanistan: an empirical analysis”, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, vol. 24, No. 2 (2012), pp. 213-234.
162 V. Asal, H. Brinton Milward and Eric W. Schoon, “When terror-
ists go bad: analyzing terrorist organizations’ involvement in drug 
smuggling”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 59, No. 1 (2015), 
pp. 112-123.
163 This database included only organizations that were at the peak of 
their power; therefore the findings could be less applicable to orga-
nizations at other stages of development.
FIG. 20 Homicide rates in selected countries 
affected by the illicit cultivation of coca 
bush and opium poppy, 2000-2013
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2015). Available at www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html.
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as territorial control, military capacity and political and 
social legitimacy. By protecting illicit activities that provide 
livelihoods for impoverished segments of the population, 
armed groups may gain support, protection and intelli-
gence from farmers. In Afghanistan, one reason for the 
Taliban’s decision to allow the trade in opium was their 
realization of how critical it was for the local economy. 
Indeed, supporting the opium trade allegedly became one 
of the Taliban’s greatest sources of legitimacy among the 
population.164 
Responses to the drug problem and its 
links to violence
Research suggests that law enforcement and policing that 
target the protagonists and elements of the drug traffick-
ing chain that generate the highest profits and the most 
violence are more effective in reducing violence than indis-
criminate law enforcement by the authorities. For example, 
policing that targets the most violent drug traffickers can 
reduce violence by creating a powerful deterrent to violent 
behaviour (see box below).165 
Another form of targeting that may reduce violence by 
weakening connections between armed groups and drug 
trafficking is the emphasis on drug interdiction rather than 
on illicit crop eradication. Along the same lines, effective 
alternative development programmes can weaken the con-
nections between armed groups, drug trafficking and the 
population by providing incentives for the population to 
move away from illicit activities. But, as discussed in chap-
ter II of the World Drug Report 2015, the interactions 
between alternative development and violence may also 
work in the opposite direction, meaning that in contexts 
where violence is already very high, alternative develop-
ment is difficult to implement. 
Targeted law enforcement can also entail strategies that 
do not focus on arresting low-level players in the drug 
trafficking chain and thus tend not to add to mass incar-
ceration problems, which would have little positive (or 
perhaps even a negative) impact on violence.166 
Long-term versus short-term outcomes  
of interventions
Strategies that focus on rapidly disrupting drug trafficking 
organizations and reducing violence in the short term can 
sometimes lead to more violence. By the same token, strat-
egies that tackle the root causes of violence in the medium-
to-long term may have a less discernible impact on 
short-term violence reduction. 
164 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War 
on Drugs (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
165 Mark Kleiman, “Surgical strikes in the drug wars: smarter policies 
for both sides of the border”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, No. 5 (Sep-
tember/October 2011), pp. 89-101; and Lessing, “Logics of vio-
lence in criminal war”.
166 Pien Metaal and Coletta Youngers, eds., Systems Overload: Drug 
Laws and Prisons in Latin America (Amsterdam, Transnational Insti-
tute, 2011).
The internal and external structure of illegal drug markets 
generate violence. Policies and measures aimed at disman-
tling the operation of criminal groups, such as actions 
primarily focused against their leaders, can lead to what 
has been described as “vacancy chains”167 and ensuing 
violent succession competition as well as violent retribu-
tion by attacking the State itself. It has been argued that 
such mechanisms were present in the escalation of drug 
violence in Mexico since 2006,168 before the rate of violent 
homicides started to decline after reaching a peak in 
2011.169 Elsewhere, analysis of organized crime in Osaka, 
Japan, suggests that the impact of law enforcement in gen-
erating “vacancy chains” was more limited than in other 
contexts, partially because police crackdowns focused on 
responding to violent activities and had as their primary 
goal the preservation of social order.170 
Rule of law, access to justice and the drug 
problem
Target 16.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Promote the rule of law at the national and interna-
tional levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
167 Richard H. Friman, “Forging the vacancy chain: law enforcement 
efforts and mobility in criminal economies”, Crime, Law and Social 
Change, vol. 41, No. 1 (2004), pp. 53-77.
168 Gabriela Calderón and others, “The beheading of criminal organi-
zations and the dynamics of violence in Mexico”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 59, No. 8 (2015), pp. 1455-1485, p. 1475.
169 UNODC Homicide Statistics (2016).
170 See McSweeney and others, “Drug policy as conservation policy”; 
and Friman, “Forging the vacancy chain”.
Examples of successful policing that 
reduced violence
Targeting the most violent drug traffickers was an approach 
implemented in Rio de Janeiro starting in 2008 as part of the 
programme known as Pacifying Police Units. The programme, 
which involved announcing in advance the entrance of police 
and military into some favelas (slums) where violent organiza-
tions operated and then introducing social programmes and 
the sustained presence of specially trained police, was credited 
with reducing homicides in certain favelas. An initiative known 
as the Drug Market Intervention Strategy and implemented 
in some cities in the United States was based on a similar 
principle, first identifying drug dealers in an active market, 
building cases against them, prosecuting the most violent 
and threatening others with arrest unless they stopped deal-
ing. However, some limitations to this “violence-targeting” 
approach derive from the difficulty in collecting appropriate 
data for determining responsibility for violence and from the 
fact that violent drug traffickers often prefer to hide violence 
so as to avoid attracting the attention of law enforcement.a
a A. Durán-Martínez, “To kill and tell? State power, criminal  
competition, and drug violence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 59, No. 8 (2015), pp. 1,377-1,402. 
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Apart from the different effects that the inner character-
istics of illicit drug markets can have on violence, there are 
characteristics related to the political and criminal justice 
systems that determine differences in violent outcomes. 
As figure 21 shows, the level of homicides in Latin America 
is not a direct consequence of drug trafficking, as some 
countries have a high level of homicides and a high level 
of cocaine trafficking while others have a high level of 
homicides but a low level of cocaine trafficking (or vice 
versa). 
The strength of the rule of law and state presence are key 
determinants of how illegal activities are organized and 
how violent they may become. Where state presence is 
weak, owing to both a lack of services and an inability to 
provide security for citizens, criminal organizations can 
grow more powerful and violent and find opportunities 
to recruit more individuals into their ranks. In addition, 
where state law enforcement is weak or corrupt, criminal 
organizations may be more able to engage in combat with 
each other or with state officials. One example of such a 
dynamic is in West Africa, a subregion deeply affected by 
political instability, where the transit traffic in cocaine 
from South America destined for Western Europe has 
increased since 2005. The violent impact of such drug 
trafficking flows has been greater in countries with a highly 
unstable political environment. 
Countries that face criminal violence may experience 
declines in, or prevent the escalation of, such violence 
when they conduct reforms that strengthen the rule of law, 
such as police reforms that increase police training and 
accountability. Those countries may also see declines in 
violence when they conduct operations to counter crime 
that make the price of using violence too high for drug 
traffickers. 
One interesting example of the importance of reforms that 
democratize and strengthen the rule of law is in Nicaragua, 
where reforms of the police and their institutional culture 
have emphasized community policing, crime prevention 
and crime intelligence. As a result, homicide rates in Nica-
ragua are significantly lower than in some of the other 
Central American countries, despite similar vulnerabilities 
to crime and violence, such as poverty, the legacy of civil 
war and geographical importance to drug trafficking 
routes.171 Elsewhere, after the violence and “crack” epi-
demic in the United States (see box on page 96), the steady 
decline in the homicide rate in that country in the 1990s 
has been attributed to different factors, including radical 
changes in policing strategies.
Criminal justice 
Government interventions to disrupt drug trafficking 
organizations have, by definition, the objective of bringing 
171 José M. Cruz, “Criminal violence and democratization in Central 
America: the survival of the violent State”, Latin American Politics 
and Society, vol. 53, No. 4 (2011), pp. 1-33.
criminals to justice and restoring the rule of law. Drug law 
enforcement operations, like law enforcement operations 
in general, when they are implemented by impartial, 
transparent and efficient institutions in compliance with 
human rights standards, promote the rule of law and 
justice for all. But when law enforcement operations go 
against those principles, incentives may be created for 
indiscriminate repression and for the violation of citizens’ 
rights.
Where law enforcement agencies lack resources and are 
prone to corruption and where justice systems are weak 
and impunity is prevalent, demands on the police to be 
more effective in countering drug trafficking can lead to 
indiscriminate apprehension of those likely to be perceived 
as criminals. This can also lead law enforcement agents to 
target the types of crime for which suspects are easier to 
identify, which tend to be minor drug-related offences 
rather than more serious offences such as homicide.172 
Zero-tolerance policies, if not properly implemented, may 
sometimes run the risk of generating violence by stigma-
tizing and enabling the abuse of power to be directed 
against people who use drugs or low-level players in the 
172 Juan Carlos Garzón, “Tough on the weak, weak on the tough: drug 
laws and policing” (Washington, D. C., Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars, 2015).
FIG. 21 Homicide rates and the amount of 
cocaine in transit in selecteda cocaine 
transit countries in Latin America, 2010
Sources: Estimates of the flow of cocaine based on United States, 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Cocaine Smuggling in 
2010”, January 2012; homicide data from UNODC Homicide Sta-
tistics (2016). Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/homicide.html. 
a Data were available for 13 countries.
b All flows are expressed per capita.
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drug trafficking chain.173, 174, 175 This, in turn, can lead 
to mass imprisonment for low-level offences or to forced 
detention of people who use drugs.
Criminal justice, drug trafficking and  
illicit drug markets 
The criminal justice system can indirectly influence the 
availability of drugs in illicit markets, not only when it 
reduces the illicit supply through interdiction but also 
when it increases the risk of interdiction, which raises the 
price of drugs in consumer markets. Drug dealers are in 
business to make profit, so when law enforcement increases 
the dealers’ costs, those costs are passed along (in the form 
of price increases) to people who use drugs. Research sug-
gests that the impact of law enforcement on drug prices 
is most appreciable in new or emerging markets, or when 
it induces market shocks in established markets.176, 177 
Research confirms that ultimately higher costs imposed 
on drug trafficking by criminal justice interventions can 
translate into a reduction in illicit drug use in the long 
term,178 although this does not automatically result in a 
reduction in market size. Indeed, it is not enough to rely 
exclusively on price increases as a deterrent to drug use, 
and it is essential to ensure that the reduction in demand, 
which is assisted by a price increase, actually outperforms 
that increase. This can be achieved by interventions that 
reduce demand directly, such as drug use prevention, treat-
ment, rehabilitation and aftercare. 
Criminal justice interventions can have other indirect and 
unforeseen impacts on drug markets. The targeting of 
high-ranking individuals in drug trafficking organizations 
may trigger restructuring179 and changes in modus oper-
andi and crackdowns in one particular area or route may 
induce shifts in supply patterns, as traffickers exploit other 
vulnerabilities and seek the path of least resistance in gar-
173 UNDP, Addressing the Development Dimensions of Drug Policy (New 
York, 2015).
174 “Making drug control ‘fit for purpose’: building on the UNGASS 
decade”, report by the Executive Director of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime as a contribution to the review of the 
twentieth special session of the General Assembly” (E/CN.7/2008/
CRP.17).
175 Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, document A/HRC/14/24/Add.6.
176 Peter Reuter and Mark A. R. Kleiman, “Risks and prices: an eco-
nomic analysis of drug enforcement”, Crime and Justice: A Review of 
Research, vol. 7 (1986), pp. 289-340. 
177 Caulkins and Reuter, “How drug enforcement affects drug prices” 
(see footnote 94).
178 Michael Grossman, “Individual behaviors and substance use: the 
role of price”, in Substance Use: Individual Behavior, Social Interac-
tions, Markets, and Politics, vol. 16, Björn Lindgren and Michael 
Grossman, eds., Advances in Health Economics and Health Services 
Research Series (Bingley, United Kingdom, Emerald Group Pub-
lishing Limited Amsterdam, 2005).
179 Jason M. Lindo and M. Padilla-Romo, “Kingpin approaches to 
fighting crime and community violence: evidence from Mexico’s 
drug war”, discussion paper No. 9067 (Bonn, Institute for the 
Study of Labor (IZA), May 2015).
nering profit from the illicit demand for drugs;180, 181 such 
outcomes reflect the necessity to systematically consolidate 
progress in the rule of law beyond successes in one country 
or on one trafficking route. An example of this phenom-
enon is the shift in illicit cocaine production to cocaine-
processing laboratories in Colombia following the 
introduction of a policy for shooting down small aircraft 
transporting coca paste or base from growing areas in the 
Upper Huallaga valley in Peru.182
In addition, drug trafficking can exert an influence on the 
criminal justice system. For example, a high level of drug 
trafficking can feed corruption and undermine the ability 
of the criminal justice system to function properly. The 
successes of drug trafficking organizations in achieving 
their criminal objectives, along with the sometimes more 
visible consequences of drug trafficking, may expose the 
inadequacy of the criminal justice system and lead to 
reform. In Colombia in the 1980s, when drug violence 
threatened the State, security agencies, especially the 
police, were unprepared for drug control operations and 
plagued by corruption and lack of coordination. The need 
to confront criminal organizations motivated crucial trans-
formations in Colombian security agencies.183
Impact of criminal justice on people  
who use drugs
Different criminal justice approaches have a different 
impact on drug use and on people who use drugs. There 
are differences across jurisdictions in terms of definitions, 
prosecutorial discretion or types and severity of sanctions 
for drug-related offences. In some regions, countries exer-
cise more punitive approaches when dealing with people 
apprehended for minor offences, such as possession of 
small quantities of drugs for personal consumption, which 
may result in such offenders being incarcerated. Several 
countries in Europe and Latin America have chosen to 
limit punishment by adopting alternative measures to 
incarceration or punishment (for example, fines, warnings, 
probation or counselling) in certain cases (without aggra-
vating circumstances) involving minor offences related to 
personal consumption.
Punitive approaches do not necessarily translate into gains 
in terms of discouraging drug use. The imposition of 
180 Peter Reuter, “The mobility of drug trafficking”, in Ending the 
Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug 
Policy, John Collins, ed. (London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2014). 
181 Juan C. Garzón and John Bailey “Displacement effects of sup-
ply-reduction policies in Latin America: a tipping point in cocaine 
trafficking, 2006-2008”, in The Handbook of Drugs and Society, 
Henry H. Brownstein, ed., Wiley Handbooks in Criminology and 
Criminal Justice Series (West Sussex, United Kingdom, John Wiley 
and Sons, 2016).
182 Barry D. Crane, A. Rex Rivolo and Gary C. Comfort, An Empirical 
Examination of Counterdrug Interdiction Program Effectiveness, IDA 
paper P-3219 (Alexandria, Virginia, Institute for Defense Analysis, 
1997). 
183 Durán-Martínez, “To kill and tell?” (see footnote 150).
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severe penalties for drug use and the possession of drugs 
for personal consumption does not appear to have a deter-
rent effect on drug use in the community,184 and it can 
actually have a negative impact on the well-being and 
health of people who use drugs.
Incarceration in prison and confinement in compulsory 
drug treatment centres often worsen the already problem-
atic lives of people who use drugs and drug-dependent 
persons, particularly the youngest and most vulnerable.185 
Exposure to the prison environment facilitates affiliation 
with older criminals and criminal gangs and organizations, 
increases stigma and helps to form a criminal identity. It 
also often increases social exclusion, worsens health condi-
tions and reduces social skills. Alternatives to incarceration 
within the community (in an outpatient or residential 
therapeutic setting), such as psychosocially supported 
pharmacological treatment for opiate dependence, can be 
more effective than imprisonment in reducing drug-related 
offences.186 Criminal justice can have a different impact 
on women than on men. Female offenders and prisoners, 
especially those with drug use disorders, face particular 
hardship as, in many instances, criminal justice systems 
are not yet equipped for the special needs of women. 
Women affected by drug use disorders are more vulnerable 
and more stigmatized than men, they suffer from co-occur-
ring mental health disorders to a greater extent than men 
and they are more likely to have been victims of violence 
and abuse (see the section above entitled “Social develop-
ment”); and yet they are far less likely than men to access 
treatment.187 Children with substance abuse disorders are 
of particular concern within the justice system, as they are 
often exploited by gangs and organized criminal groups 
in the illicit drug market. In many countries, the majority 
of children who are in detention are either children 
affected by drug dependence or children who have com-
mitted drug-related offences. Overreliance on the depriva-
tion of children’s liberty and insufficient application of 
drug treatment programmes or other alternatives to deten-
tion are common challenges,188 despite international obli-
gations to use the deprivation of liberty as a measure of 
last resort.189
184 UNODC, “From coercion to cohesion: treating drug dependence 
through health care, not punishment”, discussion paper, 2010.
185 Ralf Jurgens and Glenn Betteridge, “Prisoners who inject drugs: 
public health and human rights imperatives”, Health and Human 
Rights, vol. 8, No. 2 (2005), pp. 46-74.
186 “From coercion to cohesion” (see footnote 184).
187 World Drug Report 2015, p. 6.
188 See the report of the independent expert for the United Nations 
study on violence against children (A/61/299, para. 61); see also the 
thematic report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral on Violence against Children (Promoting Restorative Justice for 
Children (New York, 2013), pp. 7 and 29).
189 Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 37; see also rules 1 
and 2 of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty (General Assembly resolution 45/113, 
annex).
The impact of drugs on the  
criminal justice system
As with any law carrying the potential of criminal punish-
ment, the enforcement of drug-related laws may result in 
a corresponding burden on the criminal justice system and 
require resources dedicated to investigation, prosecution, 
adjudication and incarceration in connection with drug-
related offences. At the global level, drug-related offences 
recorded by the police, and offences related to personal 
consumption in particular, have increased moderately over 
the past decade, whereas other kinds of crime, such as rob-
bery, motor vehicle theft, burglary and homicide, have 
decreased substantially (see figure 22). UNODC estimates 
that just under a third of the global prison population (30 
per cent over the period 2012-2014, compared with 32 
per cent over the period 2003-2005) continues to be made 
up of unsentenced or pretrial prisoners.190 Among con-
victed prisoners, drug-related offences account for an esti-
mated 18 per cent of the global prison population, 
representing a rate of 28 per 100,000 population191 (see 
figure 23).
190 Based on data for 145 countries.
191 Based on data from 74 countries, classifying convictions with multi-
ple offences according to the most serious one.
FIG. 22 Trends in global crime rates, by type of 
crime, 2003-2013
Source: United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems (UNODC).
Notes: Trends are calculated as weighted crime rates per 100,000 popu-
lation relative to the base year 2003. To produce global estimates, the 
estimated crime rates for each region were weighted according to the 
share of the region’s population in the global population. Data on drug 
trafficking and drug-related personal consumption offences refer mostly 
to persons arrested or prosecuted for those types of crime.
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There is great variation in the criteria used by national 
laws to establish the “personal consumption” versus “traf-
ficking” character of a drug-related offence; they can 
include the drug type and amount, associated thresholds 
(or none at all), drug purity, position in a gang and whether 
the person in question uses drugs. This variation thus 
makes the comparison of data across countries challeng-
ing. Global aggregates show that the number of offences 
related to personal consumption exceeds the number of 
trafficking offences, reflecting the fact that the number of 
people who use drugs is much larger than the number of 
people in the drug supply chain. The limited data avail-
able also indicate that the conviction rate (the number of 
persons convicted as a proportion of the number of per-
sons suspected) for offences related to personal consump-
tion tends to be lower than the conviction rate for 
trafficking offences. Moreover, the stipulated periods of 
imprisonment tend to be longer for trafficking offences. 
All of those factors help determine the relative share of 
drug trafficking offences and offences related to personal 
consumption in the overall extent of incarceration attrib-
utable to drug-related offences. More than three quarters 
of all persons held in prison for drug-related offences in 
2014 had been convicted of drug trafficking offences and 
less than a quarter had been convicted of offences related 
to personal consumption (based on data from 29 
countries).192, 193
One study estimated that 235,000 people were detained 
without their consent in 1,000 drug detention centres in 
East and South-East Asia, where they may be subject to a 
range of human rights violations, such as forced labour, 
physical punishment and sexual violence.194 
Alternatives to imprisonment for personal 
consumption offences can have a positive 
impact on access to justice
The international drug control conventions have given 
the flexibility to provide people who possess, purchase or 
cultivate drugs for personal consumption, or in other situ-
ations considered minor in nature, measures of treatment, 
education, aftercare, rehabilitation and social reintegra-
tion, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment 
or in addition to conviction or punishment, taking into 
account the gravity of the offence.195 Examples of this 
approach are the diversion of minor cases from the crimi-
nal justice system through the exercise of police or prosecu-
torial discretion and the imposition of non-custodial 
measures as an alternative to imprisonment. This is in line 
with the international drug control conventions196 and 
with the requirements of an effective penal policy that is 
in compliance with human rights standards. In addition, 
States parties to international drug control conventions 
are required to take measures to prevent drug abuse and 
to provide for early identification, treatment, education, 
aftercare, rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons 
who abuse drugs.197
Alternatives to imprisonment can clearly have a positive 
impact on people who use drugs. The provision of evi-
dence-based treatment and care services to drug-using 
offenders, as an alternative to incarceration, has been 
shown to substantially increase recovery and reduce recidi-
192 Each of the above-mentioned estimates has been calculated on the 
basis of the corresponding available data set and presented on the 
assumption that the data set is representative of the global popu-
lation. However, the exact coverage, and hence the level of uncer-
tainty, differs according to the specific indicator.
193 Note by the Secretariat on world crime trends and emerging issues 
and responses in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice 
(E/CN.15/2016/10).
194 Joseph J. Amon and others, “Compulsory drug detention in 
East and Southeast Asia: evolving government, UN and donor 
responses”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 25, No. 1 
(2014), pp. 13-20. 
195 See article 3, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
of 1988, article 36, paragraph 1(b), of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol and 
article 22, paragraph 1(b), of the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1971.
196 See article 36, paragraph 1 (a), of the 1961 Convention as amended 
by the 1972 Protocol, article 22, paragraph 1 (a), of the 1971 Con-
vention and article 4 (a) of the 1988 Convention.
197 See article 38 of the 1961 Convention as amended by the 1972 
Protocol and article 20 of the 1971 Convention.
FIG. 23 Sentenced prisoners by principal offence 
of final sentence, 2012
Source: Note by the Secretariat on world crime trends and emerg-
ing issues and responses in the field of crime prevention and crim-
inal justice (E/CN.15/2016/10).
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vism.198 There is considerable evidence that effective treat-
ment of drug dependence offering clinical interventions 
(inpatient or outpatient) as an alternative to criminal jus-
tice sanctions substantially increases recovery. This 
improves outcomes both for the person with the drug use 
disorder and the community when compared with the 
effects of criminal justice sanctions alone.199 
Alternatives to imprisonment have sometimes been put in 
place as a response to developments in drug use. For exam-
ple, the spread of the use of “crack” in the United States 
in the 1980s was a major factor in prompting the intro-
duction of “drug courts”. Similarly, the challenging nature 
of the drug problem in Portugal in the 1990s set the scene 
for a turning point in Portuguese drug control policy, as 
well as the institutional setup for its implementation.200 
Corruption, organized crime and illicit 
financial flows
Corruption
Target 16.5 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all 
their forms
Corruption and related forms of crime such as extortion 
engender costs in terms of discouragement or impediment 
to investment, entrepreneurship and business formation 
(which have prerequisites such as the rule of law and pro-
cedural transparency) and ultimately the hindrance of 
prosperity and economic development.
There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the 
drug problem and corruption. The illicit drug trade often 
flourishes where state presence and the rule of law are weak 
and, thus, where opportunities for corruption exist. At the 
same time, the profits and power of drug trafficking organ-
izations provide them with resources to reinforce corrup-
tion by buying protection from law enforcement agents 
— particularly when the agents’ levels of remuneration 
are low — and from politicians and the business sector; 
this means that corruption can be the Achilles heel in the 
response to drug trafficking. 
Types of corruption
Corruption can be at a high or low level. Low-level or 
“petty” corruption often starts with street police or local 
politicians, who may be vulnerable to crime because of a 
lack of social legitimacy or because they come from the 
very same communities as members of criminal groups.201 
198 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 55/12; see also 
UNODC, Introductory Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism 
and the Social Reintegration of Offenders, Criminal Justice Handbook 
Series (Vienna, 2012), p. 43.
199 “From coercion to cohesion” (see footnote 184).
200 EMCDDA, Drug Policy Profiles: Portugal (Luxembourg, Publica-
tions Office of the European Union, 2011).
201 Graham D. Willis, “Antagonistic authorities and the civil police in 
As drug traffickers grow in power, they may also infiltrate 
police institutions to ensure the acquiescence of officials. 
High-level or “grand” corruption, for its part, affects the 
highest ranks of power, such as police chiefs, national poli-
ticians and high-level law enforcement officials. The prac-
tice of corrupting officials to facilitate drug trafficking has 
been documented in all parts of the world. 
Corruption can also vary depending on the strength of 
the rule of law and the effectiveness of state institutions; 
characteristics of the political systems such as the strength 
of political parties, the efficacy of the criminal justice 
system, including its investigative and prosecutorial func-
tions, the existence of functioning oversight mechanisms 
and sanctions for corruption can reduce the extent of drug-
related corruption. The organization of criminal groups 
can also affect the specific interaction between state offi-
cials and criminal groups. In Italy, for example, studies 
have found that organized criminal groups with complex 
internal structures, such as Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta, 
whose activities include, but are not limited to, the illicit 
drug trade, have benefited from high-level political con-
nections and even enjoyed official state sanctioning in 
parts of Sicily and Calabria. In other parts of the country, 
organized criminal groups such as the Camorra and the 
Apulian groups, which are less hierarchical and strict in 
their recruitment practices, have more diffuse, though still 
strong, political connections.202 
When institutions are strong, corruption can also exist, 
although more sporadically and manifested in more indi-
vidualized links. For example, according to a report by the 
General Accounting Office in the United States, less than 
1 per cent of employees of the Custom and Border Patrol 
were arrested on charges of corruption between 2005 and 
2012; among the 144 employees arrested or indicted for 
corruption, pressure from drug trafficking and other trans-
national criminal groups was found to be a key factor. Of 
the 144 cases, 103 were found to be “mission-compromis-
ing”, including instances involving drug trafficking or the 
smuggling of migrants. There were 32,290 allegations of 
corruption or misconduct during the same period,203 
which shows that even though corruption may not 
threaten the integrity of an institution as a whole, it does 
affect its performance and plays a very important role in 
illegal networks.
Drug trafficking organizations conduct their business 
using both corruption and violence. Criminals and drug 
traffickers use those two strategies simultaneously, and 
even as complements, because the threat of violence or the 
Sao Paulo, Brazil”, Latin American Research Review, vol. 49, No. 1 
(2014), pp. 3-22.
202 Letizia Paoli, “Italian organised crime: Mafia associations and crimi-
nal enterprises”, Global Crime, vol. 6, No. 1 (2004), pp. 19-31.
203 United States of America, Government Accountability Office, 
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts 
to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct, GAO-13-
59 (Washington, D.C., 2012).
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direct use of violence can be used to make corruption 
cheaper.204 However, the type of corrupt network can also 
determine whether violence becomes more or less perva-
sive. Corrupt networks that are predictable and stable offer 
protection that criminals might be unwilling to destabilize 
through violence.205 Some analysts argue that the charac-
teristics of political systems and the relations between dif-
ferent law enforcement agencies may shape the organization 
and predictability of corruption networks. Predictable cor-
rupt networks — those that guarantee protection from 
law enforcement — can deter criminals from deploying 
large-scale violence. Such networks may be more likely to 
emerge where government power is centralized and the 
rule of law is weak because those environments facilitate 
the creation of corruption channels at the highest echelons 
of power. This, in turn, may deter the use of violence 
because criminals may prefer to avoid violence, as that 
could force the government authorities to target them 
more strongly.206 By the same token, institutional changes 
that decentralize power and create political competition 
may fragment corruption channels and compel criminals 
to use violence to pressure the authorities.207 
Drugs and illicit financial flows
Target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and 
arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of 
stolen assets and combat all forms of organized 
crime
Profits from the illicit drug trade can constitute consider-
able financial incentives for organized criminal groups. 
For example, a recent UNODC study208 showed that the 
illicit proceeds of opiates smuggled along the Balkan route 
through Europe amounted to, on average, $28 billion per 
year. Almost half of those profits were generated in the 
four European countries with the largest illicit markets for 
opiates: France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom. 
However, profits from the illicit opiate trade in those coun-
tries accounted for a significantly smaller proportion of 
GDP (0.07-0.19 per cent) than in countries with a rela-
tively small GDP, such as Albania (2.60 per cent of GDP), 
Iran (Islamic Republic of ) (1.66 per cent) and Bulgaria 
(1.22 per cent). 
Money-laundering occurs by many different means, 
ranging from the use of small, decentralized techniques, 
204 Benjamin Lessing, “Logics of violence in criminal war”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, No. 8 (2015), pp.1486-1516.
205 R. Snyder and A. Durán-Martínez, “Drugs, Violence, and 
State-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico and Colombia”, 
Colombia Internacional, No. 70 (July/December 2009), pp. 61-91.
206 Durán-Martínez, “To kill and tell?” (see footnote 150).
207 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat 
Assessment (Vienna, 2013).
208 UNODC, Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the 
Balkan route (Vienna, 2015).
involving money orders or remittances, to sophisticated 
uses of front businesses; in all cases, however, the often 
substantial proceeds of the illicit drug trade are recirculated 
via legitimate means. In many cases, such illicit proceeds 
can inject large cash inflows into a country’s economy and 
can have important macroeconomic effects, such as 
changes in currency values and increases in budgets and 
foreign exchange reserves, as in a number of West African 
countries, some of which have been significantly affected 
by cocaine trafficking. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, 
foreign exchange reserves rose from $33 million in 2003 
to $174 million in 2008; and in the Gambia, the value of 
the dalasi increased very rapidly with no clear change in 
capital inflows.209
One of the consequences of illicit financial flows is that 
they may undermine the integrity of a country’s financial 
system, including its international financial sectors. In the 
case of opiates originating in Afghanistan, for example, a 
report by the Financial Action Task Force210 found that 
money does not generally flow from the major consumer 
markets to Afghanistan directly; rather, intermediate coun-
tries act as gateways to move money to or from Afghani-
stan. The transfer of funds between consumer markets and 
intermediate countries varies significantly, with drug traf-
fickers using the full range of money transfer techniques, 
such as the banking system, money or value transfer ser-
vices, and high-value commodity and cash couriers. How-
ever, funds moving between intermediate countries and 
Afghanistan seem to make particular use of cash couriers 
and money or value transfer services.
Part of the proceeds from the illicit drug trade generated 
in the country of consumption are transferred to financial 
centres, where the accounts of companies, financial insti-
tutions, resident individuals and financial service profes-
sionals are used to accumulate and redistribute the 
financial flows. 
Recent examples of money-laundering illustrate how illicit 
proceeds are recirculated through major financial institu-
tions in developed countries. In 2012, the United States 
Department of Justice fined a bank based in the United 
Kingdom $1.9 billion for “failures of oversight” that 
allowed the laundering of at least $881 million in proceeds 
from drug trafficking.211 Such failures included failure to 
monitor at least $670 billion in wire transfers from the 
bank’s unit in Mexico. The money originated from the 
Sinaloa cartel in Mexico, the Norte del Valle cartel in 
Colombia and other smaller drug trafficking organiza-
tions.212 These forms of illicit financial flows are essential 
209 West Africa Commission on Drugs, Not Just in Transit: Drugs, the 
State and Society in West Africa (2014).
210 Financial Action Task Force, Financial Flows Linked to the Produc-
tion and Trafficking of Afghan Opiates (Paris, 2014).
211 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 
WL 3306161, at 13-14 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
212 Press Release, Department of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and 
HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and 
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for criminal groups to survive and constitute an enormous 
threat to sustainable development.
E. PARTNERSHIP
 Sustainable Development Goal 17. 
Strengthen the means of 
implementation and revitalize the 
Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development
The provision of assistance geared towards global sustain-
able development, including development assistance to be 
provided by developed countries to developing countries, 
is another key element addressed in the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals. Developed countries are to provide 0.7 of 
gross national income in official development assistance 
to developing countries. Moreover, target 17.9 of the Sus-
tainable Development Goals is to enhance international 
support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-
building in developing countries to support national plans 
to implement all the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Given the extensive interplay that exists between sustain-
able development and drug control, development assis-
tance and capacity-building must also be channelled into 
measures to counter the world drug problem.
The efforts of the international community in countering 
the world drug problem have long recognized the impor-
tance of partnership as embodied in the concept of 
common and shared responsibility that requires effective 
and increased international cooperation. At a special ses-
sion of the General Assembly, held in April 2016, Member 
States recognized that the world drug problem remains a 
common and shared responsibility that should be 
addressed in a multilateral setting through effective and 
increased international cooperation and demands an inte-
grated, multidisciplinary, mutually reinforcing, balanced, 
scientific evidence-based and comprehensive approach. 
The special session was an important milestone after the 
policy document of 2009 “Political Declaration and Plan 
of Action on International Cooperation towards an Inte-
grated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug 
Problem”, which defined action to be taken by Member 
States as well as goals to be achieved by 2019. At the 2016 
session, Member States adopted the outcome document 
entitled “Our joint commitment to effectively addressing 
and countering the world drug problem”.213 
Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $ 1.256 Billion in Deferred Prose-
cution Agreement, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-
laundering-and-sanctions-violations, archived at http://perma.cc/
NNX2-PCLJ. Statement by Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney 
General, to the HSBC Press Conference, New York, 11 December 
2012. Available at www.justice.gov/.
213 General Assembly resolution S-30/1, annex.
This document welcomes the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development, and notes that efforts to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals and to effectively address 
the world drug problem are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. Moreover, in the document Member States 
reaffirmed the need to mobilize adequate resources to 
address and counter the world drug problem and called 
for enhancing assistance to developing countries, upon 
request, in effectively implementing the Political Declara-
tion and Plan of Action and the operational recommenda-
tions of the outcome document.
Resource allocation for international  
development assistance 
Data on the provision of official development assistance 
are made available by OECD, covering assistance com-
mitted and disbursed by members of the OECD Devel-
opment Assistance Committee as well as by other donors. 
According to OECD international aid statistics (Creditor 
Reporting System), over the period 1995-2014, interna-
tional assistance by those donors followed a broadly 
increasing trend, even when adjusted for inflation 
(expressed in 2013 dollars). However, over the same 
period, the magnitude of commitments towards the sectors 
specific to drug-related matters, namely “alternative devel-
opment” (agricultural and non-agricultural)214 and “nar-
cotics control”,215 followed a different trend. Assistance 
in these sectors, particularly in the “narcotics control” 
sector, increased substantially after 1998, when the twen-
tieth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to 
countering the world drug problem together, was held. 
Over the period 1999-2008, “narcotics control” assistance 
averaged $1.44 billion (in constant 2013 dollars) and 
“alternative development” assistance averaged $219 mil-
lion (in constant 2013 dollars) — approximately 80 times 
and 5 times the annual average over the period 1995-1998, 
respectively. 
Despite the adoption in 2009 of the Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards 
an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World 
Drug Problem,216 assistance in both sectors, particularly 
in the “narcotics control” sector, has declined significantly 
since 2008. Moreover, while the “narcotics control” sector 
dominated the drug-related total over the period 1999-
2008, the decline in that sector was so steep that assistance 
in the “alternative development” sectors, even though sig-
nificantly lower than in the peak years of 2007 and 2008, 
exceeded assistance in the “narcotics control” sector every 
year from 2010 onwards. Expressed as a percentage of total 
development assistance, total assistance to the above-men-
tioned drug-related sectors reached its highest level (2.6 
per cent) in 2000 and stood at 0.14 per cent in 2014. 
214 See the online methodology section of the present report.
215 See previous footnote.
216 See previous footnote.
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The major beneficiaries of assistance in drug-related sec-
tors reflect the location of drug crop cultivation. Over the 
period 2009-2014, South America accounted for more 
than half of the assistance committed to the “narcotics 
control” sector, as well as to “alternative development”, 
while the region of South and Central Asia (OECD des-
ignation) accounted for more than a fifth of the “narcotics 
control” commitments and more than a third of “alterna-
tive development” commitments.217
There may be important contributions towards develop-
ment assistance in drug-related areas by countries that are 
not covered by the Creditor Reporting System of OECD. 
Some development assistance, which in the OECD Credi-
tor Reporting System is not categorized under the sectors 
discussed above, may also contribute, directly or indirectly, 
to countering the world drug problem. For example, the 
sector “medical services” covers, among other areas, “drug 
and substance abuse control”,218 while assistance to the 
“STD control including HIV/AIDS” sector may also indi-
rectly contribute to the mitigation of drug use disorders.
Technical assistance and international 
cooperation
In the 2009 Plan of Action on International Cooperation 
towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter 
the World Drug Problem, several courses of action in the 
area of international cooperation were agreed. In particu-
lar, it was agreed that Member States should scale up inter-
national assistance in addressing drug demand reduction 
in order to achieve a significant impact. With respect to 
drug supply reduction, in the Plan of Action, Member 
States committed themselves to providing further encour-
agement and assistance for: the sharing of information 
through official channels in a timely manner; the imple-
mentation of border control measures; the provision of 
equipment; the exchange of law enforcement officers; col-
laboration between the private and public sectors; and the 
development of practical new methods for effectively mon-
itoring drug trafficking activities.
At the special session of the General Assembly, Member 
States reaffirmed their commitment to implementing 
effectively the provisions set out in the Political Declara-
tion and Plan of Action, and recommended, inter alia, the 
following measures: strengthening specialized, targeted, 
effective and sustainable technical assistance (including, 
where appropriate, adequate financial assistance), training, 
capacity-building, equipment and technological know-
how, to requesting countries, in order to assist Member 
States to effectively address the health, socioeconomic, 
human rights, justice and law enforcement aspects of the 
world drug problem; enhancing North-South, South-
217 See previous footnote.
218 See the purpose codes of the OECD Creditor Reporting System 
Aid Activities database (valid for reporting up to and including 
2014 flows), available at www.oecd.org.
South and triangular cooperation among Member States, 
in cooperation with the international development com-
munity and other key stakeholders; and strengthening the 
regular exchange of information, good practices and les-
sons learned among national practitioners from different 
fields and at all levels.
Responses from Member States to the UNODC annual 
report questionnaire from 2010 onwards indicate that 
Member States continued to engage in a wide range of 
cross-border activities and international cooperation to 
reduce the illicit supply of drugs, including the exchange 
of information, joint operations with other countries and 
the exchange of liaison officers. A range of communica-
tion platforms continue to be used extensively to exchange 
information between law enforcement agencies. The 
majority of responding Member States use multiple com-
munication platforms, including both formal and informal 
channels; the most common include regional and inter-
national meetings, direct communication between law 
enforcement agencies, the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), liaison officers, regional 
organizations, the World Customs Organization and dip-
lomatic channels.219 
The Plan of Action also recognizes that several developing 
countries, especially those on major drug trafficking 
routes, require technical assistance to further strengthen 
their law enforcement agencies. In line with this, nearly 
three quarters of responding Member States reported 
219 Report of the Executive Director of UNODC on action taken by 
Member States to implement the Political Declaration and Plan 
of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated 
and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem (E/
CN.7/2016/6).
FIG. 24 Number of countries reporting the  
receipt of specific types of technical  
assistance, 2010-2014
Source: Responses to the annual report questionnaire.
a Data for 2014 reflect the responses received as of November 2015.
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receiving technical assistance in the area of drug supply 
reduction from another country or from an international 
organization in 2014. The data indicate a stable trend in 
the provision of most forms of assistance and suggest that 
those forms of assistance that come with fewer financial 
implications are the most frequently adopted. Specifically, 
the most common forms of assistance were training and 
data-sharing, followed by the provision of equipment. Less 
common forms of assistance included the provision of 
software and financial aid.
The outcome document of the special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly also calls for Member States to consider 
strengthening a development perspective as part of com-
prehensive, integrated and balanced national drug policies 
and programmes so as to tackle the related causes and 
consequences of illicit supply chain of drugs by, inter alia, 
addressing risk factors affecting individuals, communities 
and society, which may include a lack of services, infra-
structure needs, drug-related violence, exclusion, margin-
alization and social disintegration, in order to contribute 
to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies. The 
document also recommends that Member States promote 
partnerships and innovative cooperation initiatives with 
the private sector, civil society and international financial 
institutions to create conditions more conducive to pro-
ductive investments targeted at job creation in areas and 
among communities affected by or at risk of illicit drug 
cultivation, production, manufacturing, trafficking and 
other illicit drug-related activities in order to prevent, 
reduce or eliminate them, and to share best practices, les-
sons learned, expertise and skills in this regard.
Given the fact that the drug problem is intertwined with 
a vast array of development issues, it is fair to say that sus-
tainable development can only truly occur if the world 
drug problem is addressed. As this chapter shows, although 
official development assistance has increased overall, assis-
tance to drug-related sectors has actually decreased. The 
momentum already generated towards the achievement 
of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda could pro-
vide an ideal opportunity to redress this imbalance.
FIG. 25 Trends in global commitments to providing official development assistance: assistance in all  
sectors and in the sectors “narcotics control” and “alternative development”,a 1995-2014
Source: OECD, International Development Statistics online database (Creditor Reporting System). Data extracted March 2016.
a The sum of agricultural alternative development and non-agricultural alternative development.
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ANNEX 
Cocaine
Cocaine
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bolivia  
(Plurinational 
State of)
23,600 27,700 25,400 27,500 28,900 30,500 30,900 31,000 27,200 25,300 23,000  20,400 
Colombia a 86,000 80,000 86,000 78,000 99,000 81,000 73,000 62,000 64,000 48,000 48,000  69,000 
Peru b 44,200 50,300 48,200 51,400 53,700 56,100 59,900 61,200 64,400
Peru c 62,500 60,400 49,800  42,900 
Total 153,800 158,000 159,600 156,900 181,600 167,600 163,800 154,200 155,600d 133,700 120,800 132,300 
Global illicit cultivation of coca bush, 2003-2014 (hectares)
Sources: Plurinational State of Bolivia: 2002: CICAD and United States Department of State, INCSR. Since 2003: national illicit crop moni-
toring system supported by UNODC. Colombia: national illicit crop monitoring system supported by UNODC. Peru: national illicit crop 
monitoring system supported by UNODC.
Note: Different area concepts and their effect on comparability were presented in the World Drug Report 2012 (p. 41-42). Efforts to improve the 
comparability of estimates between countries continue; since 2011 the net area under coca bush cultivation on the reference date of 31 December 
was estimated for Peru, in addition to Colombia. The estimate presented for the Plurinational State of Bolivia represents the area under coca cultiva-
tion as seen on satellite imagery. 
a Net area on 31 December. Estimates from 2009 onwards were adjusted for small fields, while estimates for previous years did not require that 
adjustment.           
b Area as interpreted from satellite imagery.           
c Net area on 31 December, deducting fields erradicated after satellite imagery was taken.      
d The global coca cultivation figure was calculated with the "area as interpreted on satellite imagery" for Peru.
Unit 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bolivia  
(Plurinational 
State of)
manual hectare  5,070  6,269  5,484  6,341  8,200  10,460  11,044  11,407  11,144 
Colombia manual hectare  41,346  66,392  96,003  60,565  43,804  35,201  30,487  22,127  12,496 
spraying hectare  172,026  153,134  133,496  104,771  101,939  103,302  100,549  47,053  55,554 
Peru manual hectare  9,153  10,188  11,102  10,091  12,239  10,290  14,235  23,947  31,200 
Ecuador manual hectare  9  12 12  6  3  14 
Ecuador plants  64,000  130,000 152000  57,765  3,870  55,030  122,656  41,996  15,874 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of)
manual hectare 0 0 0 0 .. .. .. ..
Reported cumulative eradication of coca bush, 2006-2014
Source: UNODC annual report questionnaire and government reports. 
Note: The totals for Bolivia (Plurinational State of) since 2006 include voluntary and forced eradication. The totals for Peru include voluntary and forced 
eradication. Cumulative eradication refers to the sum of all eradication in a year, including repeated eradication of the same fields. Two dots indicate that 
data are not available.   
vi
Potential manufacture of 100 per cent pure cocaine, 2006-2014 (tons)
Sources: Plurinational State of Bolivia: Own calculations based on UNODC (Yungas of La Paz) and DEA scientific studies (Chapare) coca 
leaf yield surveys. Colombia: National illicit crop monitoring system supported by UNODC and DEA scientific studies. Because of the 
introduction of an adjustment factor for small fields, estimates since 2010 are not directly comparable with previous years.Because of the 
introduction of an adjustment factor for small fields, estimates since 2010 are not directly comparable with previous years.Taking into 
account the incorporation (in 2013) of two adjustments to the methodological processes used to calculate coca production in Colombia 
with a view to improving accuracy (the permanence factor, which improves estimates of production area, and the differentiated cocaine 
base conversion factor, which takes account of emerging trends in the alkaloid extraction process), the continuity of the historical data is 
affected. Data from 2009 onwards have been adjusted. Peru: Own calculations based on coca leaf to cocaine conversion ratio from DEA 
scientific studies. Detailed information on the ongoing revision of conversion ratios and cocaine laboratory efficiency is available in the 
World Drug Report 2010 (p. 249).          
Note: *Conversion of hectares under coca cultivation into coca leaf and then into cocaine HCl, taking yields, amounts of coca leaf used for licit pur-
poses and cocaine laboratory efficiency into account. Because of the ongoing review of conversion factors in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Peru, 
no final estimates of the level of cocaine production can be provided. Figures in italics are being reviewed. Two dots indicate that data are not available. 
Information on estimation methodologies and definitions can be found in the online methodology section of the present report.  
Global cocaine interception rates,* 2014
Source: Coca cultivation surveys in Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2014 and UNODC, annual report questionnaire 
data. 
Note: Calculation of interception rate = b/a (for example 507/943 = 54 per cent). *Seizures adjusted for wholesale purity divided by cocaine 
production estimates. ** Calculation based on wholesale purity information from 63 countries or latest year available over the 2005-2014 period 
(information from 23 countries reporting in 2014,  23 over the 2010-13 period and 17 over the 2005-2009 period).          
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bolivia 
(Plurinational state of)
94 104 113 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Colombia a 660 630 450 488 424 384 333 290 442
Range 240-377 249-331 345-540
Peru 280 290 302 ... .. .. .. .. ..
Total based 
on "old"conversion 
ratios*
 1,034  1,024  865  842  788  776  714  662  746 
Total based on  
"new" conversion 
ratios*
 1,232  1,234  1,122  1,111  1,060  1,051  973  902  943 
Global cocaine  
production estimates 
(tons), based on: 
Global cocaine seizures (tons)
Global  
interception 
rate*  
(percentage)
“old”  
conversion 
ratios
 “new”  
conversion 
ratios
As 
reported  
(at “street 
purity”)  
(Wholesale-) purity adjusted seizures 
(100% pure substance), based on: 
“unweighted” 
average of 
reported purities 
(62%)**
average of purities 
‘weighted’ by seizures 
(69% for cocaine 
HCL/ 73% for all 
cocaine) 
Production of 
cocaine (100% 
pure), in tons
746 943
Seizures of cocaine 
HCl, in tons 
566 351 390
Interception rate
  - Best estimate a b 43
  - Minimum a b 37
  - Maximum a b 55
Seizures of cocaine 
HCl, cocaine 
paste, cocaine 
base and crack-
cocaine, in tons
655 406 507
Interception rate
  - Best estimate a b 54
  - Minimum a b 43
  - Maximum a b 68
vii
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ANNEX
Opium/Heroin
Potential manufacture of heroin (of unknown purity) out of global (illicit) opium production, 
2004-2015 (tons)
Notes: The calculation shows  the potential amount of heroin that could have been manufactured out of the opium produced in a given year; it does 
not take into account changes in opium inventories, which may be also used for the manufacture of heroin and which may be important. Only in the 
case of Afghanistan is the proportion of potential opium production not converted into heroin within the country estimated. For all other countries, 
for the purpose of this table, it is assumed that all opium  produced is converted into heroin. If all of the opium produced in Afghanistan in 2015 had 
been converted into heroin, the total potential heroin manfuacture would have risen to 300 tons in Afghanistan or 447 tons at the global level (the 
estimates for 2006 to 2009 were revised owing to the revision of opium production figures for Afghanistan). 
The amount of heroin produced in Afghanistan is calculated using two parameters that may change: (a) the distribution between opium that is not 
processed and opium processed into heroin; and (b) the conversion ratio. The first parameter is indirectly estimated, based on seizures of opium 
versus seizures of heroin and morphine reported by neighbouring countries. From 2004 to 2013 a conversion ratio of opium to morphine/heroin of 
7:1 was used, based on interviews conducted with  Afghan morphine/heroin “cooks”;  based on an actual heroin production exercise conducted by 
two (illiterate) Afghan heroin “cooks”, documented by the German Bundeskriminalamt in Afghanistan in 2003 (published in Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. 
LVII, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 11-31, 2005); and UNODC studies on the morphine content of Afghan opium (12.3 per cent over the 2010-2012 period, 
down from 15 per cent over the 2000-2003 period). The ratio was modified to 18:5 kg of opium for 1 kilogram of 100 per cent pure white heroin 
hydrochloride, equivalent to a ratio of 9.6:1 for heroin at an estimated 52 per cent export quality (see Afghan Opium Survey 2014); based on an esti-
mated export quality of 59 per cent in 2015, the ratio was adjusted to 11:1 for 2015 (range: 10:4:1 to 11.6:1; see Afghan Opium Survey 2015). The 
estimates of the export quality of Afghan heroin are based on the average heroin wholesale purities reported by Turkey. For countries other than 
Afghanistan, a “traditional” conversion ratio of opium to heroin of 10:1 is used. The ratios will be adjusted when improved information becomes 
available. Figures in italics are preliminary and may be revised when updated information becomes available.  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total potential  
opium production 
 4,620  5,810  8,091  6,841  4,953  4,730  6,983  4,831  6,810  7,723  4,770 
Potential opium not  
processed into heroin
 1,169  1,786  3,078  2,360  1,680  1,728  3,400  1,850  2,600  2,450  1,360 
Potential opium  
processed into heroin
 3,451  4,024  5,012  4,481  3,273  3,002  3,583  2,981  4,210  5,273  3,410 
Total potential  
heroin manufacture
 472  553  686  600  427  383  467  377  555  542  327 
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REGIONAL GROUPINGS  
This report uses a number of regional and subregional 
designations. These are not official designations, and are 
defined as follows:
East Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethio-
pia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania 
North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South 
Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia
Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe
West and Central Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equa-
torial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo 
Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bermuda, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Gre-
nada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and 
Tobago
Central America: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama
North America: Canada, Mexico and United States of 
America 
South America: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of ), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of )
Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan
East and South-East Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Indonesia, 
Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mon-
golia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singa-
pore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam 
South-West Asia: Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of ) 
and Pakistan 
Near and Middle East: Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of 
Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates 
and Yemen
South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal 
and Sri Lanka 
Eastern Europe: Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian 
Federation and Ukraine
South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey
Western and Central Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San 
Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland
Oceania: Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micro-
nesia (Federated States of ), Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and small island territories
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GLOSSARY  
amphetamine-type stimulants — a group of substances com-
posed of synthetic stimulants that were placed under inter-
national control in the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971 and are from the group of substances 
called amphetamines, which includes amphetamine, meth-
amphetamine, methcathinone and the “ecstasy”-group 
substances (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine 
(MDMA) and its analogues)
amphetamines — a group of amphetamine-type stimulants 
that includes amphetamine and methamphetamine
annual prevalence — the total number of people of a given 
age range who have used a given drug at least once in the 
past year, divided by the number of people of the given 
age range, and expressed as a percentage
coca paste (or coca base) — an extract of the leaves of the 
coca bush. Purification of coca paste yields cocaine (base 
and hydrochloride)
“crack” cocaine — cocaine base obtained from cocaine 
hydrochloride through conversion processes to make it 
suitable for smoking
cocaine salt — cocaine hydrochloride
new psychoactive substances — substances of abuse, either 
in a pure form or a preparation, that are not controlled 
under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 
or the 1971 Convention, but that may pose a public health 
threat. In this context, the term “new” does not necessar-
ily refer to new inventions but to substances that have 
recently become available
opiates — a subset of opioids comprising the various prod-
ucts derived from the opium poppy plant, including 
opium, morphine and heroin
opioids — a generic term applied to alkaloids from opium 
poppy (opiates), their synthetic analogues (mainly pre-
scription or pharmaceutical opioids) and compounds syn-
thesized in the body
poppy straw — all parts (except the seeds) of the opium 
poppy, after mowing
problem drug users — people who engage in the high-risk 
consumption of drugs, for example people who inject 
drugs, people who use drugs on a daily basis and/or people 
diagnosed with drug use disorders (harmful use or drug 
dependence), based on clinical criteria as contained in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(fifth edition) of the American Psychiatric Association, or 
the International Classification of Diseases (tenth revision) 
of the World Health Organization 
people who suffer from drug use disorders/people with drug 
use disorders — a subset of people who use drugs. People 
with drug use disorders need treatment, health and social 
care and rehabilitation. Dependence is a drug use 
disorder 
prevention of drug use and treatment of drug use disorders 
— the aim of “prevention of drug use” is to prevent or 
delay the initiation of drug use, as well as the transition 
to drug use disorders. Once there is a drug use disorder, 
treatment, care and rehabilitation are needed

